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Thomas Aquinas, On the Virtues (In General)
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(62) An entire question is also dedicated to the mean of virtue, I-II, q. 64, in which there are four articles: (1) Whether moral virtue is in the mean; (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is of things or of reason; (3) Whether the intellectual virtues are in the mean; (4) Whether the theological virtues are in the mean. Aristotle considered the mean in virtue so important that he included it in one of his definitions of virtue: "Virtue, then, is a habit concerned with choice, consisting in a mean (II Ethics, c. 6, 1107 a 1), and devoted several chapters of his general account of moral virtue to establish and illustrate this definition. It is difficult, therefore, to see why so many modern authors pass over this point with but scant notice. The principle, if not exclusive, concern in recent studies on the virtues has been with the mean of the virtue of justice, and this subject has suffered not a little from the confused notion and misapplication of true Aristotelico--Thomistic doctrine on the nature and distinction of the virtuous mean.
(63) Note particularly that the mean of virtue includes in its consideration all the circumstances of a human act. "The mean of virtue is preserved by its adequation of all the circumstances together, with reason. Now it happens in some virtues that, all other circumstances being adequated, there can be no extreme in another; because there can be nothing excessive in this other save in comparison with the other circumstances, as is clear in the virtue of truth: for a man cannot tell too much truth (i.e., something which is too true), as long as he says the truth which he should say, and when, where, and to whom he should speak it, and similarly as regards the other circumstances. But excess in this circumstance is taken from excess in others. For one who speaks the truth when he ought not to do so, also says too much of the truth. The same holds true of magnanimity: by reason of the amount; and in chastity, for a man cannot abstain too much, as long as the other circumstances are preserved."--In III Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2 Sol. 1 ad 4. This point, complicated perhaps by the involved language of the Sentences, is clearly stated in the Summa:
"In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing prevents something from being an extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, by its conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we consider the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, there will be an extreme and a maximum; but if we consider the quantity in respect to other circumstances, then it takes on the character of a mean: since in this regard these virtues tend to a maximum, in accordance with the rule of right reason, i.e., where, when, and for the reason that it ought. There will be excess if one tends to this maximum when, where, or for an end that is not right, and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend to this maximum where and when one should do so. And this is what the Philosopher says, in IV Ethics, c. 3: "the magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity; but the mean as regards his mode of action, as he should."--I-II, 64, 1 ad 2.
(64) There are two types of mean in the intellectual virtues: one in simple apprehension, the other in judgment.
"Since equality is a mean between more and less, the good of the intellectual virtues must consist in the mean of knowing a thing just as it is. If this mean is missed, by excess or by defect, there will be falsity, which is to the intellectual virtues what vice is to the moral. This concerns the intellect's consideration of a thing absolutely (i.e., simple apprehension). But in discoursing from one truth to another (judgment and reasoning), the mean consists not only in commensuration with reality, but also in the commensuration of conclusions with principles or of means with the end, in operations."--In III Sent., loc. cit. Sol. 3.
Note also the difference between the mean of the speculative and that of the practical intellect. In the former, virtue consists in absolute conformity with reality, and therein lies its mean. Just as virtue in general perfects man for good, so intellectual virtue perfects him for the particular good which is truth--and this is the good of the intellect. But truth itself is defined as the adequation of the mind with reality, and this conformity regards the object of knowledge absolutely, as it is in itself. Our minds do not create or fashion reality in speculation: They become what they know, simply and completely, according to their own mode of being, of course. However, virtue of the practical intellect consists in conformity to a thing or reality which has been measured by or rectified according to a well-disposed appetite. Truth which is ordered to operation bespeaks a further ordination to a right appetite: for appetite or will, in this case, is the principle of action. The appetite must be "rectified," else the true good--or we might say the good truth--will not be chosen. Thus, prudence selects or rather identifies the virtuous mean only when the will is well and virtuously disposed. Such as each man is, so does an end or a good appeal to him!
(65) The mean can be distinguished according to the essence or according to the effect of virtue. Mean is found on the part of the virtue itself when it is by its very essence a mean between two extreme vices. Virtue lies in the mean of its effect when it stands between excess and defect in its own proper matter. In the present Article, and in the Summa, St. Thomas is concerned with the latter kind of mean, which is found in every virtue. The virtue of justice knows no mean of the first type, as we are told in this Article, ad 12, in the text, above.
As regards the moral virtues, which reside in the appetitive part of the soul, the rule or measure, and hence the mean, is present in reason. Aristotle perceived a two-fold mean of reason: The first is determined without any regard to the things which constitute its material object as such, but absolutely by reason. The second has regard for the exigencies of things, and so is determined by these as well as by reason. It should be noted that great attention must be paid to the circumstances which essentially modify an act, because the act derives its moral color from these as well as from its object. This is true in matters of justice, which demands a medium rei, and not merely in the case of the other virtues, as is evident.
(66) As regards the means of theological virtue, St. Thomas remarks: "In all virtues which have a mean, the latter is taken from the virtue's attaining in its proper matter what is an equal and fitting measure. Hence if there were some virtue which had the measure itself for its matter, there would be for that virtue neither extreme nor mean; rather its good would consist in attaining the measure absolutely: for example, if the matter of a virtue were 'truth.'
"Now the First Measure of all things is God, as the Philosopher himself lays down in X Metaphys. (1053 a 31 ff). Wherefore, the theological virtues, which have God for their object, Who is the ultimate end by which all things are measured, cannot have the ratio of mean. The reason is that in this matter (God) there are no extremes to be found: as also in things which are attached to an evil end, there can be no mean."--In III Sent., loc. cit. Sol. 4.
(67) The implications of the virtuous mean in the spiritual life are indicated by Father Garrigou-Lagrange:
"These moral virtues consist in a happy mean between two extremes, shown by excess on the one hand and deficiency on the other. Thus the virtue of fortitude inclines us to keep a happy mean between fear, which flees danger without a reasonable motive, and temerity, which would lead us into the danger of getting our head broken without sufficient reason. However, this happy mean may be misunderstood. Epicureans and the tepid intend to keep a happy mean not for love of virtue but for convenience' sake in order to flee from the discomfort of the contrary vices. They confuse the happy mean with mediocrity which is found not precisely between two contrary evils, but halfway between good and evil. Mediocrity or tepidity flees the higher good as an extreme to be avoided. It hides its laziness under this principle: 'The best is sometimes the enemy of good;' and it ends by saying: 'The best is often, if not always, the enemy of the good.' It thus ends by confusing the good with the mediocre.
"The right happy medium of true virtue is not only a mean between two contrary vices: it is also a summit. It rises like a culminating point between these contrary deviations; thus fortitude is superior to fear and temerity; true prudence to imprudence and cunning; magnanimity to pusillanimity and vain and ambitious presumption; liberality to avarice or stinginess and prodigality; true religion to impiety and superstition.
"Moreover, this happy medium, which is at the same time a summit, tends to rise without deviating to the right or the left in proportion as virtue grows. In this sense the means of the infused virtue is superior to that of the corresponding acquired virtue, for it depends on a higher rule and has in view a more elevated object."--The Three Ages, I p. 64-5.
St. Thomas cites Augustine, who observed that "every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike to it, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence."--Contra Julian, IV, 3. Aristotle held the same position when he said that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of its contrary vices than the other; as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity (II Ethics, c. 8). Yet none of the vicious contraries of virtue really stands in the mean defined by reason. Cf. II-II, 21, 3.
Appendix 3 - Bibliography
APPENDIX III
Bibliography of Works Cited by St. Thomas
1. Sacred Scripture
Wisd. 1: 5 Art. 4, obj. 3
8: 7 Art. 10, S.c. 2; Art. 12 S.c.
8:21 Art. 9, obj, 4
12:10 Art. 8, obj. 16
Is. 59: 2 Art. 1, ad 5
Matt: 4:23 Art. 8, obj. 2
Luke 24:49 Art. 10, S.c. 1
Rom. 2:15 Art. 8, obj. 3
6:23 Art. 9, obj. 6
7: 5 Art. 10, ad 14
7: 7 Art. 4, S.c. 2
12:13 Art. 13, S.c.
14:23 Art. 9, obj. 2
1 Cor. 3: 2 Art. 12, obj. 24
13:10 Art. 12, obj. 7
13:13 Art. 12, S.c.
2 Cor. 12: 9 Art. 9, obj. 19
Gal. 5:17 Art. 10, ad 14
Eph. 2: 3 Art. 8, obj. 16
2: 8 Art. 9, obj. 2
2:19 Art. 9
3:17 Art. 12, ad 24
5: 1 Art. 3, S.c.
Phil. 2:13 Art. 1, ad 5
Heb. 1: 5 Art. 10, obj. 3
6:18 Art. 12, ad 24
Jas. 1:17 Art. 9, obj. 7
4:17 Art. 7, obj. 5
1 Pet. 2: 2 Art. 11, S.c. 1
2. Fathers
a. Latin
Cf. Migne, J. P.
Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, edita accur. J. P. Migne, 219 vol. text and 4 vol. indices. Paris, 1844-1855 (PL).
Alcher of Clairvaux (pseudo-Aug.)
De Spiritu et Anima, PL 40, 779-832.
Augustine, St.
Contra Iulianum Haeresis Pelagianae Defensorem Libri Sex, PL 44, 641-874.
De Bono Coniugali Liber unus, PL 40, 377-396.
De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos Libri duo et viginti, PL 41, 13-804.
De Genesi ad Litteram Libri tres, PL 34, 173-220.
De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum Libri duo, PL 32, 1309-1378.
De Natura boni contra Manichaeos Liber unus, PL 42, 551-572.
De Libero Arbitrio Libri tres, PL 32. 1221-1310.
De Quantitate Animae Liber unus, PL 32, 1035-1080.
De Trinitate Libri decimiquinti, PL 42, 819-1098.
In Ioannis Evang. Tractatus cxxiv, PL 35, 1379-1976.
Retractationum Libri duo, PL 32, 583-656.
Bernard, St.
De Diligendo Deo Libri seu Tractatus ad Haimericum, PL 182, 973-1000.
Boethius
De Arithmetica Libri duo, PL 63, 1079-1168.
Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis, PL 64, 1337-1354.
Gregory the Great, St.
Moralium Libri, I-XVI, PL 75, 509-1162; XVII-XXXV, PL 76, 9-782.
b. Greek
Cf. Migne, J. P.
Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, 616 vol. Paris 1857-1866 (PG).
Pseudo-Dionysius
De Divinis Nominibus, PG 3, 370-584. John Chrysostom, St.
In Epistolam ad Ephesios Commentarius, PG 62, 9-176.
John Damascene, St.
Expositio Accurata Fidei Orthodoxae, PG 94, 789-1228
3. Other authors
Aristotle
Cf. Aristoteles Graece, 2 vol. ex recensione Immanuelis Bekker. Ed. Academia Regia Borussica, Berlin, 1831.
De Interpretatione sive Perihermeneias, 16a1-24b9.
Analyticorum Posteriorum, 71a1-100b17.
Topicorum, 100a18-164b19.
Physica Auscultatio, 184a10-267a26.
De Caelo et Mundo, 268a1-313b32.
De Generatione et Corruptione, 314a1-338b19.
De Anima, 402a1-495b25.
Historiae Animalium (St. Thomas: De Proprietatibus Animalium), 486a4-638b37.
De Generatione Animalium, 715a1-789b20.
Metaphysica, 980a21-1093b29.
Ethica Nichomachea, 1094a1-1181b23.
Politica, 1252a1-1924b34.
Averroes
Cf. Commentaria in opera Aristotelis, 12 vol. Venice, 1462-1576.
In de Anima.
Avicenna
Cf. Opera in lucem redactam ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos amendata, tr. by Dominic Gundissalino, Venice, 15081546. Avicenna's chief work was entitled Sanatio. St. Thomas cites it in the present Question under the title of one of its parts, the De Anima, which was one one of the Liber sextus Naturalium, and also the Metaphysica.
Cicero
Cf. M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia, Leipzig, 1914-1933. Rhetorica seu De Inventione Practica (St. Thomas: De Inventione Rhetorica).
Glossa
Glossa ordinaria, 6 vol. Basle, I. P. von Langedorff and I. F. von Hamelburg, 1506-1508.
Peter Lombard
Libri IV Sententiarum, 2 vol. edited by Fathers of the College of St. Bonaventure, Quaracchi, 1916.
APPENDIX IV
Works Cited by the Translator
St. Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologiae
Comment. in IV Lib. Sententiarum
Quaestiones Disputatae
De Veritate
De Spiritualibus Creaturis
De Anima
Quaestiones Quodlibetales
Contra Errores Graecorum ad Urbanum IV
Comment. in Aristotelis Libris
Physicorum
De Memoria et Reminiscentia
Metaphysicorum
Ethicorum
Brennan, O.P., R. E.
Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan, N. Y. 1941
Cajetan, O.P., Thos. de Vio Card.
Comment. in I-II et II-II
Carpenter, O.P., Hilary
The Natural Virtues (Ch. VI) and The Supernatural Virtues (Ch. VII), in Moral Principles and Practice, Sheed & Ward, London, 1933.
Catechism of the Council of Trent, translated by McHugh, O.P. and Callan, O.P., Jos. Wagner, N. Y. 11th printing, 1949.
Coconnier, O.P., P. in
Revue Thomiste, 1893, p. 11.
Denzinger, Hen.
Enchiridion Symbolorum, Ed. 24-25, Herder, Barcelona, 1948.
De Rubeis, O.P., Bern.
De Gestis et scriptis ac de doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis dissertationes criticae et apologeticae, in Omnia Opera S. Thomae, Edit. Leonina, t. I, Introd.
Fitzpatrick, Mary, and Wellmuth, S.J., John
On Spiritual Creatures, Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee, 1949.
Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Reginald
The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Vol. 1, Herder, St. Louis, 1947.
Grabmann, Martin
Storia della Teologia cattolica, transl. by di Fabio, Milano, 1937. Die Werke Des Hl. Thomas von Aquin, Münster, 1949,
Graf, Dom. B.
De Subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum, secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saec. XIV, t. II.
Leen, Edw.
Progress Through Mental Prayer, Sheed & Ward, N. Y. 1937.
Mandonnet, O. P. P.
Chronologie des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas, in Revue Thomiste, 1918.
Prümmer, O.P. Dom. M.
Manuale Theologiae Moralis, I, Herder, Barcelona, 1946.
Scheeben, Matthias von
Handbuch des Katolisches Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1874.
Synave, P. Le problème chronologique des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas d'Aquin, in Revue Thomiste, 1926.
Vann, O.P. Gerald
Awake in Heaven, Longmans, N. Y. 1948.
Van Steenberghen
Siger dans l'histoire d'Aristotélisme, Vol. II, Louvain, 1942.
Walz, O.P. Angelus
San Tommaso d'Aquino, Roma, 1945.
Footnotes
Much of the material in this section has been adapted from the General Introduction to the Quaestiones Disputatae of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2 Vol., Vol. I, pp. VII-XII, published by Marietti, Turin, 1949.
Handbuch des Katholischen Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1874, p. 433.
P. Synave, following P. Mandonnet, assigns the Disputed Questions De Veritate to a period covering the years 1256-1259. Revue Thomiste, 1926, p. 156.
Cf. Mandonnet, Chronologie des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas in Revue Thomiste, 1918, p. 266 ff. For additional and slightly divergent details of the origin, nature, and use of the disputation as a pedagogical device in medieval universities, cf. On Spiritual Creatures, Fitzpatrick and Wellmuth, Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee, 1949, pp. 3-4.
Cf. Prologue to the Prima Pars.
Revue Thomiste, 1893, p. 11.
Cited by De Rubeis, Dissert. XI, c. 1 n. 2, Omnia Opera Leonine Edit. tom. I, Introd. p. cxxv.
Chap. 172, translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J. Herder, St. Louis, 1948, pp. 186-87.
Ibid. p. 187.
The Quodlibeta, or extraordinary disputations, were held semi-annually, at Christmas and Paschal time. They are distinguished from the Disputed Questions, or ordinary disputations, which were held more frequently.
The author of the General Introduction to Marietti's edition of the Quaestiones Disputatae, p. XV, cites P. Angelus Walz, O.P. as agreeing on these years for all five questions, cf. n. 30; and on p. XVI, in a table proposed as Walz's, this period, from 1269 to 1272 (a typographical error in the Marietti text actually reads: 1282), is listed as the date of composition. An examination of Walz's book, San Tommaso D'Aquino, Rome, 1945, p. 207, reveals a somewhat different chronology, thus: De virtutibus in communi, 1266-69 (while St. Thomas was in Italy, at the Papal Court and elsewhere); De virtutibus cardinalibus, 1269-72; De caritate, 1266-69 (Walz gives also Mandonnet's date: 1269-72). De correctione fraterna, 1269-72; and De spe, 126972. Cf. p. 106, 112, 141, and the Table, Appendix (p. 238).
Le probleme Chronologique des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas d'Aquin, in Revue Thomiste, 1926, p. 158.
Storia della Teologia cattolica, transl. by di Fabio, Milano, 1937, p. 108. Cf. also Die Werke Des Hl. Thomas von Aquin, Münster, 1949, p. 307, where Dr. Grabmann limits the period to the years 1269-1270.
Chronologie des Questions disputées de saint Thomas d'Aquin, in Revue Thomiste, 1918, p. 16.
Siger dans l'histoire d'Aristotélisme (Louvain, 1942), II, c. 3, p. 541 ff.
In Awake in Heaven, Gerald Vann, O.P., New York, 1948, ch. 6, pp. 49-50.
Op. cit., p. 151.
Cf. Art. 6 ad 1, in the text, below.
"The proper effect of law is to lead its subject to their proper virtue; and since virtue is 'that which makes its subject good,' it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either absolutely or in some particular respect."--S. Th. I-II, q. 92, a. 1.
Compendium of Theology, ch. 227, p. 273.
Proem. in Opusc. VI: Contra Errores Graecorum ad Urbanum IV, P.M. Opera omnia, Vivès, Vol. XXIX, p. 345. "Unde ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholicae fidei transferens, servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfert . . . quando ea quae in una lingua dicuntur, transferuntur in aliam, ita quod verbum sumatur ex verbo, non est mirum si aliqua dubietas relinquatur."
De Virtutibus in Communi will be found in the following editions of St. Thomas' works, one or more of which should be available to the reader:
1. Opera omnia, iussu S. Pii V, 18 vols. in fol; Rome, 1570-71, Vol. VIII, pp. 244, ff. This is known as the Piana, first Roman, or Vatican edition.
2. Opera omnia, 25 vols; Parma, 1852-73, Vol. VIII, pp. 545-ff.
3. Opera omnia, ed. E. Fretté and P. Meré, 34 vols. Paris, Vivès, 1871-80, Vol. XIV, pp. 178-229.
4. Quaestiones disputatae, ed. P. Mandonnet, 5 vols.; Paris: Lethielleux, 1927, Vol. IV.
5. Quaestiones Disputatae, 2 vols.; Marietti, Turin, 1949, Vol. 2, pp. 707-751.
The Supernatural Virtues, by Rev. Hilary Carpenter, O.P., ch. VII in Moral Principles and Practice, ed. by Rev, G. J. MacGillivray, Sheed & Ward, London, 1933, pp. 127-28.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 55, a. 1; II Sent. D. 27, a. 1; 2 Ethics, lect. 5.
I, 9 (PL 32, 598); cf. De Libero Arbitrio, II, 19.
II, 18 and 19 (PL 32, 1267).
St. Thomas calls Aristotle "the Philosopher".
I, II (281 a 15).
The much-used term potentia may mean either power, as in this case, or potency, as in the next phrase.
VII, 3 (246 b 2).
C. 15 (PL 32, 1322).
XV, 22 (PL 41, 640).
That is, a brute animal, or the sensitive powers.
Mens is used both for mind and soul. Cf. Art. 2, note 4, below.
Both election, i.e. choice, and volition are acts elicited directly by the will, and so are immediately and essentially subject to this faculty. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 13, a. 1, and q. 9, a. 1.
Cf. Art. 13, obj. 15, below.
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 19 (PL 32, 1268).
II, 6 (1107 a 1).
The Latin vis and virtus mean power or strength, also force.
Loc. cit.
I, 3 (286 a 8).
II, 6 (1106 a 15).
VII, 3 (246 b 2) Here a thing is called perfect which is well disposed and completely ready for action or operation. The latter is its end, and is said to be what is best in it. Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 5.
In a general sense, the Latin virtus means strength, force, ability. Cf. note 16 above.
III, 5 (1139 a 20).
The root of freedom is reason. "For as much as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free will"--S. Th. I, q. 83 a. 1.
III, Comm. 18. St. Thomas refers to the Arabian philosopher, Averroes, as "the Commentator," because of his renowned commentaries on Aristotle.
C. 21 (PL 40, 390).
The reference to Bk. V, ch. 3 is wrong. This statement does not appear anywhere in any edition of the Ethics consulted for this translation.
II, 3 (1104 b 4).
I, 8 (1098 b 30 and 1099 a 24).
The rational powers as such are objectively indetermined, i.e. free, as was pointed out in the Body of the Article, above.
Motus should be translated here as change; although the word movement may better suggest the idea of transition from one term to another.
Heat itself is an accidental form.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 55 a. 4; II Sent. D 27, a. 2.
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 19 (PL 32, 1268).
V Metaphys. 6. Cf. S. Th. I, q. 84, a. 3; C.G. II, 42; De Substantiis Separatis.
St. Thomas takes mens in the definition to mean mind, more precisely than soul. Cf. the next objection and resp.; also S. Th. I, q. 79, aa. 8 and 9.
XII De Trinitate, 3 (PL 42, 1000). Cf. S. Th. I, q. 79, a. 9.
I De Spiritu et Anima (PL 40, 779-832). The author of this work is not St. Augustine but a Cistercian, Alcher of Clairvaux. Cf. Bibliography, p. 177.
II, 18 (PL 32, 1257). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 3 obj. 1.
This is the work of virtue.
Tract LXXII in Ioan. (PL 35, 1823).
VI, 3 (1139 b 18).
I.e. the intellective or rational part. Cf. Art. 6 and 7 below.
This phrase is explained in the replies to objections 18, 19, and 20, below.
Add: are acts of hot and cold agents, respectively.
In all the editions of the Disputed Question The Virtues in General published since the year 1503, after the reply to the 8th obj. of Art. 2, this notation is inscribed: "The following is an addition made by Father Vincent de Castronovo, O.P., venerable professor of Sacred Theology." The remaining responses, 9th to 21st, are the work of this theologian. The interpolation concludes with the statement: "End of the addition of Vincent of Castronovo."
Father Aloysius Galea wrote a brief monograph on this addition in Divus Thomas, Piacenza, Vol. II, Jan. 1884, pp. 173-178. Father Galea noted that De Rubeis, in his De Gestis et scriptis ac doctrina sancti Thomae Aquinatis dissertationes criticae et apologeticae (Leonine ed. Omnia opera, tom. 1), makes no specific mention of this particular addition. In Dissert. 1, cap. 3, on the Disputed Questions, De Rubeis informs us that the Venice edition of the Disputed Questions, which first appeared in 1503, as revised and edited by Father Vincent Bandelli de Castronovo, who had been elected Master General of the Dominicans two years earlier. In a previous edition of these questions, that of Martin Flach at Argentin, in 1500, after the 8th resp. this statement was printed, as part of the text: "The solutions to the other objections are evident from what has been said." The addition, then, is certainly the work of a hand other than that of St. Thomas'. The addition is thence included in the Acchi edition of St. Thomas' works, Venice, 1781, tom. XV and, much earlier, in that of Rovilli at Lyons, 1595. All subsequent editions of the Disputed Questions have the addition.
In his monograph Father Galea observes that the author of the addition drew his matter from several of the works of St. Thomas. Among these were the Summa Theologiae, I Pars and I-IIae, the commentary on II Sentences, De Veritate, and other articles in the same Disputed Question, The Virtues in General. Some of the objections are transferred verbatim from passages of these works to the present article. On the other hand, as Fr. Galea remarked, Vincent de Castronovo's style is somewhat different from St. Thomas'. The same words are often needlessly repeated, a practice which the Angelic Doctor scrupulously avoided. Further, Bandelli's responses are uniformly more prolix and evolved than those of St. Thomas. However, it is most important to note that the doctrine contained in the addition is authentically Thomistic. The entire article by Fr. Galea, in Divus Thomas, can be profitably consulted.
VII, 3 (246 b 2).
III, 14 (PL 32, 1291). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 71, a. 1.
I.e. moral good is not a type of virtue, since the former is more generic and includes the latter.
Cf. Art. 6 and 7, below.
The reference is to the theological virtues.
Cf. Art. 4 to 7 below. Vincent de Castronovo has obviously included much in these responses which pertain strictly to succeeding articles.
The human intellect and will are not the first principles absolutely: God alone is the First Unmoved Mover. St. Thomas means that these superior faculties are the first of man's powers in the process of engendering acts which are truly human. Cf. S. Th. I, 83 1 ad 3.
Cf. Art. 4, below.
This must be understood strictly of the virtues, even of the theological virtues, and not of grace. Divine grace truly resides in the very essence of the soul. Cf. ad 21 below, and S. Th. I-II, q. 110, a. 4.
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 79, a. 6, S. c.
II, 4 (415 b 14). For further explanation of this two-fold signification of life, cf. In Metaphys. I lect. 1, and In De Anima, I, lect. 14.
I, 1 (980 b 26).
Cf. ad 11 and note 18, above.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 61, art. 2 and 3, and Art. 9 and 10, below.
The importance and strikingness of this response, as well as of the next response, are evident.
Nothing could be clearer or simpler than this statement of the absolute priority and infallible, intrinsic efficacy of Divine grace. The author, Vincent de Castronovo, has faithfully reproduced the authentic doctrine of his Master, Thomas Aquinas, and this a full century before the innovations, denials, and purported discoveries of the then-current new Theology.
St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure also cite St. John Chrysostom in this statement. The reference is to the Homil. 24 in Epist. ad Ephes, which is in PG 62. However, this statement occurs nowhere in this Homily, certainly, at least, not in these words. The thought expressed may be drawn from a number of the passages in Chrysostom's works. Cf. Galea, art. cit. above, note 11, p. 175, note (1).
The Divine nature is the very essence of God; men and angels share in it only by participation.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 1; III Sent. D 33, q. 2, a. 4; q. 1, a. 1.
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 19 (PL 32, 1268).
I.e. the nature of man.
I.e. which operates through the virtues.
Art. 4-7, below.
I, 22 (83 a 36).
I, 13 (1103 a 4).
The diaphane is a term designating a transparent body, through which rays of light can be transmitted. Cf. S. Th., I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 2, where, following Averroes, St. Thomas compares the agent intellect to this sort of medium.
As distinct from natural forces (virtutes), such as heat, cold, hardness, heaviness, etc.
E.g. lust, gluttony, sloth.
Cf. Art. 1, above.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 4 and a. 5 ad 1; III Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1a 2; De Verit. q. 24, a. 4, ad 9; Art. 10 ad 5, below.
VI, 2 (1139 a 23); also VIII, 13 (1163 a 23).
De Quantitate Animae, c. 5 (PL 32, 1040).
I, 4 (187 b 25).
Rational is the specific difference in the definition of man, determining; the genus, animal.
Loc. cit.
II, 6 (1139 a 2).
The Glossa ordinaria, which here cites the words of St. Augustine, commenting on v. 7: "I had not known concupiscence."
In virtue of the axiom: "Contraries are found in the same genus, from which they mutually exclude each other.-- Cf. Art. 1, obj. 5, above.
III, Ethics 9 (1117 b 22).
III, 9 (432 b 7).
At least the moral virtues. Cf. Art. 13, below.
Loc. cit.
I, 3 (1253 b 19).
An example may be drawn, by analogy, from instrumental causality: If the saw is bent, dull, and rusted, it will not cut well, no matter how skilled the carpenter may be.
Cf. note 2, above; also: S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 4 ad 4.
Cf. Art. 8, below and Art. 2 ad 12, above.
Imperium is an act of reason: cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 17, a. 1.
Cf. S. Th. III, q. 13, a. 3, Sed. c.
Either in a state of pure nature, without original justice, or after original sin. Cf. S. Th. I, q. 95, a. 2 ad 1; I-II, q. 82, a. 3.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 25, a. 1.
I, 5 (1254 b 4).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 22, a. 2; q. 72, a. 2, ad 1.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 6; III Sent. D. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 1; D. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5; De Verit. q. 24, a. 4 and 9.
III, 5 (1114 b 1).
VIII, 5 (1157 b 29).
This love is called intellectual or rational love, in the natural order; in the supernatural order it is charity. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 26, a. 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 1.
Retractations, I, 9 (PL 32, 596).
IV, 3 (PL 44, 743).
C. 13 (1103 a 5).
The will can command these acts.
Cf. Art. 1 and 2, above.
V, 1 (1130 a 4). Cf. Plato's Republic, 343 c. This is Plato's definition.
VII, 6 (248 a 7).
C. 19 (100 a 10).
X, 4 (1174 b 32). For further treatment of St. Thomas' doctrine on these points, cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 3, a. 4, 5, and 8; q. 4, a. 1 and 4; q. 5, a. 7, etc.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 2.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 3.
II Ethics, 2 (1103 b 27).
De Inventione Rhetorica, II, 53.
II, 1 (193 a 32).
II Ethics, 6 (1106 b 32).
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 2.
Virtutes here signifies forces, virtues, strength, perfections ordered to operation. Cf. Art. 1, note 16, above.
II, 6 (1107 a 1).
XXII, 1 (PL 76, 212). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 58, a. 4 S.c.; q. 61, a. 4, obj. 1, etc. St. Thomas uses this statement many times in his tract on the virtues in the Summa Theologiae.
This is the science of morals or Ethics. For the difference between the science of Ethics and the virtue of prudence, cf. also St. Thomas In Ethics, VI, lect. 4.
Thus, a man can be taught the science of Ethics by another man.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 76.
Ibid, q. 76, a. 4.
VI, 13 (1144 b 10).
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 82, a. 4 ad 1.
II, 6.
(1140 b 20 and 1141 b 23).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 56, a. 3; III Sent. D. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 1.
This is one of Aristotle's definitions of virtue. Cf. Art. 1, above.
III, 7 (431 b 10).
II, 6 (1106 a 6).
Cf. IV Topics, c. 2 (121 b 26); S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 1 obj. 3.
I, 2 (982 a 15). Cf. S. Th. loc. cit. obj. 2.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 4, a. 2.
Cf. Art. 5, above.
Loc. cit.
Cf. Art. 6 ad 5, above.
Tract XXVI in Ioan. (PL 35, 1607). Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 6 obj. 3; q. 2, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2, obj. 1.
That prudence is the most excellent of the cardinal virtues, cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1. That faith is nobler than any of the intellectual virtues is evident, since faith is a theological virtue. Cf. q. 62, a. 1.
Prudence is concerned with what must be done (agibilia); art is concerned with what must be made (factibila). These are the two virtues of the practical intellect.
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 79, a. 11.
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 3: q. 48, a. 6; I-II, q. 56, a. 3; II-II, q. 122, a. 2.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2 and ad 3.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 3, a. 5.
VI, 5 (1140 b 24).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 1; I Sent. D. 17, q. 2, a. 1; II D 39, q. 2, a. 1; III D 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1a 1; De Verit. q. 1, a. 1; II Ethic. II 1.
III, 14 (PL 94, 1046). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 1 obj. 1.
Cf. Anthony's Discourse to his Monks, in St. Athanasius' Life of St. Anthony.
De Inventione Rhetorica, II, 53.
II, 6 (PL 32, 1248).
Loc. cit.
I.e. according to its inception or in an inchoative state, as is claimed in obj. 6, above.
Cf. Art. 6, above.
De Inventione Rhetorica, II, 53. St. Thomas often quotes this definition; cf. e.g. S. Th. I-II, q. 58, a. 1, obj. 3.
Cf. St. Augustine, De Natura Boni, c. 4; also S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 2; q. 85, a. 4.
Cf S. Th. I, q. 5, a. 5.
Cf. S. Jerome, Comment. in Galat. 1:15-16. S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 3, obj. 3.
III, 11 (434 a 14). Cf. I Ethics, c. 13 (1102 b 22); S. Th. I-II, q. 95, a. 5.
According to Aristotelian astronomical physics, the higher heavenly bodies move the lower.
St. Thomas teaches that the higher spheres are moved locally by angels. Cf. S. Th. I, q. 110, a. 3.
II, 1 (1103 a 24).
VI, 13 (1144 b 5).
C. 4 (PG 3, 726). Cf. S. Thomas, Comment., 1. 9; S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 1 S. c.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 4. St. Thomas discusses this opinion in lect. 9 of his Commentary; also S. Th. I, q. 45, a. 8; q. 65, a. 4; I-II, q. 63, a. 1.
Meno, c. 15 ff. In I Metaphys. c. 9. Aristotle criticizes the Platonic doctrine of the separate existence of forms. Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 14-17.
De Anima, V, 5. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 1.
II, 3 (736 b 15). Aristotle is speaking of the three types of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, all of which, he says, pre-exist potentially in matter.
Loc. cit.
Avicenna, Averroes, and their followers. Cf. De Unitate Intellectus, c. 5.
This is the teaching of Aristotle, in II Ethics, c. 1. Cf. S. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 1.
The Latin here is: sicut circa formas naturales nihil derogat virtus naturalium agentium; which is rather difficult to translate. The meaning is clear from the comparison with science and virtue.
Art. 4-7.
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 78, a. 2.
Ibid. art. 3.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 4, a. 2.
This is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian-Thomistic Ethics, and is used throughout the Ethics of Aristotle and the moral part of the Summa Theologiae. Cf. VII Ethics, c. 8.
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, teaches that the heavenly bodies exercise a certain causality on bodies here below. Cf. S. Th. I, q. 115, a. 3.
Cf. Art. 6, note 8, above.
II, 8: here Aristotle clearly distinguishes reason and nature as each acts for an end.
Cf. Art. 1, above.
The Angels.
In brutes, of course, these are not acts of true virtues, such as exist in rational creatures; but are said to be "virtues" by metaphorical analogy.
II, 6 (1107 a 1). Cf. Art 13, below.
Loc. cit.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 82, a. 1.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 51, a. 2; q. 63, a. 2; II Sent. D. 44, q. 1, a. 1 ad 6; III D. 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1a 2; II Ethics lect. 1.
IV, c. 3 (PL 44, 793). Cf. Art. 2, above.
Glossa Ordin. gives no name; the statement is taken from the Sententiae of Prosper of Acquitaine, sent. 106. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 2, obj. 1.
VII, 1 (1145 a 35). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 58, a. 3 ad 2.
Following St. Paul, St. Augustine says this many times. St. Thomas makes use of the statement throughout the first question in the tract on grace in the Summa Theologiae. The citations in this question are drawn from several of the works of St. Augustine, e.g. De Perfectione Iustitiae, c. 21; De Natura et Gratia, c. 26; De Perseverantia, c. 2. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 109 'passim.'
I, 9 (1099 b 15).
II, 18 (PL 32, 1267). Cf. Art. 2, obj. 17, above.
II, 7 (PL 32, 1265).
This statement does not appear explicitly in the Ethics, but cf. I, 6 (1099 a 20).
I, II (281 a 15). Cf. Art. 1, note 6, above.
II, 6 (1106 a 15).
VII, 3 (245 b 24).
Cf. obj. 1, above.
VI, 13 (1145 a 5).
III, 5 (1114 a 35).
C. 4 (PG 3, 718-19).
Cf. note 9, above.
III, 11 (1276 b 34). Cf. Ethics, V, 2 (1130 b 28).
Cf. Art. 1, above; also S. Th. I-II, q. 51, a. 1 and 2.
The substantial or essential form in each supposit is one.
Cf. Ethics, II, 1 (1103 a 22).
The reference is to beings which enjoy free will, or are "objectively indeterminate." Cf. Art. 1, note 29, above.
Cf. S. Thomas, In III Ethic. lect. 15; also Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, c. 2 (452 a 30), and St. Thomas' Comment., lect. 6.
I.e. the rational appetite or will, not the sensitive appetites.
II, 6 (1107 b 1).
IX, 8 (1050 b 1).
VIII, 4 (254 b 30-33, cf. 255 a 14 and 257 b ff). Cf. S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 3; I-II, q. 51, a. 2 ad 2.
Cf. Art. 1, above.
And not from reason enlightened by faith and supernatural virtues.
Vulgate: virtus=strength.
E.g. to virtues of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, such as temperance, fortitude, and their parts.
St. Thomas is speaking of a man's accidental qualities, his temperament and characteristic traits and tendencies.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, a. 3; III Sent. D 33, q. 1, a. 2; q. 1a. 3.
VII, 3 (246 a 14).
Cf. St. Thomas, In de Anima, II, lect. 12.
This is St. Thomas' phrase for supernatural beatitude.
I.e. they have the same object or materia circa quam.
The example St. Thomas uses is that of a vice, which, nonetheless, is a moral habit, viz., a bad one.
This virtue is charity. Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4 ad 1; a. 6.
VI, 6 (PL 44, 743). Cf. Art. 9 obj. 1, above.
III, 10 (1118 a 25): Aristotle mentions only temperance explicitly.
Contraries agree in subject, in genus, and in power. Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaphys. V, lect. 12.
III, 1 (201 a 8). Cf. Metaphys. X, 1 (1045 b 34).
VII, 9 (1152 a 2).
II, 3 (1104 b 5). Cf. Art. 1, above.
I.e.: of a vice opposed to an acquired virtue.
II, 1 (1103 b 8).
Cf. Art. 9, above.
II, 1, 2 and 4 (1103 a 16, 1103 b 21; 1103 b 30; 1105 a 18). Aristotle insists that the habits are known from their acts, while the latter are determined in nature by the habits from which they spring.
Ethics, II, 6 (1106 a 15).
The notion here is not of opposition but of diversity.
III, 11 (1276 b 34). Cf. Art. 9, note 18, above.
These are the intellectual and volitional faculties and their acts. Cf. S. Thomas In De Anima, III, lect. 7.
Grace and the theological virtues.
These other infused virtues are the infused moral virtues and all their parts.
This aptitude is called the "obediential potency."
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 4 and ad 1.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 63 a. 4 ad 2.
Cf. Ethics, III, 3 (1112 b 15-20).
Cf. Art. 2 ad 12 and Art. 4, above.
Cf. Art. 4 ad 7 and 8, above.
As opposed to supernatural.
III, 9 (1119 a 32). Cf. II, 3 (1104 68) and S. Thomas In Ethics III, lect. 21.
Cf. Art. 2 ad 18, above.
I.e. acts taken singly.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 51, a. 4 ad 3.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 52, a. 1; q. 66, a. 1; q. 92, a. 1 ad 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 4.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 4 and a. 5 and S.c.
II, 4 (415 a 30).
I, 5 (320 b 30).
Movetur is taken here in the strictest sense of motion as it pertains to mobile beings, and more precisely, to the material or corporeal element in them as such. St. Thomas says, In De Anima, I, lect. 11, that only quantified beings are moved or changed.
Here again, as in Art. 6 and 7 above, science and virtue are distinguished under certain aspects, although science is itself numbered among the intellectual virtues. Cf. Art. 7 ad 3 and ad 5 above.
Virtue is a habit, the first species of quality. Cf. Art. 1, above.
Physics VII, 3 (245 b 2-4). Cf. Art. 9, obj. 20, above.
Cf. Art. 1 obj. 3, above.
VII, 3 (246 b 2). Cf. S. Th. I-II, a. 52, a. 1 obj. 2.
The reference to tract V is wrong. Cf. Tract LXXIV (PL 35, 1827) and S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 4 s.c.
Cf. Art. 8, above.
Plotinus and other neo-Platonists taught that qualities and habits are material beings, and that they pre-exist latently, although actually, in matter. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 52, a. 1.
This statement contains the basis for the thesis maintained in the present Article. St. Thomas at the very outset locates the 'increase' of virtue in the subject--in its hold on the form--rather than in the form of virtue itself.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 5.
VII, 3. Cf. St. Thomas Comment. lect. 5 and 6.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 4 ad 3.
Cf. S. Thomas' Comment., q. 2, a. 1; also a. 2-4.
I, 1 (16 a 3). St. Thomas usually refers to this work of Aristotle's by its Greek name, Perihermeneias.
Motus: cf. Art. 1, note 30, above.
X, 1 (1052 a 27). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 1, also Physics, VIII, 7 (260 a 27).
VI De Trinitate, c. 8, quoted in S. Th. I-II, q. 52, a. 1.
Cf. S. Thomas In Metaphys. IX, lect. 3.
Ibid.
VIII, 3 (1044 a 10). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. loc. cit.
"Substantially" here means "essentially."
In S. Th. I-II, q. 66, a. 1, S. Thomas says: "The nature (ratio) of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean." Cf. Art. 13, c. and ad 13, ad 16, ad 17, and ad 18, below.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 6 ad 3.
This is substantial change.
Recall what was said in note 14, above.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 10 (St. Ambrose is not cited in this article).
Cf. S. Th. ibid., a. 5.
VIII, 5 (256 b 20). Cf. I Sent. D 8, q. 3, a. 1 S. c. and ad 3.
Three uses of quantity in an accidental or transferred sense are given and illustrated: dimensive quantity: lifting a heavy object; quantity of "perfection:" performing a task of considerable "size" or which demands a good deal of ability; and discrete quantity: performing a large number of tasks.
Cf. Physics VII, 3; also S. Th. I-II, q. 52. a. 1, and q. 66, a. 1.
II, 5 (417 b 8). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 11.
This is St. Thomas' teaching on the increase of charity in remiss acts. Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 6. The question has been widely disputed, but St. Thomas' doctrine is clear and certain. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 52, a. 3; q. 114, a. 8, ad 3; I Sent. D17, q. 2, a. 3; II, D27, a. 5 ad 2. For a presentation of the authentic Thomistic position, cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The Three Ages of the Interior Life (St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1949), Vol. 1, pp. 133-138.
Cf. Art. 1 ad 3, above.
VII, 3 (246 b 2).
II, 6 (1106 b 28). Cf. Art. 13 c. and ad 9, 16, 17, and 18, below.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 7.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 52, a. 1 ad 2.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 2; III Sent. D 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 3, ad 4; De Verit. q. 14, a. 3, ad 9.
The subject of accident is called materia in qua--matter in which. Cf. S. Th. I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 39, a. 3.
De Inventione Rhetorica, 1. II, c. 53, cf. Art. 6, obj. 4, above.
Cf. St. Thomas In Ethic. I, lect. 12.
Cf. S. Th. I, q. 93, a. 2.
C. 15 (PL 32, 1322).
St. Thomas never uses this word in the tract on Hope in the Summa Theologiae. He does use the word largitas in III Sent. D 26, q. 2, a. 1 ad 4; which may be rendered "largesse" or "bounty".
II, 6 (1107 a 1).
VI, 5 (1140 b 20).
Which is in the intellective part. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 3.
Which is also in the intellective part. Ibid. a. 4.
Cf. Rhetorica, II 4 (1382 a 4).
Cf. Art. 6 ad 1 and note 11, above.
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, teaches that matter (designated by certain quantity) is the principle of individuation in beings which include matter in their constitution. This doctrine is extended to apply to all beings (except, of course, God), so that the material element in a thing is what distinguishes it numerically from all other things. In the case of the virtues, the "matter" is the material object of the virtues. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 2,
Cf. Art. 13, below; also S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1.
VI, 4 (PL 42, 927).
In Art. 7, at the end of the Response or Body, St. Thomas noted that, although the moral virtues are more properly given the name of virtue, still, they are not nobler or more perfect habits. This objection is raised in S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 1, obj. 3: "That which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3). Therefore, the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues."
Cf. Ethics IV, 3 (1123 b 30); S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 3 obj. 1.
II, 53 and 54.
Cf. Art. 7, beginning of Response, above; also Art. 1 and especially 2, above. The rest of the doctrine in this Article (12) contains the basis and foundation of St. Thomas' treatment of the nature of virtue.
II, 6 (1106 a 15).
Cf. Art. 4, above.
Cf. Art. 7, above.
I, 13 (1103 a 5).
In Books VII and VIII Aristotle shows how the contemplative life, represented by the intellectual virtues (especially wisdom), is superior to the active life, in which the moral virtues are especially exercised. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 68, a. 7 and 8; II-II, q. 23, a. 6 ad 1; also, note 17, above
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 4.
VI, 3 (1139 b 17).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 1 and 2.
Cf. S. Thomas' In Ethic. IV, lect. 2 and 8.
Cf. Art. 2 c. and ad 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, above.
II, 5 (1105 b 25). The point here is that a power is indifferent in itself to good or bad objects or acts; whereas a habit is precisely ordered to either good or bad, according as it is virtuous or vicious.
I, 7 (1097 a 20) and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 9.
Christians, who hope for the supernatural end of the Beatific Vision.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 1 ad 3.
I, 5 (644 b 33).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 3 ad 2.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 58, a. 6; q. 85, a. 2 ad 1. "Charity is the root of all the virtues." (I-II, q. 62, a. 4.)
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 5.
Cf. De Veritate, q. 14, a. 3 ad 2: "The object of the theological virtues is the ultimate end; while the object of the other virtues (moral and intellectual) is the means to the end."
Cf. Art. 7, above, also S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 1.
Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 47, a. 4.
Cf. De Veritate, q. 25, a. 5.
Art. 6. Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 47, a. 4 and 5.
I.e. unless a superior, directing force, viz., prudence, intervenes.
II, 4 (1105 a 35).
Cf. Cajetan's Comment. in I-II, q. 61. According to Cajetan, S. Ambrose was the first to use this name in designating the four principle virtues.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 2: "The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3 ad 3). Hence they should properly be called, not human, but super-human or divine virtues. The moral virtues as such are what S. Thomas would call "human" virtues.
In S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 3, St. Thomas gives another reason: "Although the intellectual virtues . . . rank before the moral virtues, by reason of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.
For the role of these virtues attached to prudence, cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 57, a. 6.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 2 ad 3: "'All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to subject and as to their formal ratios."
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, aa. 1 to 4; III Sent. D. 33, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1. a. 1; II Ethic. lect. 6 and 7.
I, 11 (281 a 15).
II, 6 (1106 a 15).
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 3 obj. 1.
De Diligendo Deo, c. 1 (PL 182, 974).
III, 4 (429 b 3). In S. Thomas' Comment. in X Metaphys. lect. 9, how a mean is properly between contraries is explained. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 3, obj. 3.
II, 42 ff. (PL 63, 1147-1152).
The mathematical formulae for these three examples of means would be: Arithmetical --8:6 :: 6:4
Geometrical --9:6 :: 6:4
Harmonic --6:2 :: 3:1.
II, 18 (PL 32, 1267). Cf. Art. 1, obj. 3, above.
VI, 8 (146 b 17).
Cf. Ethics, II, 8 and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 10.
II, 6 (1106 b 24). Throughout c. 3 of this Book, Aristotle speaks of the difficulties attached to the various virtues, and of their consequent laudability. In c. 6 he says explicitly that the mean, which is characteristic of virtue, is as difficult to hit as the center of a target.
Cf. Art. 11, above.
VII Ethics, c. 6 (1106 b 15). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1.
C. 7. (PL 64, 1352). Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 4, obj. 4.
St. Thomas treats of the mean which charity observes only very briefly, below. Charity is the subject of the next Disputed Question in this series on the virtues.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1: "Moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determined matter. Now the measure or rule of the movements of the appetite towards appetible objects is reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in conformity with its rule: thus the good of things fashioned by art is that they conform to the rule of art . . . . Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason." In the text, "passions" refer to the objects of fortitude and temperance, while "actions" designate the object of justice. Both actions and passions are regulated by prudence, which is "right reason."
The mean of moral virtue is the mean of reason. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 2.
I.e. practical matters.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 3: "Truth apprehended by our intellect if we consider it absolutely is measured by things, since things are the measure of our intellect, as we read in the Metaphysics (X, 1). We speak the truth according as what we say is so or not in reality. Accordingly, the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean in conformity with things as they are in reality, insofar as the intellect recognizes them for what they are or for what they are not."
II, 6 (1107 a 1).
I.e. the mean of reason (medium rationis). Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 47, a. 6: "To the rule of prudence it belongs to determine in what manner and by what means man shall observe in his actions the mean of reason."
The measure is reality, the thing, res; the intellect is measured by reality. Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 3 ad 3: "Things that are themselves contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one may be the reason for knowing the other."
C. 14. Aristotle poses this principle as a question, and resolves it by dialectical inquiry. Cf. S. Th. ibid.
I.e. between affirmation and negation.
Cf. Art. 7, above. Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.
Cf. Reply to the objection on the contrary, below; also S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 4.
This objection is answered in S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1 ad 1: "Moral virtue derives its goodness from the rule of reason, while its object is the passions and operations of man. If, therefore, we compare moral virtue to reason, we find that what there is in it of reason places it as an extreme, viz., its (complete) conformity; while excess and defect hold the position of the other extreme, viz., complete deformity. But if we consider moral virtue with respect to its object, then it holds the position of a mean, insofar as it conforms passions to the rule of reason."
Cf. S. Th. ibid.: "Hence the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, II, 6, that 'virtue is a mean in its essence,' inasmuch as the rule of virtue is applied to its proper object, 'but it is an extreme with regard to what is best and excellent,' viz., in its conformity with reason."
In S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1 ad 2 St. Thomas says: "In actions and passions the mean and extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing prevents something from being an extreme in a certain virtue with regard to one circumstance, while it is a mean with regard to other circumstances, namely, by its conformity with reason . . . There will be excess if one tends to the maximum when or where one should not do so, or for an inordinate end; there will be defect if one fails to tend where and when one ought."
V, 3 and 4. In 3, 1131 b 27-1132 a 2: "The justice which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the sort of proportion mentioned above (1131 b 12: "Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical") . . . But the justice in transactions between individual men is a sort of equality . . . not according to geometrical proportion, but according to arithmetical proportion." Cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 61, a. 2. "In distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to an equality of things, but according to a proportion between things and persons . . . Hence the mean in the case follows geometrical proportion . . . On the other hand, in commutations . . . it is necessary to equalize things with each other . . . The result of this will be equality according to arithmetical mean."
I.e. in present enjoyment.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 2. "Justice concerns operations, which deal with external things, in which the right is established simply and absolutely . . . wherefore the mean of reason in justice is the same as the mean of things, insofar as justice gives each one his due, no more and no less. But the other moral virtues concern our inner passions, in which what is right cannot be established in the same way . . . hence the rectitude of reason must be established in the passions with reference to ourselves."
Cf. Ethics. II, 8 (1109 a 1-19): "Since rashness is considered to be more like and nearer to courage, and cowardice to be more unlike it, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things which are further from the mean are considered more contrary to it . . . we consider as contrary to the mean the directions in which we more often take the greatest pains, thus self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance."
V, 3 (226 b 27-27).
II, 6 (1107 a 6-7).
Cf. Ethics, II, 6 (1106 a 32) and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 6.
I.e. an equal distance, proportionately speaking.
St. Thomas insists on this, following Aristotle, throughout his tract on the mean of the virtues, in general, and in each specific instance--except, of course, in the case of justice. Cf. St. Thomas' In Ethic. II, lect. 6.
Cf. S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 4.
Cf. Art. 2, note 21 in the text, above.
"Quodsi doctrinae Aquinatis cum sententiis doctorum anteriorum et aequalium, . . . comparantur, Doctori Angelico sine ullo periculo falsae elationis principatus tribuendus est. Neque Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, neque Philippus Cancellarius neque S. Albertus Magnus neque S. Bonaventura, ut de minoribus sileamus, hac re cum Aquinate certare possunt. Nemo eorum tanta praecisione solutionis, tanta cohaesione doctrinali, tanta perspicuitate argumentorum, tam ampla consideratione omnium quaestionum huc pertinentium de subiecto psychico virtutum egit." Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum, secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saec XIV, t. II, p. 114.
Edw. Leen, C.S.Sp. Progress Through Mental Prayer, Sheed & Ward, N.Y. 1937, p. 237 (4).
It is a question, obviously, of acquired habits, as Father Carpenter points out (my note).
Carpenter, op. cit. p. 117-18.
Ibid., p. 124-25.
That is, within the scope of its natural capacities (tr.).
St. Thomas can mean here, only that these infused perfections are in some way according to the soul's nature (tr.).
That is, the subject or supposit will undergo a substantial change (tr.).
Again, the Latin virtus is used in the English equivalent of force or strength or 'power.' Cf. Art. 1, notes 16 and 21, in the text, above (tr.).
The Latin here is hardly less difficult than the English: "Unde oportet quod omne quod est in actu aliquid, aliquo modo possit esse activum illius." The reasoning is close and precise: Operation follows being. But being consists primarily and essentially in act or form. Hence operation follows on act or form. Now every agent, since it acts by and through its own form, impresses something of this form, which is its own being, on its effect. Applied to the sphere of human actions, as Thomas applies it shortly, this basic truth indicates that human acts will impress something of their own character on their effects--one of which is the disposition or determination gradually induced into the power of the soul from which each given action immediately proceeds (tr.).
"Quod opponentes inducunt, fidem aut caritatem aliasque virtutes parvulis, utpote non consentientibus, non infundi, a plerisque non conceditur absolute . . ., aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis vero dicentibus, et dimitti peccatum, et virtutes infundi, habentibus illas quoad habitum, non quoad usum, donec perveniant ad aetatem adultam."--Denzinger, E. S. 410.
"Nos autem attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit, tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tamquam probabiliorem, et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante Concilio duximus eligendam."--ES 483.
"Quamquam enim nemo possit esse iustus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur, id tamen in hac impii iustificatione fit, dum eiusdem sanctissimae passionis merito 'per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus' eorum, qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret (can. II). Unde in ipsa iustificatione cum remissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur: fidem, spem et caritatem. Nam fides, nisi ad eam spes accedat et caritas etc."--ES 800 (Trent, Sess. VI (Jan. 13, 1547), cap. 7).
"Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari vel sola imputatione iustitiae Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur, atque illis inhaereat . . .: A.S."
"Ille ipse Christus Jesus tanquam caput in membra et tanquam vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit, comitatur et subsequitur, et sine qua nullo pacto Deo gratia et meritoria esse possent . . ."--ES 809.
The Catechism of the Council of Trent, which was expressly intended to state the doctrine of the universal Church, especially in keeping with the decrees of Trent, declares: "This grace (the grace of regeneration in Baptism) is accompanied by a most splendid train of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul along with grace. Hence, when writing to Titus, the Apostle says: 'He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour (Tit. 3/5, 6).' St. Augustine, in explanation of the words, 'poured forth abundantly,' says: 'that is, for the remission of sins and for abundance of virtues.'"--Catechism of the Council of Trent, transl. by McHugh and Callan, New York, Jos. Wagner, 11th Printing, 1949, p. 188. The translators note that the statement attributed to St. Augustine is taken from St. Ambrose on Luke 1/15, and is found in the Gloss. interlin. Cf. S. Th. III, q. 69, aa. 4-6.
Peter Lombard, a sole exception, held that charity is not a virtue but the Holy Ghost Himself, Who moves us to acts of charity directly and without any medium of habit. Cf. I Sent. d. 17; St. Thomas refutes this position, in his Comment. in Sent. h. 1, and in II-II, q. 23, a. 2.
A number of theologians held at one time that this is de fide, e.g.: Vega, Suarez, Ripalda, Benedict XIV (as a private theologian). Cf. Prümmer, Manuale Theol. Moral. t. I, p. 324.
Cf. Prümmer, ibid. We exclude the possible aberrations of the "new theology."
Carpenter, op. cit. p. 126-27.
In I-II, 62, 1 and 2.
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS