Chapter XIII.—Further Description of the Divine Justice; Since the Fall of Man It Has Regulated the Divine Goodness. God’s Claims on Our Love and Our Fear Reconciled.

But yet, when evil afterwards broke out, and the goodness of God began now to have an adversary to contend against, God’s justice also acquired another function, even that of directing His goodness according to men’s application for it.536    Secundum adversionem. And this is the result: the divine goodness, being interrupted in that free course whereby God was spontaneously good, is now dispensed according to the deserts of every man; it is offered to the worthy, denied to the unworthy, taken away from the unthankful, and also avenged on all its enemies. Thus the entire office of justice in this respect becomes an agency537    Procuratio. for goodness: whatever it condemns by its judgment, whatever it chastises by its condemnation, whatever (to use your phrase) it ruthlessly pursues,538    Sævit. it, in fact, benefits with good instead of injuring. Indeed, the fear of judgment contributes to good, not to evil. For good, now contending with an enemy, was not strong enough to recommend itself539    Commendari. by itself alone. At all events, if it could do so much, it could not keep its ground; for it had lost its impregnability through the foe, unless some power of fear supervened, such as might compel the very unwilling to seek after good, and take care of it. But who, when so many incentives to evil were assailing him, would desire that good, which he could despise with impunity? Who, again, would take care of what he could lose without danger? You read how broad is the road to evil,540    Matt. vii. 13. how thronged in comparison with the opposite:  would not all glide down that road were there nothing in it to fear? We dread the Creator’s tremendous threats, and yet scarcely turn away from evil. What, if He threatened not? Will you call this justice an evil, when it is all unfavourable to evil? Will you deny it to be a good, when it has its eye towards541    Prospicit. good? What sort of being ought you to wish God to be? Would it be right to prefer that He should be such, that sins might flourish under Him, and the devil make mock at Him? Would you suppose Him to be a good God, who should be able to make a man worse by security in sin? Who is the author of good, but He who also requires it? In like manner who is a stranger to evil, except Him who is its enemy? Who its enemy, besides Him who is its conqueror? Who else its conqueror, than He who is its punisher? Thus God is wholly good, because in all things He is on the side of good. In fact, He is omnipotent, because able both to help and to hurt. Merely to profit is a comparatively small matter, because it can do nothing else than a good turn. From such a conduct542    De ejusmodi. with what confidence can I hope for good, if this is its only ability? How can I follow after the reward of innocence, if I have no regard to the requital of wrong-doing? I must needs have my doubts whether he might not fail in recompensing one or other alternative, who was unequal in his resources to meet both. Thus far, then, justice is the very fulness of the Deity Himself, manifesting God as both a perfect father and a perfect master: a father in His mercy, a master in His discipline; a father in the mildness of His power, a master in its severity; a father who must be loved with dutiful affection, a master who must needs be feared; be loved, because He prefers mercy to sacrifice;543    Hos. vi. 6. be feared because He dislikes sin; be loved, because He prefers the sinner’s repentance to his death;544    Ezek. xxxiii. 11. be feared, because He dislikes the sinners who do not repent. Accordingly, the divine law enjoins duties in respect of both these attributes: Thou shalt love God, and, Thou shalt fear God. It proposed one for the obedient man, the other for the transgressor.545    Matt. xxii. 37 f.

CAPUT XIII.

Atenim, ut malum postea erupit, atque inde jam 0299C coepit bonitas Dei cum adversario agere, aliud quoque negotium eadem illa justitia Dei nacta est jam secundum adversionem dirigendae bonitatis, ut seposita libertate ejus , qua et ultro Deus bonus pro meritis cujusque pensetur, dignis offeratur, indignis denegetur, ingratis auferatur; proinde omnibus aemulis vindicetur. Ita omne hoc justitiae opus procuratio bonitatis est, quod judicando damnat, quod damnando punit, quod, ut dicitis, saevit; utique bono, non malo proficit. Denique timor judicii ad bonum, non ad malum confert. Non enim sufficiebat bonum 0300A per semetipsum commendari, jam sub adversario laborans. Nam etsi commendabile per semetipsum, non tamen et conservabile, quia expugnabile jam per adversarium, nisi vis aliqua praeesset timendi, quae bonum etiam nolentes appetere, et custodire compelleret. Coeterum, tot illecebris mali expugnantibus bonum, quis illud appeteret, quod impune contemneret? Quis custodiret, quod sine periculo amitteret? Legis (Matth., VII, 13) mali viam latam, et multo frequentiorem: nonne omnes illa laberentur , si nihil in illa timeretur? Horremus terribiles minas Creatoris, et vix a malo avellimur: quid, si nihil minaretur? Hanc justitiam malum dices, quae malo non favet? Hanc bonum negabis, quae bono prospicit? Non qualem oportet Deum velles ; 0300B qualem malles expediret? sub quo delicta gauderent? cui diabolus illuderet? illum bonum judicares Deum, qui hominem posset magis malum facere securitate delicti? Quis boni auctor, nisi qui et exactor? Proinde, quis mali extraneus, nisi qui et inimicus? Quis inimicus, nisi qui et expugnator? Quis expugnator, nisi qui et punitor? Sic totus Deus bonus est, dum pro bono omnia est. Sic denique omnipotens, quia et juvandi et laedendi potens. Minus est, tantummodo prodesse, quia non aliud quid possit quam prodesse. De ejusmodi qua fiducia bonum sperem, si hoc solum potest? quomodo innocentiae mercedem secter, si non et nocentiae spectem ? Diffidam necesse est, ne nec alteram partem remuneretur , qui utramque non valuit. Usque adeo justitia etiam plenitudo est divinitatis ipsus 0300C exhibens Deum perfectum, et patrem, et dominum: patrem, clementia; dominum, disciplina; patrem, potestate blanda; dominum, severa: patrem, diligendum pie; dominum, timendum necessarie: diligendum, quia malit misericordiam, quam sacrificium (Ps. VI, 6; Ezech., XXXIII, 11); et timendum, quia nolit peccatum: diligendum, quia malit poenitentiam peccatoris, quam mortem; et timendum, quia nolit peccatores sui jam non poenitentes. Ideo lex utrumque definit, Diliges Deum, et Timebis Deum. Aliud obsecutori proposuit, aliud exorbitatori