Chapter XXIV.—Concerning what is Voluntary and what is Involuntary.

The voluntary463    Cf. Greg. Nyss., in Maxim.; Nemes., ch. 29. implies a certain definite action, and so-called involuntariness also implies a certain definite action. Further, many attribute true involuntariness not only to suffering, but even to action. We must then understand action to be rational energy. Actions are followed by praise or blame, and some of them are accompanied with pleasure and others with pain; some are to be desired by the actor, others are to be shunned: further, of those that are desirable, some are always so, others only at some particular time. And so it is also with those that are to be shunned. Again, some actions enlist pity and are pardonable, others are hateful and deserve punishment. Voluntariness, then, is assuredly followed by praise or blame, and renders the action pleasurable and desirable to the actor, either for all time or for the moment of its performance. Involuntariness, on the other hand, brings merited pity or pardon in its train, and renders the act painful and undesirable to the doer, and makes him leave it in a state of incompleteness even though force is brought to bear upon him.

Further, what is involuntary, depends in part on force and in part on ignorance. It depends on force when the creative beginning in cause is from without, that is to say, when one is forced by another without being at all persuaded, or when one does not contribute to the act on one’s own impulse, or does not co-operate at all, or do on one’s own account that which is exacted by force464    Nemes., ch. 30.. Thus we may give this definition: “An involuntary act is one in which the beginning is from without, and where one does not contribute at all on one’s own impulse to that which one is forced.” And by beginning we mean the creative cause. All involuntary act depends, on the other hand, on ignorance, when one is not the cause of the ignorance one’s self, but events just so happen. For, if one commits murder while drunk, it is an act of ignorance, but yet not involuntary465    Ibid., ch. 31.: for one was one’s self responsible for the cause of the ignorance, that is to say, the drunkenness. But if while shooting at the customary range one slew one’s father who happened to be passing by, this would be termed an ignorant and involuntary act.

As, then, that which is involuntary is in two parts, one depending on force, the other on ignorance, that which is voluntary is the opposite of both. For that which is voluntary is the result neither of force nor of ignorance466    Ibid., ch. 32.. A voluntary act, then, is one of which the beginning or cause originates in an actor, who knows each individual circumstance through which and in which the action takes place. By “individual” is meant what the rhetoricians call circumstantial elements: for instance, the actor, the sufferer, the action (perchance a murder), the instrument, the place, the time, the manner, the reason of the action.

Notice that there are certain things that occupy a place intermediate between what is voluntary and what is involuntary. Although they are unpleasant and painful we welcome them as the escape from a still greater trouble; for instance, to escape shipwreck we cast the cargo overboard467    Ibid., ch. 30..

Notice also that children and irrational creatures perform voluntary actions, but these do not involve the exercise of choice: further, all our actions that are done in anger and without previous deliberation are voluntary actions, but do not in the least involve free choice468    Nemes., ch. 33.. Also, if a friend suddenly appears on the scene, or if one unexpectedly lights on a treasure, so far as we are concerned it is quite voluntary, but there is no question of choice in the matter. For all these things are voluntary, because we desire pleasure from them, but they do not by any means imply choice, because they are not the result of deliberation. And deliberation must assuredly precede choice, as we have said above.

Περὶ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἐν πράξει τινί ἐστι καὶ τὸ νομιζόμενον δὲ ἀκούσιον ἐν πράξει τινί ἐστι, πολλοὶ δέ τινες καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀκούσιον οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ πράττειν τίθενται, δεῖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πρᾶξίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια λογική. Ταῖς δὲ πράξεσιν ἕπεται ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λύπης πράττονται, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱρεταὶ τῷ πράττοντι, αἱ δὲ φευκταί, καὶ τῶν αἱρετῶν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ κατά τινα χρόνον, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν. Καὶ πάλιν αἱ μὲν τῶν πράξεων ἐλεοῦνται, αἱ δὲ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦνται, αἱ δὲ μισοῦνται καὶ κολάζονται. Τῷ μὲν οὖν ἑκουσίῳ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖ ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς πράττεσθαι καὶ τὸ αἱρετὰς εἶναι τὰς πράξεις τοῖς πράττουσιν ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ τότε, ὅτε πράττονται, τῷ δὲ ἀκουσίῳ τὸ συγγνώμης ἢ ἐλέους ἀξιοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ μετὰ λύπης πράττεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αἱρετὰς μηδὲ δι' ἑαυτοῦ τελεῖν τὸ πραττόμενον, εἰ καὶ βιάζοιτο.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀκουσίου τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ βίαν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν: κατὰ βίαν μέν, ὅταν ἡ ποιητικὴ ἀρχὴ ἤγουν αἰτία ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἤγουν ὅταν ὑφ' ἑτέρου βιαζώμεθα, μηδ' ὅλως πειθόμενοι μηδὲ συμβαλλώμεθα κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν μηδὲ ὅλως συμπράττωμεν ἢ δι' ἑαυτῶν τὸ βιασθὲν ποιῶμεν, ὃ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φαμεν: Οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν τοῦ βιασθέντος. Ἀρχὴν δέ φαμεν τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν. Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ παρέχωμεν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οὕτω συμβῇ. Εἰ γὰρ μεθύων τις φόνον ποιήσει, ἀγνοῶν ἐφόνευσεν, οὐ μὴν ἀκουσίως: τὴν γὰρ αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας ἤγουν τὴν μέθην αὐτὸς ἔπραξεν. Εἰ δέ τις ἐν τῷ συνήθει τόπῳ τοξεύων τὸν πατέρα παριόντα ἀπέκτεινε, δι' ἄγνοιαν λέγεται ἀκουσίως τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι.

Τοῦ οὖν ἀκουσίου διττοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ μὲν κατὰ βίαν, τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντίκειται: ἔστι γὰρ ἑκούσιον τὸ μήτε κατὰ βίαν μήτε δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενον. Ἑκούσιον τοίνυν ἐστίν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τουτέστιν ἡ αἰτία ἐν αὑτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. «Καθ' ἕκαστα» δέ ἐστιν, ἃ καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι περιστατικὰ μόρια, οἷον τίς ἤγουν ὁ πράξας, τίνα ἤγουν τὸν παθόντα, τί ἤγουν αὐτὸ τὸ πραχθέν, τυχὸν ἐφόνευσε: τίνι ἤγουν ὀργάνῳ, ποῦ ἤγουν τόπῳ, πότε ἤγουν ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ, πῶς ὁ τρόπος τῆς πράξεως, διὰ τί ἤγουν διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν.

Ἰστέον, ὥς εἰσί τινα μέσα ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων, ἅτινα ἀηδῆ καὶ λυπηρὰ ὄντα διὰ μεῖζον κακὸν καταδεχόμεθα, ὡς διὰ ναυάγιον ἀποβάλλομεν τὰ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ.

Ἰστέον, ὡς τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιεῖ, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ προαιρούμενα, καὶ ὅσα διὰ θυμὸν πράττομεν μὴ προβουλευσάμενοι, ἑκουσίως ποιοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Καὶ ὁ φίλος αἰφνιδίως ἐπέστη ἑκουσίως μὲν ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν καὶ προαιρούμενος. Καὶ ὁ θησαυρῷ ἀνελπίστως περιτυχὼν ἑκουσίως περιέτυχεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ προαιρούμενος. Πάντα ταῦτα ἑκούσια μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἥδεσθαι, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, διότι οὐκ ἀπὸ βουλῆς. Δεῖ δὲ πάντως βουλὴν προηγεῖσθαι τῆς προαιρέσεως, καθὼς εἴρηται.