Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Question 4, Article 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot , but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone . So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de deo substantialiter.

Dicit enim Damascenus, oportet singulum eorum quae de deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam, aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, dicit dionysius, I cap. De div. Nom., omnem sanctorum theologorum hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et laudative dei nominationes dividentem, et est sensus, quod nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum processus ipsius dei distinguuntur.

Sed quod significat processum alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo nomina dicta de deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur. Sed non intelligitur deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de deo secundum suam substantiam.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., deo hoc est esse, quod fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur.

Ergo omnia nomina huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod de nominibus quae de deo dicuntur negative, vel quae relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum. Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de deo dicuntur, sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet affirmative de deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid removendum a deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt quod, cum dicimus deum esse viventem, significamus quod deus non hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in aliis.

Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata, ut, cum dicimus deus est bonus, sit sensus, deus est causa bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis.

Sed utrumque istorum videtur esse inconveniens, propter tria.

Primo quidem, quia secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare quaedam nomina magis de deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud significatur, cum dicitur deus est bonus, nisi deus est causa bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod deus est corpus, quia est causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus, removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de deo, per posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra intentionem loquentium de deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum dicunt deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod differat a corporibus inanimatis.

Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic nomina deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant.

Ostensum est autem supra quod deus in se praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem.

Et hoc supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur.

Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant.

Cum igitur dicitur deus est bonus, non est sensus, deus est causa bonitatis, vel deus non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod deo competat esse bonum inquantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de doct. Christ., inquantum bonus est, sumus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non significant quid est deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur quid est deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis.

Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae deum repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum unumquemque processum, deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum dicitur deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita, licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod essentiam dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum.

Et sic nomina a nobis imposita eam significant.