Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature, or on the composite and fleshly and multiform, or on both together? For when you discuss whether man is good by nature or not, are you discussing the soul or the body or the 83 composite of these? And if about the soul, is it about it existing by itself, as it is after death, or as it uses a body? For if of the soul after death, that is another and deeper argument. But if of the soul as being a part of man, how is it that for some it is preserved uncorrupted, just as it was made (for I omit the appetites), whence the natural argument <τὸ> has its strength, but for others it is corrupted and has become fleshy, following what is worse, whence the positive argument arises? For if it possessed the good by nature, how has it cast it away by choice? But the things of nature are independent of choice and unalterable, like the radiance of the sun, the flowing of water, and the downward motion of a clod of earth. But if you say that virtue has been implanted in the body, you are refuted at once; for you will either conceive it as soulless or ensouled. And if soulless, you will find it incapable of vice and virtue, being resolved into the earth from which it was taken; but if ensouled, inclining to what is earthy and cognate to it, and warring against the soul, and opposing the law of the mind and fighting against it. But if both together, we have fallen into a depth of difficulties. Man is a composite thing, the parts of which he is composed being opposed and warring. How then will you predicate a simple name of natures that are different and unlike and opposed to one another? But how could you not predicate it, when the simple parts are often at peace with one another in the composite being, whenever the grossness of the body is refined and takes flight with the soul, so as to perceive simplicity in the composition? Do you see by what waves of difficulties we are tossed, and are driven this way and that, carried along by the scales of counter-balancing thoughts? And we have not yet investigated nature and convention; for each is of many meanings, and great is the difference of the things signified. And I ask what is the difference between nature and by nature, convention and by convention, or if there is none; and whether man is good by nature, or the nature of man is the good; for this too involves an inquiry whence and whither evils come and what they are, from where they have come and where they are established and to what they happen and whether they exist at all among beings. Plato, then, <ἐν> in the *Phaedrus*, discussing the soul, represents it as a charioteer with a pair of horses, but the horses are ill-matched in their movement, so that one strikes with its feet above the back of the pole, while the other is carried downwards and drags the other one with it. Who then is the striking horse here, the one moved in the aether and heavenly? Is it not the innate reason, being good by nature and having the desire for that which is properly good? And the other, 84 the earthly one, is it not that which stands beside it and is opposed to it, and drags the charioteer along with it? But understand the riddle more accurately. The horse above the clouds had virtue sown but uncultivated; whence also it has fallen down with its opposite. But the philosopher, having brought it down, which formerly ran with the twelve gods in *On the Soul*, led it from here to there, putting ascetic wings on it and releasing it from the body through the abstinence from passions. But Plotinus, having discoursed on the nature of the good, and having recalled that it is possible, introduces the super-eminent mind itself, saying: "The soul, dancing externally around it, looking at it and contemplating what is within it, sees God through it. And this God is without harm and blessed, and evil is nowhere here." Whence then for the soul is the motion of the dance? Whence the vision towards the inside of the mind? Whence the sight of God through it? Is it not from its own nature (for from where else?), which is like a certain seed inherent in the beautiful fruits that choice has nourished? And
τῷ λόγῳ χρήσομαι. Ἐν τίνι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐμπεφυκέναι φατέ; ἢ αὖθις ἐπιβεβλῆσθαι τῇ ἀειδεῖ φύσει καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ, ἢ τῇ
συγκειμένῃ καὶ σαρκίνῃ καὶ πολυσχήμονι, ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ; διαλεγόμενοι γὰρ περὶ τοῦ εἰ φύσει χρηστὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ μή, περὶ
ψυχῆς ἢ περὶ σώματος διαλέγεσθε ἢ περὶ τοῦ 83 ἐκ τούτων συνθέτου; καὶ εἰ περὶ ψυχῆς, πότερον αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτὴν οὔσης ὁποία
μετὰ τὴν ἀποβίωσιν ᾖ, ἢ χρωμένης σώματι; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς μετὰ τὴν ἀποβίωσιν, ἄλλος λόγος καὶ οὗτος βαθύτερος. εἰ δὲ τῆς ὡς
μέρος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὔσης, πῶς τοῖς μὲν τετήρηται ἀδιάφθορος, οἵα καὶ πεποίηται (ἐῶ γὰρ τὰς ὀρέξεις), ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ φυσικὸς <τὸ>
ἰσχυρὸν ἔχει, τοῖς δὲ διέφθαρται καὶ ἀποσεσάρκωται ἑπομένη τῷ χείρονι, ἔνθεν ἀνακύπτει ὁ θετικός; εἰ γὰρ φύσει τὸ καλὸν ἐκέκτητο,
πῶς ἀποβέβληκε προαιρέσει; ἀλλὰ ἀπροαίρετα τὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀναλλοίωτα, ὡς τῷ ἡλίῳ ἡ λαμπηδών, τὸ ῥέειν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῇ βώλῳ
ἡ κάτω φορά. εἰ δὲ σώματι ἐντεθεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν φήσετε, αὐτόθεν ἐλέγχεσθε· ἢ γὰρ ἄψυχον τοῦτο νοήσετε ἢ ἔμψυχον. καὶ εἰ ἄψυχον,
ἀνεπίδεκτον εὑρήσετε κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἧς ἐλήφθη ἀναλυόμενον γῆν· εἰ δὲ ἔμψυχον, πρὸς τὸ γεῶδες ῥέπον καὶ σύστοιχον
καὶ μαχόμενον τῇ ψυχῇ ἐναντιούμενόν τε τῷ τοῦ νοὸς νόμῳ καὶ ἀντιστρατευόμενον. εἰ δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, εἰς βάθος ἀποριῶν ἐμπεπτώκαμεν.
σύνθετόν τι χρῆμα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὰ ἐξ ὧν συντέθειται ἀντικαθιστάμενα καὶ μαχόμενα. πῶς οὖν ἁπλοῦν ὄνομα κατὰ διαφόρων καὶ ἀνομοίων
καὶ ἐναντιουμένων ἀλλήλαις κατηγορήσετε φύσεων; πῶς δ' ἂν μὴ κατηγορήσητε εἰρηνευόντων τῶν ἁπλῶν πολλάκις ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῷ συγκρίματι,
ὅταν ἡ τοῦ σώματος λεπτυνθῇ παχυμέρεια καὶ συναναπτερωθῇ τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡς νοεῖν ἐν τῇ συνθέσει ἁπλότητα; ὁρᾶτε οἷς ἀποριῶν κύμασι
ταλαντευόμεθα καὶ τῇδε κἀκεῖσε περιαγόμεθα ταῖς ἑτερορρεπέσι τῶν νοημάτων συμφορούμενοι πλάστιγξι; καὶ οὔπω περὶ φύσεως καὶ
θέσεως διηρευνήσαμεν· πολυσήμαντον γὰρ ἑκάτερον καὶ πολλὴ τῶν σημαινομένων ἡ διαφορά. Ζητῶ δὲ καὶ τί διενηνόχατον φύσις καὶ
φύσει, θέσις καὶ θέσει, ἢ μηδέν· καὶ πότερον φύσει καλὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ φύσις τἀνθρώπου τὸ καλόν· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο διάσκεψιν
πόθεν τε καὶ ποῖ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τίνα, ὅθεν τε ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὅπη ἵδρυται καὶ ὅτῳ συμβέβηκε καὶ εἰ ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. Πλάτων
οὖν <ἐν> τῷ Φαίδρῳ διαλαμβάνων περὶ ψυχῆς ἵππων συνωρίδι ἡνίοχον αὐτὸν ἐνίστησι, τοὺς δὲ ἵππους περὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἑτεροζυγεῖν,
ὡς τὸν μὲν ὑπὲρ τὸν νῶτον τοῦ πόλου ἀράσσειν τοῖς ποσί, τὸν δὲ φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάταντες καὶ συνεφέλκεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἕτερον.
τίς οὖν ὁ ἀράσσων ἵππος ἐνταῦθα ὁ αἰθεροκίνητος καὶ οὐράνιος; οὐχ ὁ ἔμφυτος λογισμός, φύσει τε ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ τοῦ κυρίως ἀγαθοῦ
ἔχων τὴν ἔφεσιν; ὁ δ' ἕτερος 84 ὁ περίγειος οὐχ ὁ παρυφιστάμενος καὶ ἀντίθετος κατὰ ταύτης τε καὶ ὢν καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον συνεφελκόμενος;
ἀλλὰ νόει τὸ αἴνιγμα ἀκριβέστερον. ὁ ὑπερνέφελος ἵππος ἐσπαρμένην μὲν ἀγεώργητον δὲ εἶχε τὴν ἀρετήν· ὅθεν καὶ τῷ ἀντιθέτῳ
συγκαταπέπτωκεν. ἀλλ' ὁ κατάξας ταύτην φιλόσοφος τὴν τέως τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς συντρέχουσαν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖσε
ἀνήγαγεν, ἀσκητικὰ ταύτῃ πτερὰ περιθέμενος καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀπολύσας διὰ τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἀποχῆς. Πλωτῖνος δὲ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
διελόμενος φύσεως, καὶ ἀναμνήσας αὐτὸ ὡς ἔστι δυνατόν, αὐτόν τε τὸν ὑπερκείμενον νοῦν ἐπάγει λέγων· «ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περὶ τοῦτον
χορεύουσα ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν βλέπουσα καὶ τὸ εἴσω αὐτοῦ θεωμένη τὸν θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ βλέπει. καὶ οὗτος θεὸς ἀπήμων καὶ μακάριος
καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐδαμοῦ ἐνταῦθα.» πόθεν οὖν τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς χορείας ἡ κίνησις; πόθεν ἡ πρὸς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ νοῦ θέα; πόθεν ἡ δι' αὐτοῦ
πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὅρασις; ἆρ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως (πόθεν γὰρ ἄλλοθεν;) ἥτις ὥσπερ τις σπορά ἐστιν ἐνδιάθετος τοῖς καλοῖς
ἀκροδρύοις ἅπερ ἐξέθρεψεν ἡ προαίρεσις; Καὶ
