Nemesius Emesenus, On Human Nature

For neither did the one who placed it place it in such a way for this one to find it, nor did the one who found it dig in such a way as to find a treasure; but the one, so that he might take it up whenever he wished, and the other, so that he might dig a ditch, but something else happened contrary to what both had purposed); and of the spontaneous are the chance events of inanimate or irrational things, without nature and art. To which of these, then, shall we subordinate the things that come through men, if man is not the cause and origin of actions? But it is not right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes shameful and unjust; nor to necessity (for they are not of things that are always the same); nor to fate (for the things of fate are not of the contingent but of the necessary); nor to nature (for the works of nature are animals and plants); nor to chance (for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected); nor to the spontaneous (for they are the chance events of inanimate or irrational things). It remains, then, that man himself, the one who acts and does, is the origin of his own works and has free will. Further, if man is the origin of no action, the faculty of deliberation is superfluous. For to what use will he put deliberation, being master of no action? To declare superfluous the most beautiful and most honorable thing in man would be among the most absurd things. If, therefore, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action; for all deliberation is for the sake of action and on account of action. Further, of the things whose activities are in our power, the actions according to those activities are also in our power; and the activities according to the virtues are in our power; therefore the virtues are also in our power. And that the activities according to virtue are in our power is also shown by what was well said by Aristotle concerning the moral virtues: for what we learn by doing, these things we do after having learned them; for by learning to control pleasures we become temperate; and having become temperate we control pleasures. It is also possible to speak thus. To practice and to exercise is agreed by all to be in our power; and practices are masters of habits (for habit is an acquired nature); but if practice is master of habit, and practice is in our power, then habit is also in our power; and of the things whose habits are in our power, the actions according to those habits are also in our power, for actions are suited to habits. Therefore, he who has a just habit will do just things; and he who has an unjust one, unjust things; therefore it is in our power to be just or unjust. And that some things are in our power is shown by exhortations and admonitions; for no man exhorts not to be hungry nor to be thirsty, nor not to fly; for these things are not in our power. It is clear, therefore, that the things for which there are exhortations, these are in our power. Further, if nothing is in our power, laws are superfluous; but naturally every nation uses some laws, knowing that it has the power to do what it legislates; and most nations ascribe their laws to gods, as the Cretans to Zeus, and the Lacedaemonians to Apollo. Therefore, the knowledge of what is in our power has been sown naturally in all men. And the same must be said of these things concerning blame and praise and all things that abolish the idea that everything happens according to fate. 39 Concerning that some things are in our power. That some things are in our power, and that we are masters of some actions, has been sufficiently demonstrated. It remains then to say what things are in our power. We say, then, generally that all things done voluntarily by us are in our power. For it would not be said to be done voluntarily, if the action were not in our power; and simply those things which are followed by blame or praise and for which there is exhortation and law; for this too was shown in the preceding sections. And properly in our power are all things of the soul and about which we deliberate. For we deliberate on the assumption that it is in our power to do the thing proposed and not to do it. And it was shown in the preceding sections that deliberation is concerned with things that are equally possible. And that is equally possible which we are able to do and its opposite. And our mind makes the choice of this, and this is the origin of actions; and these are the things in our power, the things that are equally possible, such as to be moved and not to be moved, to be impelled and not to be impelled, not to desire things that are not necessary and to desire them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in what one ought and not to rejoice, and as many such things, in which are the works of vice and of virtue; for of these we have free will. And the arts are also among the things that are equally possible. For every art is concerned with

οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὶς οὕτω τέθεικεν ὡς τοῦτον εὑρεῖν, οὔτε ὁ εὑρὼν οὕτως ὤρυξεν ὡς εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἵν' ὅταν θέλῃ ἀνέληται, ὁ δὲ ἵνα τάφρον ὀρύξῃ, συνέπεσεν δὲ ἄλλο τι παρ' ὃ προῄρηντο ἀμφότεροι)· τοῦ δὲ αὐτομάτου τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα, ἄνευ φύσεως καὶ τέχνης. τίνι τοίνυν τούτων ὑπάγαγωμεν τὰ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων; ἀλλ' οὔτε θεῷ θεμιτὸν ἐπιγράφειν αἰσχρὰς ἔσθ' ὅτε πράξεις καὶ ἀδίκους· οὔτε ἀνάγκῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων εἰσίν)· οὔτε εἱμαρμένῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης)· οὔτε φύσει (φύσεως γὰρ ἔργα ζῷα καὶ φυτά)· οὔτε τύχῃ (οὐ γὰρ σπάνιοι καὶ ἀπροσδόκητοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ πράξεις)· οὔτε τῷ αὐτομάτῳ (ἀψύχων γάρ ἐστιν ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα). λείπεται δὴ αὐτὸν τὸν πράττοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα ἄνθρωπον ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. ἔτι εἰ μηδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. εἰς τί γὰρ χρήσεται τῇ βουλῇ, μηδεμιᾶς ὢν κύριος πράξεως; τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιττὸν ἀποφαίνειν τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη. εἰ τοίνυν βουλεύεται, πράξεως ἕνεκα βουλεύεται· πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ πράξεως ἕνεκα καὶ διὰ πρᾶξιν. ἔτι ὧν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τούτων καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνέργειαι· ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους λεχθὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν· ἃ γὰρ ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, ταῦτα μαθόντες ποιοῦμεν· κρατεῖν γὰρ ἡδονῶν μανθάνοντες σώφρονες γινόμεθα· καὶ γενόμενοι σώφρονες κρατοῦμεν ἡδονῶν. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ οὕτως εἰπεῖν. τὸ μελετᾶν καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖται ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι· αἱ δὲ μελέται τῶν ἕξεών εἰσι κύριαι (τὸ γὰρ ἔθος φύσις ἐπίκτητος)· εἰ δὲ κυρία τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν ἡ μελέτη, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ μελέτη, ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ ἕξις· ὧν δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αἱ ἕξεις, τούτων ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, ταῖς γὰρ ἕξεσιν αἱ πράξεις πρόσφοροι. ὁ ἄρα δικαίαν ἕξιν ἔχων δίκαια πράξει· καὶ ὁ ἄδικον ἄδικα· ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ δικαίους εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους. ὅτι δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί τινα δηλοῦσιν αἱ προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ παραινέσεις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώ πων προτρέπει μὴ πεινῆν μηδὲ διψῆν, οὐδὲ μὴ ἵπτασθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἐφ' οἷς αἱ προτροπαί, ταῦτα ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἔτι εἰ μηδὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν περιττοὶ οἱ νόμοι· φυσικῶς δὲ πᾶν ἔθνος νόμοις χρῆταί τισιν, ἐπιστάμενον ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει πράττειν ἃ νομοθετεῖ· καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐθνῶν θεοὺς ἐπιγράφεται νομοθέτας, ὡς Κρῆτες μὲν τὸν ∆ία, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα. φυσικῶς ἄρα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν συγκατέσπαρται. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις ῥητέον ἐπὶ τῶν ψόγων καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην πάντα γίνεσθαι. 39 περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινά. Ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινα, καὶ ὅτι κύριοι πράξεών τινών ἐσμεν, αὐτάρκως ἀποδέδεικται. λοιπὸν δὲ εἴπωμεν τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. λέγομεν τοίνυν γενικῶς πάντα τὰ δι' ἡμῶν ἑκουσίως πραττόμενα ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκουσίως ἐλέγετο πράττεσθαι, τῆς πράξεως οὐκ οὔσης ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ ἁπλῶς οἷς ἕπεται ψόγος ἢ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστι προτροπὴ καὶ νόμος· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείχθη. κυρίως δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι τὰ ψυχικὰ πάντα καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα. ὡς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντος τοῦ πρᾶξαι τὸ προκείμενον καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι βουλευόμεθα. ἐδείχθη δὲ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἡ βουλὴ τῶν ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων οὖσα. ἐπίσης δέ ἐστιν ἐνδεχόμενον ὃ αὐτό τε δυνάμεθα καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ. ποιεῖται δὲ τούτου τὴν αἵρεσιν ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἡμέτερος, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεων· καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενα, οἷον τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ὁρμᾶν καὶ μὴ ὁρμᾶν, μὴ ὀρέγεσθαι τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι, ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, διδόναι καὶ μὴ διδόναι, χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μὴ χαίρειν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἐστι τὰ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα· τούτων γάρ ἐσμεν αὐτεξούσιοι. τῶν ἐπίσης δὲ ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τέχναι. πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη περὶ