The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro

 And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t

 First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review

 But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G

 Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c

 But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But

 But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,

 But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica

 For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio

 Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals

 Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes

 It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n

 If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi

 How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit

 This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in

 He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o

 Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere

 And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des

 Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun

 But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o

 I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve

 But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere

 And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n

 While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella

 And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un

 I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t

 For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named

 But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but

 But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le

 If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi

 He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w

 But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa

 They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint

 With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w

 But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els

 Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o

 For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to

 For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no

 But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som

 This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence

 Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor

 If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n

 Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain

 But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for

 But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp

 What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that

 But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin

 For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot

 But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r

 And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a

 And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s

 But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac

 For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen

 But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,

 On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage

 But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a

 In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F

 But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger

 To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha

 But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th

 But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human

 “But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an

 This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend

 But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order

 He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e

 But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I

 But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa

 Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera

 And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s

 I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in

 Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the

 But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,

 But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours

 But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,

 Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h

 But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and

 But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should

 All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t

 But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven

 But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr

 But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat

 But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo

 But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w

 Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f

 And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f

 But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a

 I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and

 I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi

 For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it

 But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i

 Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp

 He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne

 But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam

 But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap

 But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k

 What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin

 What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in

 Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e

 Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,

 But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar

 Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in

 But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But

 But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult

 But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our

 But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t

 When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c

 Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th

 Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and

 Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un

 How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo

 Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne

 “But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of

 He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr

 Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,

 Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are

 But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro

 “The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first

 With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who

 Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for

Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintains that Moses explicitly declares this, when he says, “God said,” adding His words, “Let there be light,” and, “Let there be a firmament,” and, “Let the waters be gathered together…and let the dry land appear,” and, “Let the earth bring forth,” and, “Let the waters bring forth,” and, whatsoever else is written in its order. Let us, then, examine the meaning of what is said. Who does not know, even if he be the merest simpleton, that there is a natural correlation between hearing and speech, and that, as it is impossible for hearing to discharge its function when no one is speaking, so speech is ineffectual unless directed to hearing? If, then, he means literally that “God said,” let him tell us also to what hearing His words were addressed. Does he mean that He said them to Himself? If so, the commands which He issues, He issues to Himself. Yet who will accept this interpretation, that God sits upon His throne prescribing what He Himself must do, and employing Himself as His minister to do His bidding? But even supposing one were to allow that it was not blasphemy to say this, who has any need of words and speech for himself, even though a man? For every one’s own mental action suffices him to produce choice and volition. But he will doubtless say that the Father held converse with the Son. But what need of vocal utterance for that? For it is a property of bodily nature to signify the thoughts of the heart by means of words, whence also written characters equivalent to speech were invented for the expression of thought. For we declare thought equally by speaking and by writing, but in the case of those who are not too far distant we reach their hearing by voice, but declare our mind to those who are at a distance by written characters; and in the case of those present with us, in proportion to their distance from us, we raise or lower the tones of our voice, and to those close by us we sometimes point out what they are to do simply by a nod; and such or such an expression of the eye is sufficient to convey our determination, or a movement of the hand is sufficient to signify our approval or disapproval of something going on. If, then, those who are encompassed by the body are able to make known the hidden working of their minds to their neighbours, even without voice, or speech, or correspondence by means of letters, and silence causes no hindrance to the despatch of business, can it be that in the case of the immaterial, and intangible, and, as Eunomius says, the Supreme and first Being, there is any need of words to indicate the thought of the Father and to make known His will to the Only-Begotten Son—words, which, as he himself says, are wont to perish as soon as they are uttered? No one, methinks, who has common sense will accept this as the truth, especially as all sound is poured forth into the air. For voice cannot be produced unless it takes consistence in air. Now, even they themselves must suppose some medium of communication between the speaker and him to whom he speaks. For if there were no such medium, how could the voice travel from the speaker to the hearer? What, then, will they say is the medium or interval by which they divide the Father from the Son? Between bodies, indeed, there is an interval of atmospheric space, differing in its nature from the nature of human bodies. But God, Who is intangible, and without form, and pure from all composition, in communicating His counsels with the Only-Begotten Son, Who is similarly, or rather in the same manner, immaterial and without body—if He made His communication by voice, what medium would He have had through which the word, transmitted as in a current, might reach the ears of the Only-Begotten? For we need hardly stop to consider that God is not separable into apprehensive faculties, as we are, whose perceptions separately apprehend their corresponding objects; e.g. sight apprehends what may be seen, hearing what may be heard, so that touch does not taste, and hearing has no perception of odours and flavours, but each confines itself to that function to which it was appointed by nature, holding itself insensible, as it were, to those with which it has no natural correspondence, and incapable of tasting the pleasure enjoyed by its neighbour sense. But with God it is otherwise. All in all, He is at once sight, and hearing, and knowledge; and there we stop, for it is not permitted us to ascribe the more animal perceptions to that refined nature. Still we take a very low view of God, and drag down the Divine to our own grovelling standard, if we suppose the Father speaking with His mouth, and the Son’s ear listening to His words. What, then, are we to suppose is the medium which conveys the Father’s voice to the hearing of the Son? It must be created or uncreate. But we may not call it created; for the Word was before the creation of the world: and beside the Divine nature there is nothing uncreate. If, therefore, there was no creation then, and the Word spoken of in the cosmogony was older than creation, will he, who maintains that speech and a voice are meant by “the Word,” suggest what medium existed between the Father and the Son, whereby those words and sounds were expressed? For if a medium exist, it must needs exist in a nature of its own, so as to differ in nature both from the Father and the Son. Being, then, something of necessity different, it divides the Father and the Son from each other, as though inserted between the two. What, then, could it be? Not created, for creation is younger than the Word. Generated we have learnt the Only-begotten (and Him alone) to be. Except the Father, none is ungenerate. Truth, therefore, obliges us to the conclusion that there is no medium between the Father and the Son. But where separation is not conceived of the closest connection is naturally implied. And what is so connected needs no medium for voice or speech. Now, by “connected,” I mean here what is in all respects inseparable. For in the case of a spiritual nature the term connection does not mean corporeal connection, but the union and blending of spiritual with spiritual through identity of will. Accordingly, there is no divergence of will between the Father and the Son, but the image of goodness is after the Archetype of all goodness and beauty, and as, if a man should look at himself in a glass (for it is perfectly allowable to explain the idea by corporeal illustrations), the copy will in all respects be conformed to the original, the shape of the man who is reflected being the cause of the shape on the glass, and the reflection making no spontaneous movement or inclination unless commenced by the original, but, if it move, moving along with it,—in like manner we maintain that our Lord, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and inseparably one with the Father in every movement of His Will. If the Father will anything, the Son Who is in the Father knows the Father’s will, or rather He is Himself the Father’s will. For, if He has in Himself all that is the Father’s, there is nothing of the Father’s that He cannot have. If, then, He has all things that are the Father’s in Himself, or, say we rather, if He has the Father Himself, then, along with the Father and the things that are the Father’s, He must needs have in Himself the whole of the Father’s will. He needs not, therefore, to know the Father’s will by word, being Himself the Word of the Father, in the highest acceptation of the term. What, then, is the word that can be addressed to Him who is the Word indeed? And how can He Who is the Word indeed require a second word for instruction?

Τοιαύτη τοῦ προσφάτου θεοῦ ἡ φύσις διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ νέου θεοποιοῦ ἀναπέφηνεν. ἀλλὰ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν γεγραμμένων καί φησι « ταῦτα τὸν Μωϋσέα διαρρήδην βοᾶν ὅτι εἶπεν ὁ θεός, καὶ προστίθησι τὰ ῥήματα, τὸ Γενηθήτω φῶς καὶ Γενηθήτω στερέωμα καὶ Συναχθήτω τὰ ὕδατα καὶ Ὀφθήτω ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ Βλαστησάτω ἡ γῆ καὶ Ἐξαγαγέτω τὰ ὕδατα καὶ πάντα ὅσα καθεξῆς ἀναγέγραπται ». οὐκοῦν ἐξετάσωμεν τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων διάνοιαν. τίς οὐκ οἶδε καὶ τῶν κομιδῇ νηπίων ὅτι φυσικὴν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν ἀκοή τε καὶ λόγος, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκοὴν ἐνεργῆσαι μηδενὸς φθεγγομένου, οὕτως οὐδὲ λόγον ἐνεργὸν εἶναι μὴ πρὸς ἀκοὴν εὐθυνόμενον. εἰ οὖν λέγει τὸ εἰρηκέναι τὸν θεόν, ὑποδειξάτω ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν πρὸς ἣν εἴρηκεν. ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ταῦτα λέγειν φήσει; οὐκοῦν ἑαυτῷ προστάσσει ταῦτα ἐγκελευόμενος. καὶ τίς τοῦτο δέξεται, καθῆσθαι τὸν θεὸν τὸ πρακτέον ἑαυτῷ διατάττοντα καὶ ἑαυτῷ διακόνῳ τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ὑπηρέτῃ χρώμενον; εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις εὐαγὲς εἶναι λέγειν, τίς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ῥημάτων ἐδεήθη καὶ λόγων, κἂν ἄνθρωπος ᾖ; ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις τὴν τῆς προαιρέσεως ὁρμὴν ἐμποιῆσαι. ἀλλὰ τῷ υἱῷ διαλέγεσθαι πάντως ἐρεῖ. καὶ τίς ἦν χρεία πρὸς τοῦτο φωνῆς; ἴδιον γὰρ τῆς ἐνσωμάτου φύσεως τὸ διὰ ῥημάτων ἐξαγγέλλειν τὰ τῆς καρδίας νοήματα: ὅθεν καὶ ἰσοδυναμοῦσα τῇ χρήσει τῆς φωνῆς ἡ δι' ἐπινοίας τῶν γραμμάτων ἐξεύρηται δήλωσις: ἐπίσης γὰρ φθεγγόμενοί τε καὶ γράφοντες τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν μὴ λίαν ἀφεστηκότων φωνῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς καθικνούμεθα, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πόρρωθεν γράμμασι δηλοῦμεν τὴν γνώμην, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρόντων πρὸς λόγον τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἢ ἐπιτείνομεν τὸν τόνον τῆς φωνῆς ἢ ὑφίεμεν, ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε καὶ διανεύοντες μόνον τὸ πρακτέον τοῖς πέλας διεσαφήσαμεν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς τοιῶσδε διατεθεὶς ἐνεδείξατο καὶ χειρὸς ποιὰ κίνησις ἢ ἀπεῖπέ τι τῶν γινομένων ἢ κατεδέξατο. εἰ τοίνυν οἱ σώματι περιειλημμένοι τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς διανοίας κινήματα καὶ δίχα φωνῆς ἢ ῥήματος ἢ τῆς ἐν γράμμασιν ὁμιλίας πολλάκις τοῖς πέλας γνωρίζουσι καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἤνεγκε τῷ σπουδαζομένῳ πράγματι ζημίαν ἡ σιωπή, ἆρ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀΰλου καὶ ἀναφοῦς καί, ὥς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, « ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτης οὐσίας » ῥημάτων χρεία τῶν καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς διασαφούντων τὸ νόημα καὶ τῷ μονογενεῖ γνωριζόντων τὸ βούλημα; ῥημάτων τῶν, καθὼς αὐτός φησι, « τῇ φωνῇ πεφυκότων συνδιαλύεσθαι »;
Οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῆ παραδέξεται, ἄλλως τε παντὸς φθόγγου πάντως εἰς ἀέρα προχεομένου (οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι φωνὴν μὴ ἐν ἀέρι συνισταμένην) ἀνάγκη πᾶσα μέσον τι τοῦ φθεγγομένου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος γίνεται καὶ αὐτοὺς ὑποθέσθαι. μὴ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ μεσιτεύοντος, πῶς ἐκ τοῦ λαλοῦντος ἡ φωνὴ διοδεύσει πρὸς τὸν ἀκούοντα; τί οὖν ἐροῦσι τὸ μέσον ᾧ τὸν υἱὸν [ἐκ] τοῦ πατρὸς διορίζουσι; τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων ὁ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα τόπος γίνεται μέσος, ἄλλο τι ὢν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων οὐσίαν. ὁ δὲ ἀναφὴς καὶ ἀνείδεος καὶ πάσης συνθέσεως καθαρεύων θεός, τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ παραπλησίως, μᾶλλον δὲ ὡσαύτως ἀΰλως τε καὶ ἀσωμάτως τῶν ἰδίων κοινωνῶν βουλευμάτων, εἴπερ διὰ φωνῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κοινωνίαν, τί τὸ μεσιτεῦον εἶχε, δι' οὗ ῥέων ὁ λόγος καὶ μεθιστάμενος ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τοῦ μονογενοῦς εἰσῳκίζετο; εἴγε χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο παραδραμεῖν ἀθεώρητον, τὸ μὴ μεμερίσθαι τὸ θεῖον ταῖς ἀντιληπτικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, ὡς παρ' ἡμῖν διῃρημένως ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων τοῦ συγγενοῦς ἐπιδράσσεται, τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μὲν ἡ ὅρασις τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν αἴσθησις, καὶ οὔτε γεύεται ἡ ἁφὴ οὔτε ἡ ἀκοὴ τὴν τῶν ἀτμῶν ἢ τῶν χυμῶν ἀντίληψιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ παραμένει ἕκαστον τῇ μιᾷ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰς ἣν ἐτάχθη παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἀναίσθητον τρόπον τινὰ πρὸς ὃ μὴ πέφυκε διαμένον καὶ ἄγευστον τῆς ἀπολαύσεως ἧς καρποῦται ἡ γείτων αἴσθησις. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου τὸ θεῖον ὅρασίς ἐστι καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ γνῶσις. οὐ γὰρ δὴ θέμις καὶ τὰς ζῳωδεστέρας τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐφαρμόζειν τῇ ἀκηράτῳ φύσει. πλὴν εἰ χρή τι καὶ ταπεινὸν ὑποθέσθαι καὶ καταγαγεῖν εἰς χαμαιζήλους ὑπολήψεις τὸ θεῖον, ὥστε λαλεῖν μὲν οἴεσθαι ῥήματα διὰ στόματος τὸν πατέρα, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ, τί τὸ μέσον ὑποτιθέμεθα τὸ διάγον τὴν πατρικὴν φωνὴν εἰς τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀκοήν; κτιστὸν εἶναι χρὴ τοῦτο ἢ ἄκτιστον; ἀλλὰ κτιστὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν: πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ συστῆναι τὴν κτίσιν ὁ λόγος ἐγένετο: ἄκτιστον δὲ πλὴν τῆς θείας φύσεώς ἐστιν οὐδέν. εἰ οὖν κτίσις οὐκ ἦν, ὁ δὲ μνημονευθεὶς ἐν τῇ κοσμογενείᾳ λόγος τῆς κτίσεως πρεσβύτερος ἦν, ἄρα ὁ λέγων ῥήματα καὶ φωνῆς ἦχον διὰ τοῦ λόγου σημαίνεσθαι τί τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποθήσεται, ᾧ διετυποῦτο ἡ φωνὴ τὰ ῥήματα; εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέσον, ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ φύσει πάντως ἐστίν, ὡς μήτε τῷ πατρὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι μήτε τῷ υἱῷ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πάντως ὂν διΐστησιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν μεταξὺ τῶν δύο παρενειρόμενον. τί οὖν τοῦτο; κτιστὸν οὐκ ἔστι: νεωτέρα γὰρ ἡ κτίσις τοῦ λόγου. γεννητὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἐδιδάχθημεν, ἀγέννητον πλὴν τοῦ πατρός ἐστιν οὐδέν. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι μέσον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοεῖν ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος συναναγκάζει. ὅπου δὲ διάστασις οὐκ ἐπινοεῖται, τὸ συνημμένον πάντως ὁμολογεῖται, τὸ δὲ διὰ πάντων συνημμένον φωνῇ καὶ λόγῳ οὐ μεσιτεύεται. συνημμένον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον. οὐ γὰρ σωματικήν τινα συμφυΐαν ἐπὶ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως τὸ ὄνομα τῆς συναφείας ἐνδείκνυται, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τῆς ταὐτότητος τῶν θελημάτων ἕνωσίν τε καὶ ἀνάκρασιν.
Διότι οὐδὲ ἔστι διαφορὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν θελήματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τῆς ἀγαθότητος κάλλος καὶ ἡ εἰκών ἐστι τῆς ἀγαθότητος. καὶ ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἑαυτὸν ἐν κατόπτρῳ βλέποι (κωλύει γὰρ οὐδὲν σωματικοῖς ὑποδείγμασι παραστῆσαι τὸ νόημα), κατὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μορφωθήσεται, ὡς αἰτίαν τῆς ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ μορφῆς εἶναι τὴν ἐνορῶσαν μορφὴν καὶ μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐπικλίνεσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα, μὴ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου τῆς ἐπικλίσεως ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἄρξαντος, εἰ δὲ κινηθείη τὸ προηγούμενον, συγκινεῖσθαι πάντως καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ δεικνύμενον, οὕτω φαμὲν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου τὸν κύριον πρὸς πᾶσαν θελήματος κίνησιν ἀμέσως τε καὶ ἀδιαστάτως συνδιατίθεσθαι τῷ πατρί. ἠθέλησέ τι ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὢν υἱὸς εἶχε τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγένετο θέλημα. ὁ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἔχει. εἰ δὴ πάντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πατρῷα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν πατέρα, πάντως μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ὅλον τὸ θέλημα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ πατρῷον. οὐ χρῄζει τοίνυν λόγῳ μαθεῖν τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ θέλημα, αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ λόγος κατὰ τὴν ὑψηλοτέραν σημασίαν τοῦ λόγου. τίς οὖν ἐκεῖνος ὁ λόγος ὁ πρὸς τὸν ὄντως λόγον γινόμενος; καὶ πῶς ὁ ὄντως λόγος λόγου πάλιν ἑτέρου πρὸς διδασκαλίαν προσδέεται;