A Treatise on the Soul.

 Having discussed with Hermogenes the single point of the origin of the soul, so far as his assumption led me, that the soul consisted rather in an ada

 Chapter II.—The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.

 Chapter III.—The Soul’s Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.

 Chapter IV.—In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.

 Chapter V.—Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.

 Chapter VI.—The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul’s Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.

 Chapter VII.—The Soul’s Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.

 Chapter VIII.—Other Platonist Arguments Considered.

 Chapter IX.—Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.

 Chapter X.—The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.

 Chapter XI.—Spirit—A Term Expressive of an Operation of the Soul, Not of Its Nature.  To Be Carefully Distinguished from the Spirit of God.

 Chapter XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.

 Chapter XIII.—The Soul’s Supremacy.

 Chapter XIV.—The Soul Variously Divided by the Philosophers This Division is Not a Material Dissection.

 Chapter XV.—The Soul’s Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.

 Chapter XVI.—The Soul’s Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.

 Chapter XVII.—The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.

 Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics.  Functions of the Soul.

 Chapter XIX.—The Intellect Coeval with the Soul in the Human Being. An Example from Aristotle Converted into Evidence Favourable to These Views.

 Chapter XX.—The Soul, as to Its Nature Uniform, But Its Faculties Variously Developed. Varieties Only Accidental.

 Chapter XXI.—As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.

 Chapter XXII.—Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.

 Chapter XXIII.—The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.

 Chapter XXIV.—Plato’s Inconsistency. He Supposes the Soul Self-Existent, Yet Capable of Forgetting What Passed in a Previous State.

 Chapter XXV.—Tertullian Refutes, Physiologically, the Notion that the Soul is Introduced After Birth.

 Chapter XXVI.—Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.

 Chapter XXVII.—Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.

 Chapter XXVIII.—The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.

 Chapter XXIX.—The Pythagorean Doctrine Refuted by Its Own First Principle, that Living Men are Formed from the Dead.

 Chapter XXX.—Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory.  The State of Contemporary Civilisation.

 Chapter XXXI.—Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.

 Chapter XXXII.—Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.

 Chapter XXXIII.—The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.

 Chapter XXXIV.—These Vagaries Stimulated Some Profane Corruptions of Christianity. The Profanity of Simon Magus Condemned.

 Chapter XXXV.—The Opinions of Carpocrates, Another Offset from the Pythagorean Dogmas, Stated and Confuted.

 Chapter XXXVI.—The Main Points of Our Author’s Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.

 Chapter XXXVII.—On the Formation and State of the Embryo. Its Relation with the Subject of This Treatise.

 Chapter XXXVIII.—On the Growth of the Soul. Its Maturity Coincident with the Maturity of the Flesh in Man.

 Chapter XXXIX.—The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.

 Chapter XL.—The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.

 Chapter XLI.—Notwithstanding the Depravity of Man’s Soul by Original Sin, There is Yet Left a Basis Whereon Divine Grace Can Work for Its Recovery by

 Chapter XLII.—Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.

 Chapter XLIII.—Sleep a Natural Function as Shown by Other Considerations, and by the Testimony of Scripture.

 Chapter XLIV.—The Story of Hermotimus, and the Sleeplessness of the Emperor Nero. No Separation of the Soul from the Body Until Death.

 Chapter XLV.—Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul’s Activity.  Ecstasy.

 Chapter XLVI.—Diversity of Dreams and Visions. Epicurus Thought Lightly of Them, Though Generally Most Highly Valued. Instances of Dreams.

 Chapter XLVII.—Dreams Variously Classified. Some are God-Sent, as the Dreams of Nebuchadnezzar Others Simply Products of Nature.

 Chapter XLVIII.—Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.

 Chapter XLIX.—No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.

 Chapter L.—The Absurd Opinion of Epicurus and the Profane Conceits of the Heretic Menander on Death, Even Enoch and Elijah Reserved for Death.

 Chapter LI.—Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.

 Chapter LII.—All Kinds of Death a Violence to Nature, Arising from Sin.—Sin an Intrusion Upon Nature as God Created It.

 Chapter LIII.—The Entire Soul Being Indivisible Remains to the Last Act of Vitality Never Partially or Fractionally Withdrawn from the Body.

 Chapter LIV.—Whither Does the Soul Retire When It Quits the Body?  Opinions of Philosophers All More or Less Absurd. The Hades of Plato.

 Chapter LV.—The Christian Idea of the Position of Hades The Blessedness of Paradise Immediately After Death. The Privilege of the Martyrs.

 Chapter LVI.—Refutation of the Homeric View of the Soul’s Detention from Hades Owing to the Body’s Being Unburied. That Souls Prematurely Separated fr

 Chapter LVII.—Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects.  God Alone Can Raise the Dead.

 Chapter LVIII.—Conclusion. Points Postponed. All Souls are Kept in Hades Until the Resurrection, Anticipating Their Ultimate Misery or Bliss.

Chapter XLV.—Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul’s Activity.  Ecstasy.

We are bound to expound at this point what is the opinion of Christians respecting dreams, as incidents of sleep, and as no slight or trifling excitements of the soul, which we have declared to be always occupied and active owing to its perpetual movement, which again is a proof and evidence of its divine quality and immortality. When, therefore, rest accrues to human bodies, it being their own especial comfort, the soul, disdaining a repose which is not natural to it, never rests; and since it receives no help from the limbs of the body, it uses its own.  Imagine a gladiator without his instruments or arms, and a charioteer without his team, but still gesticulating the entire course and exertion of their respective employments: there is the fight, there is the struggle; but the effort is a vain one. Nevertheless the whole procedure seems to be gone through, although it evidently has not been really effected. There is the act, but not the effect. This power we call ecstasy, in which the sensuous soul stands out of itself, in a way which even resembles madness.278    We had better give Tertullian’s own succinct definition: “Excessus sensûs et amentiæ instar.” Thus in the very beginning sleep was inaugurated by ecstasy: “And God sent an ecstasy upon Adam, and he slept.”279    Gen. ii. 21. The sleep came on his body to cause it to rest, but the ecstasy fell on his soul to remove rest: from that very circumstance it still happens ordinarily (and from the order results the nature of the case) that sleep is combined with ecstasy. In fact, with what real feeling, and anxiety, and suffering do we experience joy, and sorrow, and alarm in our dreams! Whereas we should not be moved by any such emotions, by what would be the merest fantasies of course, if when we dream we were masters of ourselves, (unaffected by ecstasy.) In these dreams, indeed, good actions are useless, and crimes harmless; for we shall no more be condemned for visionary acts of sin, than we shall be crowned for imaginary martyrdom. But how, you will ask, can the soul remember its dreams, when it is said to be without any mastery over its own operations? This memory must be an especial gift of the ecstatic condition of which we are treating, since it arises not from any failure of healthy action, but entirely from natural process; nor does it expel mental function—it withdraws it for a time. It is one thing to shake, it is another thing to move; one thing to destroy, another thing to agitate. That, therefore, which memory supplies betokens soundness of mind; and that which a sound mind ecstatically experiences whilst the memory remains unchecked, is a kind of madness. We are accordingly not said to be mad, but to dream, in that state; to be in the full possession also of our mental faculties,280    Prudentes. if we are at any time. For although the power to exercise these faculties281    Sapere. may be dimmed in us, it is still not extinguished; except that it may seem to be itself absent at the very time that the ecstasy is energizing in us in its special manner, in such wise as to bring before us images of a sound mind and of wisdom, even as it does those of aberration.

CAPUT XLV.

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Tenemur hic de somnis quoque christianam sententiam expromere, ut de accidentibus somni; et non modicis jactationibus animae, quam ediximus negotiosam, et exercitam semper ex perpetuitate motationis, quod divinitatis et immortalitatis est ratio. Igitur, cum quies corporibus evenit, quorum solatium proprium est, vacans illa a solatio alieno, non quiescit; et si caret opera membrorum corporalium, suis utitur. Concipe gladiatorem sine armis, vel aurigam sine curriculis, gesticulantes omnem habitum artis suae atque conatum. Pugnatur, certatur; sed vacua jactatio est. Nihilominus tamen fieri videntur, quae fieri tamen non videntur; actu enim fiunt, effectu vero non fiunt. Hanc vim 0725C ecstasin dicimus, excessum sensus, et amentiae instar. Sic et in primordio, somnus cum ecstasi dedicatus (Gen. II): et misit Deus ecstasin in Adam, et obdormivit. Somnus enim corpori provenit in quietem; ecstasis animae accessit adversus quietem; et inde 0726A jam forma, somnum ecstasi miscens, et natura de forma. Denique, et oblectamur, et contristamur, et conterremur in somniis, quam adfecte, et anxie, et passibiliter! cum in nullo permoveremur, a vacuis seilicet imaginibus, si compotes somniaremus. Denique et bona facta gratuita sunt in somnis, et delicta secura; non magis enim ob stupri visionem damnabimur, quam ob martyrii coronabimur. Et quomodo, inquis, memor est somniorum anima, scilicet quam compotem esse non licet? Hoc erit proprietas amentiae hujus, quia non fit ex corruptela bonae valetudinis, sed ex ratione naturae. Nec enim exterminat, sed avocat mentem. Aliud est concutere, aliud movere; aliud evertere, aliud agitare. Igitur quod memoria suppetit, sanitas mentis est; quod sanitas 0726B mentis salva memoria stupet, amentiae genus est. Ideo non dicimur furere, sed somniare: ideo et prudentes, si quando sumus: sapere enim nostrum licet obumbretur, non tamen exstinguitur. Nisi quod et ipsum potest videri vacare tunc; ecstasin autem hoc quoque operari de suo proprio, ut sic nobis sapientiae imagines inferat, quemadmodum et erroris.