Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

Objection 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.

Objection 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (Question 3, Article 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rm. 11:33).

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question 7, Article 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Question 7, Article 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (Question 4, Article 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (Question 13, Article 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (Article 7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).

Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in deo non sit scientia.

Scientia enim habitus est, qui deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam et actum.

Ergo scientia non est in deo.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum est in deo. Ergo scientia non est in deo.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in deo non est universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in deo non est scientia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit Rom. XI, o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod in deo perfectissime est scientia.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem. Propter quod dicit philosophus, III de anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia.

Coarctatio autem formae est per materiam.

Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam infinitatem.

Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis.

Unde in II de anima dicitur quod plantae non cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem.

Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Unde, cum deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a deo in creaturas, altiori modo sunt in deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione creaturae deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. Unde scientia non est qualitas in deo vel habitus, sed substantia et actus purus.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis, in deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est.

Homo autem, secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam, secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed haec omnia deus una et simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit.

Unde simplex dei cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest, ita tamen quod ab unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit, secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid perfectionis est.

Et secundum hoc dicitur iob XII, apud ipsum est sapientia et fortitudo; ipse habet consilium et intelligentiam.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis, scitum enim est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo, cum modus divinae essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturae sunt, scientia divina non habet modum creatae scientiae, ut scilicet sit universalis vel particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia, vel secundum aliquem talem modum disposita.