45

arising within, is bodily for the sensible part, but for the other, intelligible and incorporeal. Likewise also, the beautiful and that which is not so is not the same for each of the two forms of our life, but is intelligible to the intelligible part, and to the sensible and bodily part, it is such as sensation wishes. Since, then, sensation is innate from our first birth, while the mind awaits the progression to a commensurate age, so as to be able to appear little by little in the subject, for this reason the mind, which arises bit by bit, is dominated by sensation, being wholly present, and is forcibly accustomed always by the more powerful part to obey it, judging that to be beautiful or base which sensation has either chosen or rejected. For this reason the comprehension of the truly good becomes for us both difficult and 5.420 hard to achieve, because we are preoccupied by the criteria of the senses, defining the beautiful in that which delights and pleases. For just as it is not possible to look at the beauties in heaven when a fog has taken over the air above one's head, so too the eye of the soul does not clearly see virtue, being dimmed in its sight as by a kind of mist through pleasure. Since, then, sensation looks toward pleasure, and the mind is hindered by pleasure from seeing virtue, this becomes the origin of evil, because the mind, too, having been dominated by sensation, has ratified the irrational judgment about the beautiful; and if the eye should say that the beautiful is in the pleasing color of what appears, the intellect also inclines to this; and in other cases likewise, that which delights the sense has won the vote for the beautiful. But if it were somehow possible for us from the beginning to have a true judgment concerning the beautiful, with the mind testing the good by itself, we would not have become beast-like, being enslaved to irrational sensation, and been subjugated. So that, therefore, such confusion in us might be distinguished and that which is by nature lovable and that which is otherwise might be unerringly recognized, Ecclesiastes now says these things in the passage, that there is a time to love and a time to hate. Through which he distinguishes the nature of things, showing what is 5.421 profitably loved and what is hated. Youth, seething with the passions of its age, says it is a time for it to love these things that are dear to youth. But Ecclesiastes cries out against youth, defining another time for pure love; for the soul's erring disposition towards unfitting things is not love. For just as when nature is proceeding well in health, thirst comes to the body at the right time, but for those in whom the bite of the thirst-inducing viper has produced such a condition, one would not say that the thirst is active at the right time; for in these cases thirst is not a natural desire, but a passion; so also the sordid love-potion of youth is not a love-potion, but a disease arising from the burning and venomous bite of that age. Therefore, not every love is opportune, but only that which is directed toward the only lovable object. But it is not possible to obtain clear knowledge about these things without dividing the discourse in contemplation thus: of the good things which are esteemed by men, some are truly such as they are also named, but others have a falsely-named title. For whatever does not give temporary enjoyment, nor, seeming good to some, becomes useless to others, but is always and through all and in all good to whomever it comes, 5.422 these are truly good things, being always the same and not admitting the admixture of the worse; which things, to those who examine carefully, are contemplated only concerning the divine and eternal nature. But all other things, as many as are beautiful to the sense, appearing beautiful through the deceit of opinion, neither exist by nature nor have substance, but being of a flowing and transient nature, are considered by the uneducated to be real through a certain deceit and vain prejudice. Therefore, those who are engrossed in unstable things do not long for the things that are ever-abiding. It seems, then, that Ecclesiastes, as if standing on some high watchtower, cries out to human nature, through what he says: A time to love, and a time to hate, that there are other things that are truly good, which are also themselves

45

ἐγγινομένη, σωματικὴ μὲν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μέρει, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ νοητὴ καὶ ἀσώματος. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ καλόν τε καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτον οὐ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἑκατέρῳ τῷ τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν εἴδει, ἀλλὰ νοητὸν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ, τῷ δὲ αἰσθητῷ τε καὶ σωματικῷ μέρει τοιοῦ τον, οἷον ἡ αἴσθησις βούλεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει συμφύεται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀναμένει τὴν εἰς τὸ σύμμετρον τῆς ἡλικίας ἀναδρομήν, ὥστε δυνηθῆναι κατ' ὀλίγον ἐμφανῆναι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τούτου χάριν δυναστεύεται ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὅλης οὔσης ὁ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐγγινόμενος νοῦς καὶ κατὰ κράτος ἀεὶ τῷ πλεονάζοντι πρὸς τὸ ὑπακούειν αὐτῇ συνεθίζεται, ἐκεῖνο καλὸν ἢ φαῦλον κρίνων, ὅπερ ἂν ἢ προέληται ἢ ἀποβάλῃ ἡ αἴσθησις. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπή τε καὶ 5.420 δυσκατόρθωτος ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθοῦ κατανόησις γίνεται, ὅτι προειλήμμεθα τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς κριτηρίοις, ἐν τῷ εὐφραίνοντί τε καὶ ἥδοντι τὸ καλὸν ὁριζόμενοι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ κάλλη βλέπειν, ὁμίχλης τὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀέρα διαλαβούσης, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμὸς πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν καθορᾷ, οἷον ἀχλύϊ τινὶ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν διὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀμβλυνόμενος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν βλέπει, ὁ δὲ νοῦς διὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁρᾶν ἐμποδίζεται, αὕτη γίνεται ἡ τῆς κακίας ἀρχή, διότι τὴν ἄλογον περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ κρίσιν καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυναστευθεὶς ἐπεψήφισε, κἂν εἴπῃ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν τῇ εὐχροίᾳ τοῦ φαινομένου τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, συνεπιρρέπει τούτῳ καὶ ἡ διάνοια· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ ὡσαύτως τὸ εὐφραῖνον τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ ψῆφον ἠνέγκατο. εἰ δέ πως οἷόν τε ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ κρίσιν ἐγγίνεσθαι, τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δοκιμάζοντος, οὐκ ἂν τῇ ἀλόγῳ αἰσθήσει δεδουλωμένοι κτηνώδεις γινόμενοι κατεδουλούμεθα. ὡς ἂν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη σύγχυσις ἐν ἡμῖν διακριθείη καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τὸ ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχον ἀπλανῶς ἐπιγνωσθείη, ταῦτά φησι νῦν ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι καιρός ἐστι τοῦ φιλῆσαι καὶ καιρὸς τοῦ μισῆ σαι. δι' ὧν διακρίνει τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν, δεικνὺς τί 5.421 τὸ συμφερόντως φιλούμενον καὶ τί τὸ μισούμενον. λέγει ἡ νεότης τοῖς τῆς ἡλικίας πάθεσι ζέουσα καιρὸν εἶναι αὐτῇ τοῦ φιλῆσαι ταῦτα, ἃ τῇ νεότητι φίλα ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἀντιβοᾷ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς τῇ νεότητι ἄλλον τῆς καθαρᾶς φιλίας καιρὸν ὁριζόμενος· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο φιλίαν τὴν διημαρτημένην τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τὰ ἄτοπα σχέσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εὐοδουμένης ἐν ὑγείᾳ τῆς φύσεως ἐν καιρῷ προσγίνεται τὸ δίψος τῷ σώματι, οἷς δὲ τὸ δῆγμα τῆς διψάδος ἐχίδνης τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ἐνεποίησεν, οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι κατὰ καιρὸν ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὴν δίψαν· οὐ γὰρ φυσικὴ ὄρεξις ἐπὶ τούτων, ἀλλὰ πάθος ἡ δίψα γίνεται· οὕτως καὶ τὸ ῥυπαρὸν τῆς νεότητος φίλτρον οὐ φίλτρον, ἀλλὰ νόσος ἐστὶ τῷ διακαεῖ τε καὶ ἰώδει τῆς ἡλικίας δήγματι ἐγγινομένη. οὐ πᾶσα τοίνυν φιλία τὸ εὔκαιρον ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὸ μόνον ἀγαπητὸν γινομένη. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι σαφῆ τὴν περὶ τούτων γνῶσιν λαβεῖν μὴ οὑτωσὶ διελόμενον ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ τὸν λόγον· τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅσα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σπουδάζεται τὰ μὲν ὄντως τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, οἷα καὶ ὀνομάζεται, τὰ δὲ ψευδώνυμον τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. ὅσα γὰρ οὐχὶ πρόσκαιρον δίδωσι τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν οὐδέ τινι δοκοῦντα καλὰ ἑτέροις ἄχρηστα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντοτε καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται, 5.422 ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ τὴν τοῦ χείρονος ἐπιμιξίαν οὐ προσδεχόμενα· ἅπερ τοῖς ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζουσι περὶ μόνην τὴν θείαν τε καὶ ἀΐδιον θεωρεῖται φύσιν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῇ αἰσθήσει καλά ἐστι, διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν οἴησιν ἀπάτης καλὰ φαινόμενα οὔτε ἔστι τῇ φύσει οὔτε ὑφέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ῥοώδους καὶ παροδικῆς ὄντα φύσεως δι' ἀπάτης τινὸς καὶ ματαίας προλήψεως ὡς κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὄντα τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις νομίζεται. οἱ οὖν τῶν ἀστάτων περιεχόμενοι τῶν ἀεὶ ἑστώτων οὐκ ἐπορέγονται. ἔοικε τοίνυν οἷον ἐπί τινος ὑψηλῆς σκοπιᾶς ἑστὼς ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἐμ βοᾶν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, δι' ὧν λέγει· Καιρὸς τοῦ φιλῆσαι καὶ καιρὸς τοῦ μισῆσαι, ὅτι ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθά, ἃ καὶ αὐτά ἐστι