45

reasonings, having noted these with a most clear and divinely inspired word, you know John, the one who shone forth from Damascus and bathed the whole inhabited world with the light of the knowledge of God. Does he not say most distinctly, "that we say Spirit of the Son, but we do not say from the Son"? "Yes," he says, "and I cannot say that he did not say so, but I can say that He is not said to be from the Son with respect to the first cause."

(p. 244) Indeed! Do you have another cause in the Godhead, if not the first? For this has been said by the fathers with respect to us who have been created, and thus 'the first' has meaning with respect to the cause, inasmuch as the Son and the Spirit are also co-causes. For which reason the great Basil also called the Father the procatarctic cause. And just as He is properly Father of the only-begotten, but is also called our [Father], we who are not begotten but created by Him, so again 'first cause' is properly [said] on account of us; and it is also said there by the theologians, as indicative of the Father's hypostasis, but not as if the Son is also a co-cause in the Godhead.

The procatarctic and first cause, therefore, is not with respect to the unoriginate Spirit—away with the blasphemy!—but with respect to those things that have a beginning in time, in which the Son is also a co-cause with the Father. But surely, concerning those things of which the Father is properly the first cause, that is, of created things, it is not pious to say, 'that we speak of creation of the Son, but we do not speak of it from the Son.' If, therefore, the Father were the first cause also with respect to the uncreated Spirit, with the Son also being a co-cause, it would be impious to say, 'that we do not say from the Son.' But since he who says this is not only pious, but also numbered among the saints, then he is impious who says the Son is a co-cause with the Father with respect to the Spirit, and for this reason [calls] the Father the first cause in the most high Trinity. For the Father hears this on account of us who have come into being through the Son, for which reason each is our maker, and indeed also Father; and even if in our case the Father with the Son is called one maker and Father, it is as possessing one and the same creative power. But there, in every way and altogether, there is one Father, one cause; for the generative power does not belong to both, but there is one fount of divinity, the Father. Where, then, does 'the first cause' have any place at all, as if the (p. 246) caused one were also a co-cause? Impious is the argument; let it be cast to the crows, lest it make you a companion to the intelligible crows.

How then could this John, wise if anyone in divine matters, and what is more, setting forth with precision the sure doctrine concerning God, have put forth without qualification that which requires qualification? And what room will there not be for the things foolishly said by the heterodox, if we should grant the qualification of things that have been stated without qualification concerning the tri-hypostatic divinity? For since God is Spirit, each of the three is also individually called Spirit. If, then, someone innovating were to say that the Son is from the Spirit, since the Son is God and from God, and God is Spirit, and then we were to rejoin that God is indeed called Spirit and the Spirit of God, but God is not said to be from Spirit, would he be able to say, that He is not said [to be from Spirit] with respect to the first cause? Certainly not.

And if someone dared to say that the Son is not the creator, would we have justified him by saying that he asserts the Son is not the creator with respect to the first cause? Away with it! And again, when we piously say, 'that there was not when the Son was not,' if someone qualifying this were to say not eternally but temporally, as if the phrase encompassed only time, but not eternity, would he not immediately hear from us that 'what you say, O man, is a clear rejection of what is confessed and a distortion of what is piously established'? Thus it is the occasion and beginning of all impiety

45

λογισμούς, σαφεστάτῳ τε καί θεοπνεύστῳ λόγῳ τούτους ἐπισημηνάμενοι, Ἰωάννην οἶσθα τόν ἐκ ∆αμασκοῦ πυρσεύσαντα καί τήν οἰκουμένην ὅλην φωτί περιαυγάσαντα θεογνωσίας. Οὐχ οὗτος ἀριδηλότατά φησιν, «ὡς Πνεῦμα μέν Υἱοῦ λέγομεν, ἐκ δέ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν»; "Ναί", φησί, "καί οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν ὡς οὐχ οὗτος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἔχω λέγειν ὡς πρός τό πρῶτον αἴτιον ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγεται".

(σελ. 244) Βαβαί˙ ἔστι δέ σοι καί ἄλλο αἴτιον ἐπί τῆς θεότητος, εἰ μή τό πρῶτον; Τοῦτο γάρ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν τῶν δεδημιουργημένων τοῖς πατράσιν εἴρηται καί οὕτως ἔχει λόγον τό πρῶτον ἐπί τοῦ αἰτίου, ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Πνεύματος ὄντων συναιτίων. ∆ιό καί προκαταρκτικόν τόν Πατέρα αἴτιον ὁ μέγας εἴρηκε Βασίλειος. Ὥσπερ δέ Πατήρ μέν ἔστι κυρίως τοῦ μονογενοῦς, λέγεται δέ καί ἡμῶν τῶν μή γεγεννημένων ἀλλά δεδημιουργημένων ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ, οὕτω πάλιν πρῶτον αἴτιον δι᾿ ἡμᾶς κυρίως˙ λέγεται δέ κἀκεῖ παρά τῶν θεολόγων, ὡς δεικτικόν τῆς τοῦ Πατρός ὑποστάσεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ συναιτίου ὄντος ἐπί τῆς θεότητος.

Οὐκ ἐπί τοῦ ἀνάρχου τοίνυν Πνεύματος τό προκαταρκτικόν καί πρῶτον αἴτιον, ἄπαγε τῆς βλασφημίας, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπί τῶν ἐσχηκότων τήν χρονικήν ἀρχήν, ἐφ᾿ ὧν καί ὁ Υἱός τῷ Πατρί συναίτιός ἐστιν. Ἀλλά μήν ἐφ᾿ ὧν πρῶτον κυρίως αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὁ Πατήρ, τῶν κτισμάτων δηλαδή, οὐκ εὐσεβές εἰπεῖν, ὡς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μέν τήν κτίσιν λέγομεν, ἐκ δέ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Εἰ τοίνυν καί ἐπί τοῦ ἀκτίστου Πνεύματος πρῶτον αἴτιον ὑπῆρχεν ὁ Πατήρ, ὡς καί τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου, δυσσεβοῦς ἄν ἦν λέγειν, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐ λέγομεν. Ἐπεί δέ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων οὐκ εὐσεβής μόνον, ἀλλά καί τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐναρίθμιος, δυσσεβής ἄρ᾿ ὁ λέγων συναίτιον τῷ Πατρί τόν Υἱόν ἐπί τοῦ Πνεύματος καί διά τοῦτο πρῶτον αἴτιον ἐπί τῆς ἀνωτάτω Τριάδος τόν Πατέρα. Τοῦτο γάρ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς τούς διά τοῦ Υἱοῦ γεγονότας ἀκούει ὁ Πατήρ, διό καί ποιητής ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος, μενοῦνγε καί Πατήρ˙ κἄν εἷς καί ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν λέγηται ποιητής τε καί Πατήρ ὁ Πατήρ σύν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν δημιουργικήν δύναμιν πλουτοῦντες. Ἐκεῖ δέ πάντῃ τε καί πάντως εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς αἴτιος˙ οὐ γάρ ἐστι τό γόνιμον ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά μία πηγαία θεότης, ὁ Πατήρ. Ποῦ γοῦν ὅλως χώραν ἔχει τό πρῶτον αἴτιον; ὡς καί τοῦ (σελ. 246) αἰτιατοῦ ὄντος συναιτίου; Ἀσεβής ὁ λόγος˙ ἐς κάρακας ριπτέσθω, μή τοῖς νοητοῖς σε κόραξι σύννομον καταστήσῃ.

Πῶς δέ ἄρα ὁ σοφός οὗτος εἴπερ τις τά θεῖα Ἰωάννης, καί ταῦτα τήν ἀσφαλῆ δόξαν περί Θεοῦ ἠκριβωμένως ἐκτιθείς, ἀπροσδιορίστως ἄν προέθετο τό προσδιορισμοῦ δεόμενον; Ποῖον δέ οὐχ ἕξει χώραν τῶν ἀφρόνως παρά τῶν κακοδόξων εἰρημένων, εἰ προσδιορίζειν δοίημεν τά ἀπροσδιορίστως περί τῆς τρισυποστάτου θεότητος ἐκπεφασμένα; Ἐπεί γάρ Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός, καί τῶν τριῶν ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει Πνεῦμα λέγεται. Εἴ τις οὖν καινοτομῶν ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, ἐπεί Θεός ὁ Υἱός καί ἐκ Θεοῦ, Πνεῦμα δέ ὑπάρχει ὁ Θεός, εἶθ᾿ ἡμεῖς ἀντεπεφέρωμεν ὅτι Θεός μέν Πνεῦμα καί Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα λέγεται, Θεός δέ ἐκ Πνεύματος οὐ λέγεται, ἆρα ἄν εἶχε λέγειν, ὡς πρός τό πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐ λέγεται; Οὔμενοῦν.

Τολμήσαντος δέ τινος μή δημιουργόν εἶναι φάναι τόν Υἱόν, ἆρ᾿ ἄν ἡμεῖς ἐδικαιώσαμεν αὐτόν εἰπόντες, ὡς πρός τόν πρῶτον αἴτιον οὐκ εἶναι φάσκει τόν Υἱόν δημιουργόν; Ἄπαγε. Ἡμῶν δ᾿ αὖ λεγόντων εὐσεβῶς, 'ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ Υἱός', εἴ τις προσδιορίζων ἔλεγε μή αἰωνίως ἀλλά χρονικῶς, ὡς τόν χρόνον μόνον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί τόν αἰῶνα συμπεριβαλλούσης τῆς φωνῆς, οὐκ εὐθύς ἄν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀκούσειεν ὡς τοῦθ᾿ ὅ λέγεις, ἄνθρωπε, σαφής ἀθέτησίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμολογουμένων καί διαστροφή τῶν εὐσεβῶς κειμένων; Οὕτω πάσης δυσσεβείας ἐστίν ἀφορμή καί ἀρχή