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Therefore, voluntary. And since we have often mentioned choice and what is in our power, we must also discuss choice. 32 Concerning choice. What, then, is choice? Is it the voluntary, since everything done by choice is also voluntary? But the converse is not true, which would be the case if the voluntary and choice were the same; but as it is, we find the voluntary to be more extensive. For all choice is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is a matter of choice. For children and irrational animals act voluntarily, but not by choice. And whatever we do out of anger without prior deliberation, we do these things voluntarily, but not by choice. But also, a friend suddenly appeared to us; voluntarily, as we are pleased, but not by choice. And he who unexpectedly found a treasure voluntarily came upon a windfall, but not by choice. From all these things, therefore, it is concluded that the voluntary is not the same as choice. Is choice, then, appetite? Not this either. For appetite is divided into three: desire, anger, and will. But that choice is neither anger nor desire is clear from the fact that human beings do not have a community with irrational animals in respect to choice, but in respect to desire and anger. For if we share in these things, but differ in respect to choice, it is clear that choice is one thing, and anger and desire another. And the incontinent man also shows this, being overcome by desire and acting according to it, but certainly not by choice; for in his case, choice opposes desire. And if they were the same, they would not be in conflict. And the continent man, acting by choice, does not act by desire. That choice is not will is clear from this. For 'to will' does not apply to all the things to which 'to choose' applies. For we say that we will to be healthy, but no one would say that they choose to be healthy; and we will to be rich, but it is not said that we choose to be rich. Further, willing is also directed at impossible things, but choosing only at things in our power; thus we say, 'I will to become immortal'; but we do not say, 'I choose to become immortal.' For will is of the end, but choice is of the means to the end, in the same proportion as the object of will is to the object of deliberation. For the object of will is the end, but the objects of deliberation are the means to the end. Further, we choose only those things which we think can come about through ourselves; but we also will things that cannot come about through ourselves, such as for a certain general to be victorious. That choice is neither anger nor desire nor will has been sufficiently demonstrated; but that it is not opinion either becomes clear both through the same proofs and through others. For opinion is not only of things in our power but also of eternal things. Further, we speak of opinion as true and false; but we do not speak of choice as true and false. And opinion is of universals, but choice is of particulars; for choice is about things to be done, and these are particulars. But choice is not deliberation either, such as counsel. For deliberation is an inquiry about things to be done by oneself. But what is chosen is what has been preferred out of deliberation. It is clear, therefore, that deliberation is about things still being sought; but choice is about things already preferred. What choice is not, therefore, has been said; let us say what it is. It is, then, something mixed from deliberation and judgment and appetite; and it is neither appetite by itself, nor judgment, nor deliberation alone, but something compounded from these. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that the animal is neither body by itself, nor soul alone, but the combination of both, so also is choice. That it is, then, a kind of counsel and deliberation with judgment, even if it is not counsel itself, is clear also from its etymology; for that which is chosen is one thing taken before another. And no one prefers something without having deliberated, nor takes it without having judged. But since we are not eager to put into action all things that seem to us to be good, then what has been preferred out of deliberation becomes a choice and an object of choice, when it receives the addition of appetite. Necessarily, therefore, choice is concerned with the same things as deliberation. And it is concluded from these things that choice is an appetite

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ἑκούσια ἄρα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλαχοῦ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐμνημονεύσαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν διαληπτέον καὶ περὶ προαιρέσεως. 32 περὶ προαιρέσεωσ Τί ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις; ἆρα τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει, ὅπερ ἐγένετο ἂν εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἑκούσιον καὶ προαίρεσις· νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον εὑρίσκομεν τὸ ἑκούσιον. πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ προαίρεσις ἑκούσιος· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἐν προαιρέσει. καὶ γὰρ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιεῖ, οὐ μὴν καὶ προαιρούμενα. καὶ ὅσα δὲ διὰ θυμὸν πράττομεν μὴ προβουλευσάμενοι ταῦτα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἡμῖν ἐξαίφνης ἐπέστη· ἑκουσίως μὲν ὡς ἥδεσθαι, οὐ μὴν προῃρημένοις. καὶ ὁ θησαυρὸν ἀπροσδοκήτως εὑρὼν ἑκουσίως μὲν ἑρμαίῳ περιέτυχεν, οὐ προαιρούμενος δέ. ἐκ πάντων οὖν συνάγεται τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον τῇ προαιρέσει. ἆρ' οὖν ὄρεξίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο. διαιρεῖται γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ βούλησιν. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὔτε θυμὸς οὔτε ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα μὲν κοινωνοῦμεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δὲ διαφέρομεν, δῆλον ὡς ἄλλο μέν τι προαίρεσις, ἄλλο δὲ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία. δείκνυσι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρα τής, κρατούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ πράττων κατ' αὐτήν, μὴ μέντοι καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν· ἀντιβαίνει γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ προαίρεσις τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἦσαν οὐκ ἐμάχοντο. καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ πράττων κατὰ προαίρεσιν οὐ πράττει κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. οὐ πᾶσιν οἷς ἁρμόζει τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι, τούτοις ἁρμόζει καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι. φαμὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι ὑγιαίνειν, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι· καὶ βούλεσθαι πλουτεῖν, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ προαιρεῖσθαι πλουτεῖν λέγεται. ἔτι τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων τάττεται, τὸ δὲ προαιρεῖσθαι ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· οὕτω γοῦν φαμεν βούλομαι ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι· προαιροῦμαι δὲ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι οὐ φαμέν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν ἣν ἔχει τὸ βουλητὸν πρὸς τὸ βουλευτόν. βουλητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος, βουλευτὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔτι ταῦτα μόνα προαιρούμεθα ἃ δι' ἡμῶν οἰόμεθα δύνασθαι γενέσθαι· βουλό μεθα δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ δι' ἡμῶν οἷά τε γενέσθαι, ὡς τὸ νικῆσαί τινα στρατηγόν. ὅτι μὲν οὔτε θυμὸς οὔτε ἐπιθυμία οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτάρκως ἀποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ δόξα δῆλον γίνεται καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ δι' ἑτέρων. ἡ γὰρ δόξα οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων. ἔτι δόξαν μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν καὶ ψευδῆ· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. καὶ ἡ μὲν δόξα τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα· περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρακτῶν ἡ προαίρεσις, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βούλευσίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, οἷον βουλή. βούλευσις μὲν γάρ ἐστι ζήτησις περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν. προαιρετὸν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθέν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν βούλευσις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔτι ζητουμένοις· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἤδη προκεκριμένοις. τί μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις εἴρηται· τί δέ ἐστιν εἴπωμεν. ἔστιν οὖν μικτόν τι ἐκ βουλῆς καὶ κρίσεως καὶ ὀρέξεως· καὶ οὔτε ὄρεξις καθ' ἑαυτήν, οὔτε κρίσις, οὔτε βουλὴ μόνη, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων τι συγκείμενον. ὡς γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ ζῷον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι, μήτε δὲ σῶμα εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ ζῷον, μήτε ψυχὴν μόνην, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βουλή τίς ἐστι καὶ βούλευσις μετ' ἐπικρίσεως, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτὸ βουλή, φανερὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐτυμολογίας· προαιρετὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον πρὸ ἑτέρου αἱρετόν. οὐδεὶς δὲ προκρίνει τι μὴ βουλευσάμενος, οὐδὲ αἱρεῖται μὴ κρί νας. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πάντα τὰ δόξαντα ἡμῖν εὖ ἔχειν εἰς ἔργον ἀγαγεῖν προθυμούμεθα, τότε προαίρεσις καὶ προαιρετὸν γίνεται τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, ὅταν προσλάβῃ τὴν ὄρεξιν. ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ ταὐτά ἐστιν περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ βουλή. συνάγεται δὲ ἐκ τούτων προαίρεσιν εἶναι ὄρεξιν