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And of those who have partaken of sensation: Since a little before he seemed in a way to speak of the good as a substrate, calling it the cause of being, and so forth, lest those who read without understanding should find an occasion for blame, he says: That the good is not one thing, and being another, and again, life another, or wisdom; for the cause of all things is one, and not many, and one divinity, as is fitting, produces all things, the holy and blessed Trinity, and not many demiurgic deities; and he said this not superfluously, but criticizing the wise among the Greeks and the heretics from Simon, who say that there are world-making gods, who, insofar as they are subordinate, produce the weaker of creatures, even down to the sediment of all things, as they say, that is, matter.

(14S_212> And that the one is: He says that the appellation of the good is receptive of complete providence, but the rest are partial, such as life and wisdom and reason; for while all beings were brought into existence through the goodness of God, and are good, that is, very beautiful, not all partake of life or reason or wisdom; therefore he has set forth such appellations in contradistinction to the complete one. And he says that those which are observed in more things are more universal, such as life; for it extends to plants and animals, both rational and irrational; but wisdom and reason are more partial, for these are seen only in rational beings.

§ 3. And wisdom than life: Since the saying is somewhat obscure, I think what is said indicates some such meaning as this: as if someone were raising a difficulty and saying: Why, when the name of being itself surpasses the designation of life, and again the name of life surpasses wisdom, since the order also demands this, as he himself showed a little before, saying that the cause which gives substance, life, and wisdom to those who partake of substance, life, mind, reason, and sensation is both being, life, and wisdom, do we no longer see this order in beings? For it would be necessary, according to the grades mentioned by you, for beings to be closer to God than living things and those that have sensation and are intelligent and rational, that is, those who partake of mind and reason; but it is no longer so, but on the contrary, for example, living things are closer to the providence of God than heaven and stars and earth and water and air and the things from them, even if they live a vegetative life, such as plants and such things, and closer than living things are sentient things, that is, the irrational animals; for irrational animals are more honorable in life than plants and herbs, inasmuch as they at least have sensation, while plants do not, and of rational beings, the minds, that is, the super-cosmic (14S_214> powers, being superior to us rational beings, in their immaterial and intellectual nature, draw nearer to God than we do; and yet it ought to be the opposite, that beings, enjoying greater gifts from God, should be above the others, such as the heaven, the stars, and such things, And this is the difficulty; therefore, the divine Dionysius answers, ordering them in descending order from mind and reason and sensation and their preferments; thus you will find after one page.

And yet it was necessary for the things of the greater: He calls greater gifts those which are observed in more things, such as being and life, but the things that partake only of these are seen not among the first and better, but among the lesser, since the superior things also have the properties of the subordinate ones, of being, of living, and are for this reason better, even if they are signified by more partial appellations, but the more universal things do not partake of the property of the better things, that is, of wisdom and reason and intellect, and for this reason are lesser, as partaking of lesser, that is, fewer gifts, whereas the others, as partaking of more, are both better and closer to God.

And they live above the others: Because the things which are superior and draw nearer to God are said to live more than the subordinate ones, for example, the divine minds live above us, as

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Καί αἰσθήσεως μετειληφότων: Ἐπειδή πρό μικροῦ ἔδοξέ πως ὑπόβασιν λέγειν τό ἀγαθόν, εἰπών τοῦ ὄντος αἴτιον, καί οὕτω καθεξῆς, ἵνα μή οἱ ἀσυνέτως ἀναγινώσκοντες εὕρωσι μέμψεως ἀφορμήν, φησίν· Οὐκ ἄλλο δέ εἶναι τό ἀγαθόν, καί ἄλλο τό ὄν, καί αὖ πάλιν, ἄλλο τήν ζωήν, ἤ τήν σοφίαν· ἕν γάρ εἶναι τῶν ἁπάντων αἴτιον, καί οὐ πολλά, καί μίαν εἰκότως θεότητα πάντα παράγουσαν, τήν ἁγίαν καί μακαρίαν Τριάδα, καί μή πολλάς θεότητας δημιουργούς· τοῦτο δέ οὐ περιττῶς εἶπεν, ἀλλά καθαπτόμενος τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι σοφῶν καί τῶν ἀπό Σίμωνος αἱρετικῶν, οἵ κοσμοποιούς φασι θεούς, καθόσον ὑποβεβήκασι, τοσοῦτον καί τά ἀσθενέστερα τῶν κτισμάτων παράγοντας, ἕως καί τῆς τῶν ἁπάντων ὑποστάθμης, ὥς φασι, τουτέστι τῆς ὕλης.

(14S_212> Καί τήν μέν εἶναι: Τήν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπωνυμίαν παντελοῦς προνοίας δεκτικήν εἶναί φησι, τάς δέ λοιπάς, μερικάς, οἷον ζωήν καί σοφίαν καί λόγον· καί πάντα μέν γάρ τά ὄντα δι' ἀγαθότητα Θεοῦ παρήχθη πρός ὕπαρξιν, καί εἰσίν ἀγαθά, ἤτοι καλά λίαν, οὐ πάντα δέ ζωῆς ἤ λόγου ἤ σοφίας μετέχουσι· διό τάς τοιαύτας ἐπωνυμίας κατά ἀντιδιαστολήν τῆς παντελοῦς τέθεικεν. Ὁλικωτέρας δέ φησι τάς ἐπί πλειόνων θεωρουμένας, οἷον ζωήν· φθάνει γάρ ἐπί φυτῶν καί ζώων, λογικῶν τε καί ἀλόγων· σοφία δέ καί λόγος μερικώτεραι ἐπί μόνων γάρ λογικῶν ὁρῶνται ταῦτα.

§ 3. Καί τῆς ζωῆς τήν σοφίαν: Ἀσαφέστερόν πως ἐγκειμένης τῆς ρήσεως, οἶμαι τό λεγόμενον τοιοῦτόν τινα νοῦν ὑποφαίνειν· ὥς τινος ἐπαποροῦντος καί λέγοντος· ∆ιά τί, τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος ὑπερέχοντος τῆς ζωῆς τήν προσηγορίαν, καί πάλιν τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ζωῆς ὑπεραίροντος τήν σοφίαν, ἅτε καί τῆς τάξεως τοῦτο ἀπαιτούσης, ὡς καί αὐτός πρό βραχέως ἐδήλωσεν εἰπών, καί ὄν, καί ζωήν, καί σοφίαν τήν οὐσιοποιόν καί ζωοποιόν καί σοφοδότιν αἰτίαν τῶν οὐσίας, καί ζωῆς, καί νοῦ, καί λόγου μετειληφότων, καί αἰσθήσεως, οὐκέτι τήν τάξιν ταύτην ὁρῶμεν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι; ∆έον γάρ, κατά τούς εἰρημένους ὑπό σοῦ βαθμούς, τά ὄντα πλέον τῶν ζώντων καί τῶν αἰσθανομένων καί τῶν νοερῶν καί λογικῶν, τουτέστι τοῦ νοῦ καί λόγου μετειληφότων, πλησιάζειν Θεῷ· οὐκέτι μέν οὕτως, ἐξ ἐναντίου δέ ἐστιν, οἷον οὐρανοῦ καί ἄστρων καί γῆς καί ὕδατος καί ἀέρος καί τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν πλησιαίτερα περί τήν πρόνοιαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τά ζῶντα, εἰ καί τήν φυτικήν ζῶσι ζωήν, οἷα τά φυτά καί τά τοιαῦτα, καί τῶν ζώντων πλησιαίτερα τά αἰσθητικά, τουτέστι τά ἄλογα· τῶν γάρ φυτῶν καί βοτανῶν τιμιώτερα ἐν ζωῇ τά ἄλογα, καθ' ὅ κἄν μόνον αἰσθάνωνται, τῶν φυτῶν μή αἰσθανομένων, τῶν δέ λογικῶν οἱ νόες, τουτέστιν αἱ ὑπερκόσμιοι (14S_214> δυνάμεις, ὡς ἡμῶν τῶν λογικῶν ἀνώτεραι, κατά τό ἄυλον καί νοερόν ἐγγίζουσαι μᾶλλον ἡμῶν τῷ Θεῷ· καίτοι ἔδει τό ἐναντίον, τά ὄντα καί μειζόνων δωρεῶν ἀπολαύοντα τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπέρ τά ἄλλα εἶναι, οἷον τόν οὐρανόν, τά ἄστρα καί τά τοιαῦτα, Καί αὐτή μέν ἡ ἐπαπόρησις· λοιπόν οὖν ἀποκρίνεται ὁ θεῖος ∆ιονύσιος ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ καί τοῦ λόγου καί τῆς αἰσθήσεως καθ' ὑπόβασιν καί τά προτιμήσεις τάττων· οὕτως εὑρήσεις ματά μίαν σελίδα.

Καίτοι ἔδει τά τῶν μειζόνων: Μείζονας δωρεάς φησι τάς ἐπί πλειόνων θεωρουμένας, οἷον τό ὄν καί τήν ζωήν, ἀλλά τά τούτων μόνον μετέχοντα οὐκ ἐν πρώτοις καί κρείττοσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ὁρρῶνται, ἐπειδή τά μέν ὑπερέχοντα καί τάς τῶν ὑφειμένων ἔχουσιν ἰδιότητας τοῦ εἶναι, τοῦ ζῇν, καί κατά τοῦτο κρείττονα, εἰ καί διά μερικωτέρων ἐπωνυμιῶν σημαίνονται, τά δέ τῶν ὁλικωτέρων οὐ μετέχουσι τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἰδιότητος, τουτέστι σοφίας καί λόγου καί νοερότητος, καί κατά τοῦτο ἥττονα, ὡς ἡττόνων, ἤγουν ὀλιγωτέρων δωρεῶν μετέχοντα, ὥσπερ οὖν τά ἕτερα, ὡς πλειόνων, καί κρείττονα καί Θεῷ πλησιαίτερα.

Καί ζῶσιν ὑπέρ τά ἄλλα: Ὅτι τά ὑπερκείμενα καί μᾶλλον Θεῷ πλησιάζοντα λέγεται πλέον ζῇν τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων, οἷον οἱ θεῖοι νόες ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς ζῶσιν, ὡς