Chapter XLVII.

What is seemly should always shine forth in our life. What passions, then, ought we to allow to come to a head, and which should we restrain?

234. If any one preserves an even tenor in the whole of life, and method in all that he does, and sees there is order and consistency in his words and moderation in his deeds, then what is seemly stands forth conspicuous in his life and shines forth as in some mirror.

235. There should be besides a pleasant way of speaking, so that we may win the good-will of those who hear us, and make ourselves agreeable to all our friends and fellow-citizens, if possible. Let none show himself to be given to flattery, nor to be desirous of flattery from any one. The one is a mark of artfulness, the other of vanity.

236. Let no one ever look down on what another, least of all a good man, thinks of him, for thus he learns to give regard to the good. For to disregard the judgment of good men is a sign of conceitedness or of weakness. One of these arises from pride, the other from carelessness.

237. We must also guard against the motions of our soul. The soul must always watch and look after itself, so as to guard itself against itself. For there are motions in which there is a kind of passion that breaks forth as it were in a sort of rush. Wherefore in Greek it is called ὁρμή, because it comes out suddenly with some force. In these there lies no slight force of soul or of nature. Its force, however, is twofold: on the one side it rests on passion, on the other on reason, which checks passion, and makes it obedient to itself, and leads it whither it will; and trains it by careful teaching to know what ought to be done, and what ought to be avoided, so as to make it submit to its kind tamer.

238. For we ought to be careful never to do anything rashly or carelessly, or anything at all for which we cannot give a reasonable ground. For though a reason for our action is not given to every one, yet everybody looks into it. Nor, indeed, have we anything whereby we can excuse ourselves. For though there is a sort of natural force in every passion of ours, yet that same passion is subject to reason by the law of nature itself, and is obedient to it.303    Cic. de Off. I. 29, § 102. Wherefore it is the duty of a careful watchman so to keep a lookout, that passion may not outrun reason nor utterly forsake it, lest by outstripping it confusion be caused, and reason be shut out, and come to nothing by such desertion. Disquiet destroys consistency. Withdrawal shows cowardice and implies indolence. For when the mind is disquieted passion spreads wide and far, and in a fierce outburst endures not the reins of reason and feels not the management of its driver so as to be turned back. Wherefore as a rule not only is the soul perturbed and reason lost, but one’s countenance gets inflamed by anger or by lust. it grows pale with fear, it contains not itself in pleasure, and cannot bear joy.

239. When this happens, then that natural judgment and weight of character is cast aside, and that consistency which alone in deed and thought can keep up its own authority and what is seemly, can no longer be retained.

240. But fiercer passion springs from excessive anger,304    Cic. de Off. I. 38, § 137. which the pain of some wrong received kindles within us. The monitions of the psalm which forms the opening of our subject instruct us on this point. Beautifully, then, has it come about that, in writing on duties, we used that declaration of our opening passage which also itself has to do with the direction of duty.

241. But since (as was but right) we there only touched upon the matter, as to how each one ought to take care not to be disturbed when wrong is done him, for fear that our preliminary remarks should run to too great length, I think that I will now discuss it a little more fully. For the occasion is opportune, as we are speaking on the different parts of temperance, to see how anger may be checked.

CAPUT XLVII.

Ut in vita nostra eluceat decorum illud, quid praestare nos oporteat, quosve appetitus refraenare?

0090C 224. Si quis igitur aequabilitatem universae vitae, et singularum actionum modos servet, ordinem quoque, et constantiam dictorum atque operum, moderationemque custodiat, in ejus vita decorum illud excellit, et quasi in quodam speculo elucet.

235. Accedat tamen suavis sermo, ut conciliet sibi affectum audientium, gratumque se vel familiaribus, vel civibus, vel, si fieri potest, omnibus praebeat. Neque adulantem se, neque adulandum cuiquam exibeat; alterum enim calliditatis est, vanitatis alterum.

226. Non despiciat quid de se unusquisque et maxime vir optimus sentiat; hoc enim modo discit bonis deferre reverentiam. Nam negligere bonorum judicia vel arrogantiae, vel dissolutionis est: quorum 0091A alterum superbiae ascribitur, alterum negligentiae.

227. Caveat etiam motus animi sui; ipse enim sibi et observandus et circumspiciendus est: et ut adversum se cavendus, ita etiam de se tuendus. Sunt enim motus, in quibus est appetitus ille, qui quasi quodam prorumpit impetu; unde Graece ὁρμὴ dicitur quod vi quadam se repente proripiat. Non mediocris in his vis quaedam animi atque naturae est. Quae tamen vis gemina est, una in appetitu, altera in ratione posita, quae appetitum refrenet, et sibi obedientem praestet, et ducat quo velit: et tamquam sedulo magisterio edoceat quid fieri, quid evitari oporteat, ut bonae domitrici obtemperet.

228. Solliciti enim debemus esse, ne quid timere 0091B aut incuriose geramus, aut quidquam 61 omnino cujus probabilem non possimus rationem reddere. Actus enim nostri causa, etsi non omnibus redditur, tamen ab omnibus examinatur. Nec vero habemus, in quo nos possimus excusare Nam etsi vis quaedam naturae in omni appetitu sit; tamen idem appetitus rationis subjectus est lege naturae ipsius, et obedit ei. Unde boni speculatoris est ita praetendere animo, ut appetitus neque praecurrat rationem, neque deserat; ne praecurrendo perturbet atque excludat, eamque deserendo destituat. Perturbatio tollit constantiam, destitutio prodit ignaviam, accusat pigritiam. Perturbata enim mente latius se ac longius fundit appetitus, et tamquam efferato impetu frenos rationis non suscipit, nec ulla sentit aurigae moderamina, 0091C quibus possit reflecti. Unde plerumque non solum animus exagitatur, amittitur ratio; sed etiam inflammatur vultus, vel iracundia, vel libidine: pallescit timore, voluptate se non capit, et nimia gestit laetitia.

229. Haec cum fiunt, abjicitur illa naturalis quaedam censura, gravitasque morum: nec teneri potest illa quae in rebus gerendis atque consiliis sola potest auctoritatem suam, atque illud quod deceat tenere, constantia.

230. Gravior autem appetitus ex indignatione nimia nascitur, quam acceptae plerumque accendit injuriae dolor. De quo satis nos psalmi quem in 0092A praefatione posuimus (Cap. II. 6, 7), praecepta instruunt. Pulchre autem et hoc accidit, ut scripturi de Officiis, ea praefationis nostrae assertione uteremur quae et ipsa ad officii magisterium pertineret.

231. Sed quia supra, ut oportebat, perstrinximus quemadmodum unusquisque cavere possit, ne excitetur accepta injuria, verentes ne praefatio prolixior fieret, nunc de eo uberius disputandum arbitror. Locus enim opportunus est, ut in partibus temperantiae dicamus quemadmodum reprimatur iracundia.