Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him; and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philosopher Proclus and the great Syrianus, and Plotinuses and Iamblichuses, men beyond bodies and for this very reason naked intellects, and all the Platonists. And not less than these, if not even more, truth bears witness. With these things thus acknowledged beforehand by us, let us see if it is possible for the soul to grow, according to both Plato and Aristotle and according to the truth of things. For if that which grows moves, the soul will be moved; and if that which is moved is a body, the soul too will be a body; than which what could be more absurd? If, therefore, the soul is incorporeal, it will not be moved; and if this is so, it will not grow. Furthermore, Aristotle says in the first book of *On Generation and Corruption* thus verbatim: "growth is an increase of magnitude"; and reasonably so, for it is a certain change from the small to the great. If, therefore, the soul grows, it will surely somehow have magnitude or it will itself be magnitude. But this is absurd for other reasons as well, and this same man again powerfully refuted it in the first of his treatises *On the Soul*. If, then, the soul is without magnitude, it does not grow. But if it seems good, let us also examine the argument in another way. If the soul grows, and the body grows too, as sense-perception witnesses, it is necessary either for each of these to grow of itself and both through themselves (and by of itself and through itself I mean not needing the growth of the other, such that because the other grows it grows also, but being so constituted that it would grow alone while the other remained without growth); or for both to grow on account of the other, that is, on account of each other, the soul on account of the body, and the body on account of the soul; or both at once, both through itself and through the other; or one through itself, and the other through the other. But if both grow through themselves, they will in no way need each other's growth, nor will one be hindered in any way by the other. But if each grows on account of the other, the same things will be causes and effects, and they will be demonstrated circularly through each other, although they are not the same as each other nor are they convertible; but if the other does not grow, the one will grow, and this is for neither to grow along with the other; therefore, even if it grows of itself, the soul will not grow along with the body; but that it does not even grow of itself, has been shown before. And if they grow both through themselves and through each other, is it one and the same growth both 79 through themselves and through each other, or one kind of growth through themselves and another through each other? If it is one and the same, how can it be both of itself and through another? For the same thing in the same respect cannot admit of contrary relations; but if one kind and another, let those who support the doctrine tell us what is the difference between the growths, and what is the one of itself, and what kind is the one through the other; for I think it is not even possible to imagine it, but if some are able to say, I would gladly listen. And were Plato and Aristotle and the other natural philosophers so very dull, as it seems, and untalented, that when there was a twofold growth they perceived one, but did not recognize the other? And not only this, but also, of the two growths observed in each of our parts, body and soul, they perceived the one concerning the body, and not even this one completely, but were ignorant of the one concerning the soul, suffering the same as drunkards, but in another way: for the latter see the one thing as double, while the former saw the double thing as one. unless perhaps the effect of drunkenness is what those who now philosophize on these matters have suffered. But if one grows through itself, and the other through the other, shall we say that the soul grows on account of the body's growth, or the body on account of the soul's? For if the first, the inferior will be the cause of the superior, and the body of the incorporeal, and the divisible of the indivisible. But if the second, how do you say that the soul grows along with the body, when you ought to say the opposite, that the body grows along with the soul? Do you see how this argument, being struck from all sides, rings false and counterfeit? And indeed if that which is of itself
συγγνώσεται καὶ αὐτὸς τῷ αὐτοῦ φοιτητῇ τῆς δο78 κούσης πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ ἥξουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν μαρτυρήσοντες
ἄλλοι, ὁ φιλόσοφος Πρόκλος καὶ ὁ μέγας Συριανός, Πλωτῖνοί τε καὶ Ἰάμβλιχοι, ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ τὰ σώματα καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο νόες γυμνοί,
καὶ σύμπαντες οἱ Πλατωνικοί. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ ἀλήθεια μαρτυρεῖ. Τούτων οὕτω προωμολογημένων ἡμῖν ἴδωμεν
εἰ δυνατὸν αὐξάνειν ἐστὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατά τε Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην κατά τε τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθειαν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐξάνον κινεῖται,
κινηθήσεται ἡ ψυχή· εἰ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα, σῶμα ἔσται καὶ ψυχή· οὗ τί ἂν γένοιτο ἀτοπώτερον; εἰ τοίνυν ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχή,
οὐδὲ κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ αὐξηθήσεται. Ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς οὑτωσὶ κατὰ
ῥῆμα· «ἡ αὔξησις μεγέθους ἐπίδοσίς ἐστι»· καὶ εἰκότως, μεταβολὴ γάρ τίς ἐστιν εἰς τὸ μέγα ἐκ τοῦ μικροῦ. εἰ τοίνυν αὔξεται
ἡ ψυχή, πάντως που καὶ μέγεθος ἕξει ἢ αὐτὴ ἔσται μέγεθος. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἄλλως τε ἄτοπον καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν οὗτος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν
Περὶ ψυχῆς λόγων ἤλεγξε κραταιῶς. εἰ ἄρα ἀμεγέθης ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, οὐδὲ αὔξεται. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως τὸν λόγον περισκοπήσωμεν.
εἰ αὔξεται ἡ ψυχή, αὔξεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα δέ, ὡς ἡ αἴσθησις μαρτυρεῖ, ἀνάγκη ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ τούτων ἑκάτερον αὔξειν καὶ ἀμφότερα
δι' αὑτό (λέγω δὲ καθ' αὑτό τε καὶ δι' αὑτὸ τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι τῆς θατέρου αὐξήσεως, ὡς διὰ τὸ θάτερον αὔξειν αὔξεσθαι καὶ αὐτό,
ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς εἰ μόνον ηὔξανε τοῦτο τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀναυξοῦς μένοντος)· ἢ ἀμφότερα διὰ τὸ λοιπόν, τουτέστι δι' ἄλληλα, ψυχὴν
μὲν διὰ τὸ σῶμα, σῶμα δὲ διὰ τὴν ψυχήν· ἢ ὁμοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ δι' αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἕτερον· ἢ τὸ μὲν δι' αὑτό, τὸ δ' ἄλλο διὰ τὸ
ἕτερον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀμφότερα δι' αὑτά, οὐδὲν τῆς ἀλλήλων αὐξήσεως δεηθήσονται οὐδὲ ἐμποδισθήσονται πάντως ὑπὸ θατέρου θάτερον.
εἰ δ' ἑκάτερον διὰ θάτερον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἔσται αἴτια καὶ αἰτιατά, καὶ κύκλῳ δι' ἀλλήλων ἀποδειχθήσονται καίτοι μὴ ταὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις
ὄντα μηδ' ἀντιστρέφοντα, ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ τὸ λοιπὸν αὔξῃ, τὸ ἕτερον αὐξηθήσεται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδέτερόν ἐστιν οὐδετέρῳ συναύξεσθαι·
οὐκ ἄρα, κἂν εἰ καθ' αὑτὴν αὔξῃ, τῷ σώματι συναυξηθήσεται ἡ ψυχή· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ καθ' αὑτό, δέδεικται πρότερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ δι'
ἑαυτὰ καὶ δι' ἄλληλα, πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν αὔξησιν καὶ 79 δι' ἑαυτὰ καὶ δι' ἄλληλα, ἢ ἑτέραν δι' ἑαυτὰ καὶ ἑτέραν δι'
ἄλληλα; εἰ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν, πῶς καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ δι' ἕτερον; οὐ δύναται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἀναδέξασθαι
σχέσεις· εἰ δὲ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην, λεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν οἱ τῷ δόγματι συνιστάμενοι τίς ἡ τῆς αὐξήσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλας διαφορά, καὶ τίς
μὲν ἡ καθ' αὑτό, ποία δὲ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἕτερον· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ πλάσαι δυνατὸν οἶμαι, εἰ δέ τινες ἔχοιεν λέγειν, ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι.
ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ φυσικοὶ οὕτω πάνυ παχεῖς ὡς ἔοικεν ἦσαν καὶ ἀφυεῖς, ὡς διττῆς αὐξήσεως οὔσης
μίαν μὲν συνεωρακέναι, μίαν δὲ οὐ συνεγνωκέναι; καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δυεῖν τουτωνὶ περὶ ἑκάτερον θεωρουμένων τῶν
ἡμετέρων μερῶν, σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς, τὴν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτην ὁλόκληρον συνιδεῖν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγνοῆσαι,
ἕτερον τρόπον πεπονθότες ταὐτὰ τοῖς μεθύουσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς διπλοῦν ὁρῶσι τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὸ διπλοῦν κατεῖδον ὡς ἕν. εἰ μὴ τὸ
τῆς μέθης ἴσως οἱ ταῦτα νῦν φυσιολογοῦντες πεπόνθασιν. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν δι' αὑτό, τὸ δ' ἄλλο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον, πότερον τὴν ψυχὴν
ἐροῦμεν αὔξειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αὔξησιν ἢ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ χεῖρον ἔσται τοῦ κρείττονος
αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοῦ ἀμερίστου τὸ μεριστόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, πῶς τὴν ψυχὴν συναύξεσθαι λέγεις τῷ σώματι,
δέον ἔμπαλιν λέγειν τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ συναυξάνεσθαι; ὁρᾷς ὅπως πάντοθεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος πληττόμενος κίβδηλόν τι καὶ ἀδόκιμον ὑπηχεῖ;
καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ
