Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.

Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental . But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental . Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).

Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

Articulus 7

Argumentum 1

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, non dicantur de deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur.

Unde et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina substantia, et creator significat dei actionem, quae est eius essentia.

Sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de deo ex tempore, sed ab aeterno.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo de deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, si aliqua nomina dicuntur de deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, in caritate perpetua dilexi te.

Ergo et alia nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de deo ab aeterno.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod relatio illa vel sit aliquid in deo, vel in creatura tantum.

Sed non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic deus denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis; nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod relatio est etiam aliquid in deo. Sed in deo nihil potest esse ex tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi nomina non dicantur de deo ex tempore.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio dominii non est in deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, sequitur quod deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse falsum.

Argumentum 6

Praeterea, in relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut dicitur in praedicamentis.

Sed relativa quae dicuntur de deo et creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative de deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente.

Et sic huiusmodi nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de deo ab aeterno, et non ex tempore.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio dominus deo convenit ex tempore.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore de deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno.

Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed rationis tantum.

Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi.

Quaedam vero relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia.

Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis, et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus.

Unde philosophus dicit, in V metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa.

Et similiter dextrum non dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum igitur deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum deum; sed in deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, praedicari de deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali translato.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant actionem dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de deo dicuntur ex tempore, non sunt in deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum esse dicitur de deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa ipsum existente, sicut est id, domine refugium factus es nobis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante, et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de deo ab aeterno. Quae vero consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad exteriores effectus, dicuntur de deo ex tempore, ut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae dicuntur de deo ex tempore, sunt in deo secundum rationem tantum, oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, deus denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum nostrum oppositae relationes in deo. Ut sic deus dicatur relative ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus dicit, in V metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia refertur ad ipsum.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur deus ad creaturam, qua creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit in creatura, sequitur quod deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed realiter sit dominus.

Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei subiecta est.

Ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura vel non, non oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul natura.

Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile. Nam scibile dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel secundum actum. Unde scibile, secundum modum suae significationis, praeexistit scientiae. Sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum, tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum, nam scitum non est aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur deus sit prior creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus, sunt simul natura. Unde deus non fuit dominus, antequam haberet creaturam sibi subiectam.