Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.

Objection 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.

Objection 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.

On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

I answer that, This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).

The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

Reply to Objection 4: The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

Reply to Objection 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Question 12, Article 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

Articulus 10

Argumentum 1

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen deus univoce dicatur de deo per naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed catholicus dicens idolum non est deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est deus. Ergo deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut idolum est deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine vera. Ergo et hoc nomen deus univoce dicitur de deo secundum veritatem, et de deo secundum opinionem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed catholicus, cum dicit unum esse deum, intelligit nomine dei rem omnipotentem, et super omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum esse deum. Ergo hoc nomen deus univoce dicitur utrobique.

Sed Contra 1

Sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, ut dicitur in I periherm..

Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen deus, dictum de deo vero et de deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.

Sed Contra 2

Praeterea, nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est deus, non significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat catholicus dicens unum esse deum. Ergo hoc nomen deus non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce, de deo vero, et de deo secundum opinionem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et medicina factiva.

Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen deus, secundum quod pro deo vero sumitur, in ratione dei sumitur secundum quod dicitur deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim aliquem nominamus deum secundum participationem, intelligimus nomine dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri dei. Similiter cum idolum nominamus deum, hoc nomine deus intelligimus significari aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit deus. Et sic manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis.

Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. Unde patet quod catholicus dicens idolum non esse deum, contradicit Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine deus ad significandum verum deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse deum, non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat deum opinabilem, sic enim verum diceret, cum etiam catholici interdum in tali significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia.

Ad 2

Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum diversam significationem.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga.

Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod ipsam naturam dei prout in se est, neque catholicus neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra dictum est.

Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen deus, cum dicit idolum est deus, in qua accipit ipsum catholicus dicens idolum non est deus. Si vero aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem deum cognosceret, nec ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum significationem ignoramus.