The Rule of Faith

 THE recognition of this rule is the basis of St. Athanasius's method of arguing against Arianism. Vid. art. Private Judgment . It is not his aim ordinarily to prove doctrine by Scripture, nor does he appeal to the private judgment of the individual Christian in order to determine what Scripture means; but he assumes that there is a tradition, substantive, independent, and authoritative, such as to supply for us the true sense of Scripture in doctrinal matters a tradition carried on from generation to generation by the practice of catechising, and by the other ministrations of Holy Church. He does not care to contend that no other meaning of certain passages of Scripture besides this traditional Catholic sense is possible or is plausible, whether true or not, but simply that any sense inconsistent with the Catholic is untrue, untrue because the traditional sense is apostolic and decisive. What he was instructed in at school and in church, the voice of the Christian people, the analogy of faith, the ecclesiastical [ phronema ], the writings of saints; these are enough for him. He is in no sense an inquirer, nor a mere disputant; he has received, and he transmits. Such is his position, though the expressions and turn of sentences which indicate it are so delicate and indirect, and so scattered about his pages, that it is difficult to collect them and to analyse what they imply. Perhaps the most obvious proof that what I have stated is substantially true, is that on any other supposition he seems to argue illogically. Thus he says: "The Arians, looking at what is human in the Saviour, have judged Him to be a creature ... But let them learn, however tardily, that the Word became flesh ;" and then he goes on to show that he does not rely simply on the inherent, unequivocal force of St. John's words, satisfactory as that is, for he adds, "Let us, as possessing [ ton skopon tes pisteos ], acknowledge that this is the right ([ orthen ], orthodox) understanding of what they understand wrongly." Orat. iii. § 35.

 Again: "What they now allege from the Gospels they explain in an unsound sense, as we may easily see if we will but avail ourselves of [ ton skopon tes kath  ' hemas pisteos ], and using this [ hosper kanoni ], apply ourselves, as the Apostle says, to the reading of inspired Scripture." Orat. iii. 28.

 And again: "Since they pervert divine Scripture in accordance with their own private ([ idion ]) opinion, we must so far ([ tosouton ]) answer them as ([ hoson ]) to justify its word, and to show that its sense is orthodox, [ orthen ]." Orat. i. 37.

 For other instances, vid. art. [ orthos ]; also vid. supr. vol. i. pp. 36, 237 note, 392, fin. 409; also Serap. iv. § 15, Gent. § 6, 7, and 33.

 In Orat. ii. § 5, after showing that "made" is used in Scripture for "begotten," in other instances besides that of our Lord, he says, "Nature and truth draw the meaning to themselves" of the sacred text that is, while the style of Scripture justifies us in thus interpreting the word "made," doctrinal truth obliges us to do so. He considers the Regula Fidei the principle of interpretation, and accordingly he goes on at once to apply it.

 It is his way to start with some general exposition of the Catholic doctrine which the Arian sense of the text in dispute opposes, and thus to create a præjudicium or proof against the latter; vid. Orat. i. 10, 38, 40 init. 53, ii. § 12 init. 32-34, 35, 44 init., which refers to the whole discussion, (18-43,) 73, 77, iii. 18 init. 36 init. 42, 51 init. etc. On the other hand he makes the ecclesiastical sense the rule of interpretation, [ toutoi ] ([ toi skopoi ], the general drift of Scripture doctrine) [ hosper kanoni chresamenoi ], as quoted just above. This illustrates what he means when he says that certain texts have a "good," "pious," "orthodox" sense, i.e. they can be interpreted (in spite, if so be, of appearances) in harmony with the Regula Fidei.

 It is with a reference to this great principle that he begins and ends his series of Scripture passages, which he defends from the misinterpretation of the Arians. When he begins, he refers to the necessity of interpreting them according to that sense which is not the result of private judgment, but is orthodox. "This," he says, "I conceive is the meaning of this passage, and that a meaning especially ecclesiastical ." Orat. i. § 44. And he ends with: "Had they dwelt on these thoughts, and recognised the ecclesiastical scope as an anchor for the faith, they would not of the faith have made shipwreck." Orat. iii. § 58.

 It is hardly a paradox to say that in patristical works of controversy the conclusion in a certain sense proves the premisses. As then he here speaks of the ecclesiastical scope "as an anchor for the faith;" so when the discussion of texts began, Orat. i. § 37, he introduces it as already quoted by saying, "Since they allege the divine oracles and force on them a misinterpretation according to their private sense, it becomes necessary to meet them so far as to do justice to these passages, and to show that they bear an orthodox sense, and that our opponents are in error." Again, Orat. iii. 7, he says, "What is the difficulty, that one must need take such a view of such passages?" He speaks of the [ skopos ] as a [ kanon ] or rule of interpretation, supr. iii. § 28. vid. also § 29 init. 35 Serap. ii. 7. Hence too he speaks of the "ecclesiastical sense," e.g. Orat. i. 44, Serap. iv. 15, and of the [ phronema ], Orat. ii. 31 init. Decr. 17 fin. In ii. § 32, 3, he makes the general or Church view of Scripture supersede inquiry into the force of particular illustrations.