Chapter 41

Form is the substance which has been, as it were, given form and made specific by the essential differences, and which signifies the most specific species. Thus, for example, the substance which has been given form and made specific by the animate and sentient body constitutes the animal. And again, when this last has taken on the rational and the mortal, it constitutes the species of man. It is precisely this most specific species which is called form, an informed substance, as it were.

And so the holy Fathers apply the terms substance, and nature, and form to the most specific species, and they say that substance and nature and form are the same thing, namely, the most specific species. And the individuals coming under the same most specific species they say to be of the same substance, of the same nature, of the same species, of the same genus, and of the same form. On the other hand, they say that the most specific species are of different substance, of different nature, of different species, of different genus, and of different form. This is because it is impossible for a species not to be of a different substance and of a different nature and of a different form from another species, or for a nature so not to differ from another nature, or for a substance so not to differ from another substance.

One should know that it is impossible for one compound nature to be made from two substances, that is to say, from two natures, because it is impossible for logically opposed constituent differences to exist in the same thing. It is possible, however, for one compound hypostasis to be made from diverse natures, which is how man is made up of body and soul. Now, even though men are said to have one nature, the individual man is not said to be of one nature. This is because, on the one hand, the one nature of man is said to be compound, since all the compound hypostases of men come under one species; whereas, on the other hand, the individual man is not said to be of one nature, since each human hypostasis is made up of two natures—soul and body, I mean—which it preserves unconfused in itself, to which fact the separation caused by death bears witness.

[27] {Περὶ μορφῆς.} Μορφή ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν διαφορῶν οἱονεὶ μορφωθεῖσα καὶ εἰδοποιηθεῖσα οὐσία, ἥτις σημαίνει τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος: οἷον ἡ οὐσία μορφωθεῖσα καὶ εἰδοποιηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἐμψύχου καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ ἀποτελέσασα τὸ ζῷον, πάλιν τε προσλαβοῦσα τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν ἀποτελεῖ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος. Ὅπερ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος μορφὴ λέγεται οἷον οὐσία μεμορφωμένη. Οἱ οὖν ἅγιοι πατέρες ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου εἴδους τάσσουσι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως καὶ μορφῆς ὄνομα καὶ ταὐτὸν λέγουσιν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ μορφὴν τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος: καὶ ὁμοούσια καὶ ὁμοφυῆ καὶ ὁμογενῆ καὶ σύμμορφα λέγουσι τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος ἄτομα. Ἑτεροούσια δὲ καὶ ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτεροειδῆ καὶ ἑτερογενῆ καὶ ἑτερόμορφα τὰ εἰδικώτατα εἴδη λέγουσιν. Οὐ δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶδος ἄλλῳ εἴδει ἢ φύσιν ἄλλῃ φύσει ἢ οὐσίαν ἄλλῃ οὐσίᾳ μὴ εἶναι ἑτεροούσιον καὶ ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερόμορφον. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὡς ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐκ δύο οὐσιῶν ἤγουν φύσεων μίαν φύσιν σύνθετον γενέσθαι: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα τὰς ἀντιδιῃρημένας συστατικῶς ὑπάρξαι διαφοράς. Ὑπόστασιν δὲ μίαν σύνθετον ἐκ διαφόρων φύσεων δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς ἐστι συντεθειμένος καὶ σώματος: εἰ γὰρ καὶ λέγεται μία φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' οὐ μιᾶς φύσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ὁ καθέκαστα. Μία μὲν γὰρ φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων σύνθετος λέγεται, διότι ὑφ' ἓν εἶδος πᾶσαι αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τελοῦσι σύνθετοι ὑποστάσεις. Μιᾶς δὲ φύσεως ὁ καθέκαστα ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται, διότι ἑκάστη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπόστασις ἐκ δύο συνέστηκε φύσεων, ἐκ ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος, καὶ ἀσυγχύτους ταύτας ἐν ἑαυτῇ φυλάττει: καὶ μάρτυς ἡ ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου γινομένη διαίρεσις.