Chapter 10 [VI.]—Children May Be Found of Like or of Unlike Dispositions with Their Parents.

Then, again, how ineptly he labours to free the soul, which he supposes to be corporeal, from the passions of the body, raising questions about the soul’s infancy; about the soul’s emotions, when paralysed and oppressed; about the amputation of bodily limbs, without cutting or dividing the soul. But in dealing with such points as these, my duty is to treat rather with him than with you; it is for him to labour to assign a reason for all he says. In this way we shall not seem to wish to be too importunate with an elderly man’s gravity on the subject of a young man’s work. As to the similarity of disposition to the parents which is discovered in their children, he does not dispute its coming from the soul’s seed. Accordingly, this is the opinion also of those persons who do away with the soul’s propagation; but the opposite party who entertain this theory do not place on this the weight of their assertion. For they observe also that children are unlike their parents in disposition; and the reason of this, as they suppose, is, that one and the same person very often has various dispositions himself, unlike each other,—not, of course, that he has received another soul, but that his life has undergone a change for the better or for the worse. So they say that there is no impossibility in a soul’s not possessing the same disposition which he had by whom it was propagated, seeing that the selfsame soul may have different dispositions at different times. If, therefore, you think that you have learnt this of him, that the soul does not come to us by natural transmission at birth,—I only wish that you had discovered from him the truth of the case,—I would with the greatest pleasure resign myself to your hands to learn the whole truth. But really to learn is one thing, and to seem to yourself to have learned is another thing. If, then, you suppose that you have learned what you still are ignorant of, you have evidently not learnt, but given a random credence to a pleasant hearsay. Falsity has stolen over you in the suavity.66    This play of words too inadequately represents Augustin’s Subrepsit tibi falsiloquium per suaviloquium. Now I do not say this from feeling as yet any certainty as to the proposition being false, which asserts that souls are created afresh by God’s inbreathing rather than derived from the parents at birth; for I think that this is a point which still requires proof from those who find themselves able to teach it. No; my reason for saying it is, that this person has discussed the whole subject in such a way as not only not to solve the point still in dispute, but even to indulge in statements which leave no doubt as to their falsity. In his desire to prove things of doubtful import, he has boldly stated things which undoubtedly merit reprobation.

CAPUT VI.

10. Jamvero quam inepte laboret, animam, quam putat esse corpoream, vindicare a passionibus corporis, disputans de animae infantia, de paralyticis et oppressis animae sensibus, de amputatis membris corporis absque animae sectione, non tecum, sed cum illo potius agere debeo: illi quippe insudandum est, ut rationem reddat dictorum suorum; ne de opere juvenis velle fatigare videamur gravitatem senis. Quod autem similitudines morum qui reperiuntur in filiis, non ex animae semine venire disputat: consequens est quidem, ut hoc sentiant quicumque animae propaginem destruunt; sed nec illi qui hanc astruunt, ibi constituunt pondus assertionis suae. Vident enim et filios parentum dissimiles moribus: quod ideo fieri putant, quia et ipse unus homo plerumque suis moribus alios mores dissimiles habet, non utique anima altera accepta, sed vita in melius vel in deterius commutata. Ita dicunt, non esse impossibile ut anima non habeat eos mores, quos habet ille a quo propagata est; quandoquidem ipsa una nunc alios, alias alios habere mores potest. Quare si hoc te credis ab isto didicisse, quod anima non sit ex traduce: utinam id vere didicisses; me tibi docendum libentissime traderem. Sed aliud est discere, aliud videri sibi didicisse. Si ergo te didicisse arbitraris quod adhuc nescis; non plane didicisti, sed 0501 temere credidisti quod libenter audisti, et subrepsit tibi falsiloquium per suaviloquium. Quod non ideo dico, quia falsum esse jam certus sim, animas potius insufflari novas, quam de origine parentum trahi; hoc enim adhuc ab eis qui docere id possunt, existimo requirendum: sed quia iste de hac re ita disseruit, ut non solum eam, quae adhuc discutienda est, non solveret quaestionem; verum etiam talia diceret, quae falsitatis non habeant dubitationem. Cum enim vellet probare dubia, ausus est dicere sine dubio reprobanda.