Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" (Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (Article 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (Article 3).

Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.

Articulus 6

Argumentum 1

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa intellectuum.

Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam deum. Ergo nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam deo.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, secundum dionysium, in libro de div. Nom., deum ex creaturis nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in deum, per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. Ergo omnia nomina quae de deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius de creaturis quam de deo dicuntur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnia nomina quae communiter de deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit dionysius.

Sed quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de deo.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. III, flecto genua mea ad patrem domini nostri iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur.

Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de deo quam de creaturis dicuntur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium.

Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis.

Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de deo dicuntur, per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de deo, quia dicta de deo, nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod, secundum quod dicuntur de deo, eorum significatio definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur.

De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de deo, esset etiam eadem ratio, si dicerentur de deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt.

Sic enim. Cum dicitur deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum, dictum de deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de deo.

Sed supra ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de deo quam de creaturis, quia a deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem nominis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum de deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de medicina.