Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

But to prevent such a thought being entertained, and pretending to be forced somehow away from it, he says that he withdraws from all these results of Providence, and goes back to the manner of the Son’s generation, because “the manner of His likeness must follow the manner of His generation.” What an irresistible proof! How forcibly does this verbiage compel assent! What skill and precision there is in the wording of this assertion! Then, if we know the manner of the generation, we shall know by that the manner of the likeness. Well, then; seeing that all, or at all events most, animals born by parturition have the same manner of generation, and, according to their logic, the manner of likeness follows this manner of generation, these animals, following as they do the same model in their production, will resemble entirely those similarly generated; for things that are like the same thing are like one another. If, then, according to the view of this heresy, the manner of the generation makes every thing generated just like itself, and it is a fact that this manner does not vary at all in diversified kinds of animals but remains the same in the greatest part of them, we shall find that this sweeping and unqualified assertion of his establishes, by virtue of this similarity of birth, a mutual resemblance between men, dogs, camels, mice, elephants, leopards, and every other animal which Nature produces in the same manner. Or does he mean, not, that things brought into the world in a similar way are all like each other, but that each one of them is like that being only which is the source of its life. But if so, he ought to have declared that the child is like the parent, not that the “manner of the likeness” resembles the “manner of the generation.” But this, which is so probable in itself, and is observed as a fact in Nature, that the begotten resembles the begetter, he will not admit as a truth; it would reduce his whole argumentation to a proof of the contrary of what he intended. If he allowed the offspring to be like the parent, his laboured store of arguments to prove the unlikeness of the Beings would be refuted as evanescent and groundless.

So he says “the manner of the likeness follows the manner of the generation.” This, when tested by the exact critic of the meaning of any idea110    ἐννοίας λόγον., will be found completely unintelligible. It is plainly impossible to say what a “manner of generation” can mean. Does it mean the figure of the parent, or his impulse, or his disposition; or the time, or the place, or the completing of the embryo by conception; or the generative receptacles; or nothing of that kind, but something else of the things observed in ‘generation.’ It is impossible to find out what he means. The impropriety and vagueness of the word “manner” causes perplexity as to its signification here; every possible one is equally open to our surmises, and presents as well an equal want of connexion with the subject before us. So also with this phrase of his “manner of likeness;” it is devoid of any vestige of meaning, if we fix our attention on the examples familiarly known to us. For the thing generated is not to be likened there to the kind or the manner of its birth. Birth consists, in the case of animal birth, in a separation of body from body, in which the animal perfectly moulded in the womb is brought forth; but the thing born is a man, or horse, or cow, or whatever it may chance to be in its existence through birth. How, therefore, the “manner of the likeness of the offspring follows the manner of its generation” must be left to him, or to some pupil of his in midwifery, to explain. Birth is one thing: the thing born is another: they are different ideas altogether. No one with any sense would deny that what he says is perfectly untrue in the case of animal births. But if he calls the actual making and the actual fashioning a “manner of the generation,” which the “manner of the likeness” of the thing produced is to “follow,” even so his statement is removed from all likelihood, as we shall see from some illustrations. Iron is hammered out by the blows of the artificer into some useful instrument. How, then, the outline of its edge, if such there happen to be, can be said to be similar to the hand of the worker, or to the manner of its fashioning, to the hammers, for instance, and the coals and the bellows and the anvil by means of which he has moulded it, no one could explain. And what can be said in one case fits all, where there is any operation producing a result; the thing produced cannot be said to be like the “manner of its generation.” What has the shape of a garment got to do with the spool, or the rods, or the comb, or with the form of the weaver’s instruments at all? What has an actual seat got to do with the working of the blocks; or any finished production with the build of him who achieved it?—But I think even our opponents would allow that this rule of his is not in force in sensible and material instances.

It remains to see whether it contributes anything further to the proof of his blasphemy. What, then, was he aiming at? The necessity of believing in accordance with their being in the likeness or unlikeness of the Son to the Father; and, as we cannot know about this being from considerations of Providence, the necessity of having recourse to the “manner of the generation,” whereby we may know, not indeed whether the Begotten is like the Begetter (absolutely), but only a certain “manner of likeness” between them; and as this manner is a secret to the many, the necessity of going at some length into the being of the Begetter. Then has he forgotten his own definitions about the beings having to be known from their works? But this begotten being, which he calls the work of the supreme being, has as yet no light thrown upon it (according to him); so how can its nature be dealt with? And how can he “mount above this lower and therefore more directly comprehensible thing,” and so cling to the absolute and supreme being? Again, he always throughout his discourse lays claim to an accurate knowledge of the divine utterances; yet here he pays them scant reverence, ignoring the fact that it is not possible to approach to a knowledge of the Father except through the Son. “No man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son shall reveal Him111    Matt. xi. 27..” Yet Eunomius, while on every occasion, where he can insult our devout and God-adoring conceptions of the Son, he asserts in plain words the Son’s inferiority, establishes His superiority unconsciously in this device of his for knowing the Deity; for he assumes that the Father’s being lends itself the more readily to our comprehension, and then attempts to trace and argue out the Son’s nature from that.

Ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο νοηθῇ, ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὸς βιασθεὶς « ἀποστῆναι μὲν λέγει τῶν τῆς προνοίας ἔργων, ἀναχθῆναι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν », φησί, « τῷ τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπῳ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὁμοιότητος ». ὢ τῆς ἀνάγκης τῶν ἀποδείξεων: ὡς βιαίως ἡμᾶς ἡ περιουσία τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν τέχνης καταναγκάζει τοῖς εἰρημένοις συντίθεσθαι. « ἀκολουθεῖν » λέγει « τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς γεννήσεως τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὁμοιότητος ». ὅσον τὸ τεχνικὸν καὶ περιεσκεμμένον τῆς ἀποφάσεως. οὐκοῦν ἂν γνωρισθῇ τρόπος γεννήσεως, συναπεδείχθη τούτῳ καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὁμοιότητος. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τῶν διὰ σαρκὸς τικτομένων ζῴων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπος, « ἀκολουθεῖ » δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς « τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς γεννήσεως ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὁμοιότητος », πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τικτόμενα ὁμοίως ἕξει πάντως πρὸς τὰ ὁμοίως γεννώμενα. [τὰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ὅμοια καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ὅμοια.] εἰ οὖν ὁ τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπος, καθώς φησιν ὁ τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγος, ἑαυτῷ τὸ τικτόμενον ὁμοιοῖ, οὗτος δὲ κατ' οὐδὲν ἐν ταῖς ποικίλαις τῶν ζῴων διαφοραῖς ἀλλοιοῦται, ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐστίν, εὑρεθήσεται ἡ καθόλου καὶ δίχα τινὸς διορισμοῦ γενομένη ἀπόφασις πάντα ἀλλήλοις ὅμοια κατασκευάζουσα διὰ τὸ τῆς γεννήσεως ὅμοιον, ἄνθρωπον κύνα κάμηλον μῦν ἐλέφαντα πάρδαλιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τίκτεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἢ οὐκ ἀλλήλοις φησὶν ὅμοια τὰ παραπλησίως τικτόμενα, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ, παρ' οὗ τὴν γένεσιν ἔχει; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο λέγειν ἐβούλετο, τῷ τίκτοντι ὅμοιον ἔδει τὸ τικτόμενον ἀποφήνασθαι, οὐχὶ « τρόπῳ γεννήσεως ὁμοιότητος τρόπον ». ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει θεωρεῖται, τὸ ὁμοιογενὲς εἶναι τῷ γεννῶντι τὸ γεννώμενον, τοῦτο οὐ δέχεται, ὡς ἂν μὴ εἰς τοὐναντίον αὐτῷ περιτραπείη τὸ κατασκεύασμα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ γεννῶντι τὸ τικτόμενον ὅμοιον ἔλεγε, φροῦδα πάντα καὶ ἀνυπόστατα τὰ φιλοπόνως αὐτῷ συντεθέντα περὶ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀπηλέγχετο.
Νυνὶ δὲ « τρόπῳ γεννήσεως τρόπον » φησὶν « ὁμοιότητος ἕπεσθαι ». τοῦτο δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένοις ἐξετάζειν ἐννοίας λόγων ἀδιανόητον παντελῶς πῶς οὐχ εὑρεθήσεται; τί γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι γεννήσεως τρόπον ἀκούσαντα, πάνυ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐστί. τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ ἀποτίκτοντος ζῴου λέγει ἢ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ τὴν διάθεσιν ἢ τόπον ἢ χρόνον ἢ τὸ διὰ συλλήψεως τελειοῦσθαι τὸ ἔμβρυον; ἢ αὐτῶν τῶν γεννητικῶν μέμνηται τόπων; ἢ ταῦτα μὲν οὐχί, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν θεωρουμένων λέγει; καὶ πῶς ἂν μάθοιμεν τὸ λεγόμενον; τὸ γὰρ ἄκυρον καὶ ἀσήμαντον τῆς τοῦ « τρόπου » λέξεως ἐπιδιστάζειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς σημαινομένοις παρασκευάζει, ἐπίσης πάντων ταῖς ὑπονοίαις ὑποπιπτόντων καὶ κατ' ἴσον ἑκάστου τὸ ἀσυνάρτητον πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἐχόντων. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅ φησιν « ὁμοιότητος τρόπον » οὑτωσὶ λεγόμενον, ἀλλότριον πάσης διανοίας ὑπονοοῦμεν πρὸς τὰ ὑποδείγματα τῶν διὰ τῆς συνηθείας γνωρίμων ἀποσκοποῦντες. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸν « τρόπον » τοῦ τόκου καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ὁμοιοῦται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόκος ἐπὶ τῆς διὰ σαρκὸς γεννήσεως σώματός ἐστι διαστολή, τὸ τελειωθὲν ζῷον ἐν τῇ διαπλάσει τῶν σπλάγχνων ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω προάγουσα, τὸ δὲ γεννώμενον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ ἵππος ἢ βοῦς ἢ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ διὰ γεννήσεως ὑφιστάμενον. πῶς τοίνυν « ὁ τῆς ὁμοιότητος » τοῦ τικτομένου « τρόπος ἕπεται τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς γεννήσεως », εἰπάτω αὐτὸς οὗτος ἢ εἴ τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν μαιευτικὴν ἐπαιδεύθη τέχνην. ἄλλο γάρ τι ὁ τόκος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ τόκου ἄλλο καὶ διάφορος ἐφ' ἑκατέρου ὁ λόγος.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ σαρκὸς τικτομένων ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀντείποι τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων. εἰ δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ κατασκευάζειν « τρόπον γεννήσεως » ὀνομάζει, « ᾧ ἕπεσθαι τὸν τρόπον τῆς » τοῦ γινομένου φησὶν « ὁμοιότητος », καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος τοῦ εἰκότος κεχώρισται. οὑτωσὶ δὲ διὰ τῶν ὑποδειγμάτων σκοπήσωμεν. πληγαῖς τυποῦται σίδηρος πρός τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρησίμων παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος σχηματιζόμενος. τὸ οὖν σχῆμα τῆς ἄμης, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, πῶς ὁμοιοῦται τῇ χειρὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου ἢ τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς κατασκευῆς οἷον σφύραις καὶ ἄνθραξι καὶ φύσαις καὶ ἄκμονι, δι' ὧν αὐτὴν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀνετυπώσατο, οὐκ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν ἔχοι: τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑποδείγματος εἰρημένον πᾶσιν ἐφαρμόζει τοῖς διά τινος κατασκευῆς ἀπεργασθεῖσιν, ὅτι « τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς γεννήσεως » τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὁμοιοῦται. τί γὰρ κοινὸν ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἱματίου πρὸς τὸ πηνίον ἢ τοὺς κανόνας ἢ τὴν κερκίδα ἢ ὅλως πρὸς τὸν τρόπον τῆς τοῦ ὑφάντου κατασκευῆς; τί δὲ τὸ βάθρον πρὸς τὴν τῶν ξύλων ἀπεργασίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν γινομένων πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κατεργασαμένου;
Ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ σωματικοῖς ἀργεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον καὶ αὐτοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς ἐναντίους συντίθεσθαι. ὑπόλοιπον δ' ἂν εἴη σκοπεῖν, εἴ τινα συντέλειαν πρὸς τὴν τῆς βλασφημίας κατασκευὴν συνεισφέρεται. τί οὖν τὸ ζητούμενον ἦν; τὸ δεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμοίως ἢ ἀνομοίως ἔχειν τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁμολογεῖσθαι, ὅπερ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι, φησίν, ἐκ τῶν τῆς προνοίας λόγων μαθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς γεννήσεως ἀνεληλυθέναι τρόπον, ὡς διὰ τούτου γνῶναι οὐχὶ τὸν γεννηθέντα, εἰ ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν γεννήσαντα, ἀλλά τινα « ὁμοιότητος τρόπον », καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄγνωστον εἶναι τοῦτον, διὰ τοῦτο τὴν γεννήσασαν οὐσίαν περιεργάζεσθαι. ἆρα οὖν ἐπιλέλησται τῶν ἰδίων διορισμῶν, ἐν οἷς φησιν « ἐκ τῶν ἔργων » δεῖν « τὰς οὐσίας καταλαμβάνεσθαι »; τῆς οὖν γεννηθείσης οὐσίας, ἣν ἔργον ὀνομάζει τῆς ὑπερκειμένης, μηδέπω φανερωθείσης πῶς ἔχει κατὰ τὴν φύσιν; πῶς ὑπερβὰς τό, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, κατώτερον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ καταλήψει τῶν ζητούντων προσεχέστερον, τῇ « κυριωτάτῃ καὶ ἀνωτάτῃ » προσφύεται; καὶ τὸ ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι τὰς θείας φωνὰς ἐν τῷ καθ' αὑτὸν λόγῳ κατασκευάζων, νῦν κἀκείνων ὀλίγον ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῇ γνώσει τοῦ πατρὸς προσβῆναι μὴ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσεγγίσαντα; Οὐδεὶς γάρ, φησίν, ἔγνω τὸν πατέρα, εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱός, καὶ ᾧ ἂν βούληται ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψαι.
Ἀλλ' οὗτος ἐν οἷς μὲν ἂν μέλλῃ καθυβρίζειν τὰς εὐσεβεῖς καὶ τῇ θεότητι πρεπούσας τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑπολήψεις, ἐλάττονα εἶναι λέγει γυμνῇ τῇ φωνῇ, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῆς γνώσεως τῶν θείων λανθάνει τὸ μεῖζον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζων, εἴπερ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίαν ὡς ἑτοιμοτέραν εἰς κατανόησιν καταλαβὼν δι' ἐκείνης ἀνιχνεύειν πειρᾶται καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν φύσιν.