and there by the theologians, as indicative of the Father's hypostasis, but not as of the Son also being a joint-cause with respect to the Godhead.

Not with respect to the beginningless Spirit, therefore, is the pre-eminent and first cause, away with the blasphemy, but with respect to those things that have a temporal beginning, for which the Son is also a joint-cause with the Father. But truly, for those things for which the Father is properly the first cause, that is, of created things, it is not pious to say, that we speak of creation as of the Son, but we do not say from the Son. If therefore also with respect to the uncreated Spirit the Father were the first cause, with the Son also being a joint-cause, it would be impious to say, that we do not say "from the Son". But since he who says this is not only pious, but also numbered among the saints, impious, then, is he who says the Son is a joint-cause with the Father with respect to the Spirit, and for this reason calls the Father the first cause with respect to the most high Trinity. For the Father hears this on account of us, who have come to be through the Son, wherefore each is our maker, and indeed also Father; and though one maker and Father is spoken of in our case, the Father with the Son, yet it is as possessing one and the same creative power. But there, in every way and entirely, one is Father, one is cause; for that which begets does not belong to both, but one fount of Godhead, the Father. Where, then, does "first cause" have any place at all? As of the (p. 246) effect also being a joint-cause? The saying is impious; let it be thrown to the crows, lest it make you a companion to the intelligible ravens.

But how then would this John, wise as any in divine matters, and what is more, one who set forth with precision the sure doctrine concerning God, have proposed without qualification that which required qualification? And what statement foolishly made by the heterodox would not have a place, if we were to permit the qualification of things that have been declared without qualification concerning the tri-hypostatic Godhead? For since God is Spirit, and each of the three is in turn called Spirit. If then someone, innovating, were to say that the Son is from the Spirit, since the Son is God and from God, and God is Spirit, and then we were to retort that God is indeed called Spirit and the Spirit of God, but God is not said to be from Spirit, would he be able to say that this is not said with respect to the first cause? Certainly not.

And if someone dared to say that the Son is not creator, would we have justified him by saying, that he asserts the Son is not creator with respect to the first cause? Away with it. But if we, for our part, piously say, 'that there was not when the Son was not', and someone, qualifying this, were to say not eternally but temporally, as if the expression embraced only time, but not eternity, would he not immediately hear from us that what you are saying, O man, is a clear rejection of the acknowledged truths and a distortion of what is piously established? Thus, the occasion and beginning and root and fount of all impiety is to qualify those things which were theologized without qualification by our God-bearing fathers; and this almost alone of all things mixes the unmixable and spins together, so to speak, the unspinnable and things most hostile to one another, both piety and impiety, and shows those who hold to each as having no opposition, for the sake of deception. To such an extent do the Latins abuse this, that even when hearing the saints theologizing without qualification that (p. 248) the Father alone is the principle and root and fount of Godhead, they themselves qualify all these things (or rather, through qualification, they deceitfully dogmatize against these things) and yet they ought to have adhered together to all the utterances of the divinely wise theologians, both where they say the Spirit is from the Father alone, wherefore the Father is also the only cause and fount of Godhead, and where again, that the Spirit is from the Son, to bring them together into one and to understand correctly that [the Spirit is] from the Father alone, but not also from the Son the

κἀκεῖ παρά τῶν θεολόγων, ὡς δεικτικόν τῆς τοῦ Πατρός ὑποστάσεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ συναιτίου ὄντος ἐπί τῆς θεότητος.

Οὐκ ἐπί τοῦ ἀνάρχου τοίνυν Πνεύματος τό προκαταρκτικόν καί πρῶτον αἴτιον, ἄπαγε τῆς βλασφημίας, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπί τῶν ἐσχηκότων τήν χρονικήν ἀρχήν, ἐφ᾿ ὧν καί ὁ Υἱός τῷ Πατρί συναίτιός ἐστιν. Ἀλλά μήν ἐφ᾿ ὧν πρῶτον κυρίως αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὁ Πατήρ, τῶν κτισμάτων δηλαδή, οὐκ εὐσεβές εἰπεῖν, ὡς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μέν τήν κτίσιν λέγομεν, ἐκ δέ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Εἰ τοίνυν καί ἐπί τοῦ ἀκτίστου Πνεύματος πρῶτον αἴτιον ὑπῆρχεν ὁ Πατήρ, ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου, δυσσεβοῦς ἄν ἦν λέγειν, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Ἐπεί δέ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων οὐκ εὐσεβής μόνον, ἀλλά καί τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐναρίθμιος, δυσσεβής ἄρ᾿ ὁ λέγων συναίτιον τῷ Πατρί τόν Υἱόν ἐπί τοῦ Πνεύματος καί διά τοῦτο πρῶτον αἴτιον ἐπί τῆς ἀνωτάτω Τριάδος τόν Πατέρα. Τοῦτο γάρ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς τούς διά τοῦ Υἱοῦ γεγονότας ἀκούει ὁ Πατήρ, διό καί ποιητής ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος, μενοῦνγε καί Πατήρ˙ κἄν εἷς καί ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν λέγηται ποιητής τε καί Πατήρ ὁ Πατήρ σύν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν δημιουργικήν δύναμιν πλουτοῦντες. Ἐκεῖ δέ πάντῃ τε καί πάντως εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς αἴτιος˙ οὐ γάρ ἐστι τό γόνιμον ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά μία πηγαία θεότης, ὁ Πατήρ. Ποῦ γοῦν ὅλως χώραν ἔχει τό πρῶτον αἴτιον; ὡς καί τοῦ (σελ. 246) αἰτιατοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου; Ἀσεβής ὁ λόγος˙ ἐς κάρακας ριπτέσθω, μή τοῖς νοητοῖς σε κόραξι σύννομον καταστήσῃ.

Πῶς δέ ἄρα ὁ σοφός οὗτος εἴπερ τις τά θεῖα Ἰωάννης, καί ταῦτα τήν ἀσφαλῆ δόξαν περί Θεοῦ ἠκριβωμένως ἐκτιθείς, ἀπροσδιορίστως ἄν προέθετο τό προσδιορισμοῦ δεόμενον; Ποῖον δέ οὐχ ἕξει χώραν τῶν ἀφρόνως παρά τῶν κακοδόξων εἰρημένων, εἰ προσδιορίζειν δοίημεν τά ἀπροσδιορίστως περί τῆς τρισυποστάτου θεότητος ἐκπεφασμένα; Ἐπεί γάρ Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός, καί τῶν τριῶν ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει Πνεῦμα λέγεται. Εἴ τις οὖν καινοτομῶν ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, ἐπεί Θεός ὁ Υἱός καί ἐκ Θεοῦ, Πνεῦμα δέ ὑπάρχει ὁ Θεός, εἶθ᾿ ἡμεῖς ἀντεπεφέρωμεν ὅτι Θεός μέν Πνεῦμα καί Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα λέγεται, Θεός δέ ἐκ Πνεύματος οὐ λέγεται, ἆρα ἄν εἶχε λέγειν, ὡς πρός τό πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐ λέγεται; Οὔμενοῦν.

Τολμήσαντος δέ τινος μή δημιουργόν εἶναι φάναι τόν Υἱόν, ἆρ᾿ ἄν ἡμεῖς ἐδικαιώσαμεν αὐτόν εἰπόντες, ὡς πρός τόν πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐκ εἶναι φάσκει τόν Υἱόν δημιουργόν; Ἄπαγε. Ἡμῶν δ᾿ αὖ λεγόντων εὐσεβῶς, 'ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ Υἱός', εἴ τις προσδιορίζων ἔλεγε μή αἰωνίως ἀλλά χρονικῶς, ὡς τόν χρόνον μόνον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί τόν αἰῶνα συμπεριβαλλούσης τῆς φωνῆς, οὐκ εὐθύς ἄν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀκούσειεν ὡς τοῦθ᾿ ὅ λέγεις, ἄνθρωπε, σαφής ἀθέτησίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμολογουμένων καί διαστροφή τῶν εὐσεβῶς κειμένων; Οὕτω πάσης δυσσεβείας ἐστίν ἀφορμή καί ἀρχή καί ρίζα καί πηγή τό προσδιορίζειν τά τεθεολογημένα τοῖς θεοφόροις ἡμῶν πατράσιν ἀπροσδιορίστως˙ καί σχεδόν τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἁπάντων μιγνύει τά ἄμικτα καί συγκλώθει, τό τοῦ λόγου, τά ἀσύγκλωστα καί τά πολεμιώτατα πρός ἄλληλα, εὐσέβειάν τε καί ἀσέβειαν, καί τούς ἀντεχομένους ἑκατέρας ὠς μηδέν ἀντικειμένους πρός ἀπάτην δείκνυσι. Τοσούτῳ δέ οἱ Λατῖνοι τούτῳ καταχρῶνται, ὡς καί τῶν ἁγίων ἀκούοντες θεολογούντων ἀπροσδιορίστως ὅτι (σελ. 248) μόνος ὁ Πατήρ ἀρχή καί ρίζα καί πηγή θεότητος, αὐτοί πάντα ταῦτα προσδιορίζουσι (μᾶλλον δέ διά τοῦ προσδιορισμοῦ δολίως τούτοις ἀντιδογματίζουσι) καίτοι πάσαις ἐχρῆν αὐτούς ὁμοῦ στοιχεῖν ταῖς τῶν θεοσόφων θεολόγων φωναῖς, καί ποῦ μέν λεγούσαις ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός τό Πνεῦμα, διό καί μόνον αἴτιον τόν Πατέρα καί πηγήν θεότητος, ποῦ δ᾿ αὖ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα συνάγειν εἰς ἕν καί φρονεῖν εὖ ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό