Chap. I.—A Comparison of the Truth with Eloquence: Why the Philosophers Did Not Attain to It. Of the Simple Style of the Scriptures.

Since it is supposed that the truth still lies hidden in obscurity—either through the error and ignorance of the common people, who are the slaves of various and foolish superstitions, or through the philosophers, who by the perverseness of their minds confuse rather than throw light upon it—I could wish that the power of eloquence had fallen to my lot, though not such as it was in Marcus Tullius, for that was extraordinary and admirable, but in some degree approaching it;344    [Ingeniously introduced, and afterward very forcibly expanded.]      The word temples is not here applied to the buildings which the faithful set apart for the worship of God, but to the places used by the heathens for their rites and sacrifices. [For three centuries templa was the word among Christians for the idolatrous places.] That buildings were set apart by Christians from the earliest ages for their religious assemblies, is gathered from the express testimony of Tertullian, Cyprian, and other early writers. They were called ecclesiæ; churches, not temples. [For κυριακὸν, dominicum, basilica, etc., see Bingham, book viii. cap i. sec. 2.]      [A modest confession of his desire to “find out acceptable words.” Eccles. xii. 10. His success is proverbial.]   that, being supported as much by the strength of talent as it has weight by its own force, the truth might at length come forth, and having dispelled and refuted public errors, and the errors of those who are considered wise, might introduce among the human race a brilliant light. And I could wish that this were so, for two reasons: either that men might more readily believe the truth when adorned with embellishments, since they even believe falsehood, being captivated by the adornment of speech and the enticement of words; or, at all events, that the philosophers themselves might be overpowered by us, most of all by their own arms, in which they are accustomed to pride themselves and to place confidence.  

But since God has willed this to be the nature of the case, that simple and undisguised truth should be more clear, because it has sufficient ornament of itself, and on this account it is corrupted when embellished345    The heathens thought that the souls of the unburied dead wandered about on the earth, until their remains were committed to the tomb.      Stained, counterfeit.   with adornings from without, but that falsehood should please by means of a splendour not its own, because being corrupt of itself it vanishes and melts away, unless it is set off346    The words simulacrum, “an image,” and similitudo, “a likeness” or “resemblance,” are connected together through the common root similis, “like.”      Embellished.   and polished with decoration sought from another source; I bear it with equanimity that a moderate degree of talent has been granted to me. But it is not in reliance upon eloquence, but upon the truth, that I have undertaken this work,—a work, perhaps, too great to be sustained by my strength; which, however, even if I should fail, the truth itself will complete, with the assistance of God, whose office this is. For when I know that the greatest orators have often been overcome by pleaders of moderate ability, because the power of truth is so great that it defends itself even in small things by its own clearness: why should I imagine that it will be overwhelmed in a cause of the greatest importance by men who are ingenious and eloquent, as I admit, but who speak false things; and not that it should appear bright and illustrious, if not by our speech, which is very feeble, and flows from a slight fountain, but by its own light? Nor, if there have been philosophers worthy of admiration on account of their literary erudition, should I also yield to them the knowledge and learning of the truth, which no one can attain to by reflection or disputation. Nor do I now disparage the pursuit of those who wished to know the truth, because God has made the nature of man most desirous of arriving at the truth; but I assert and maintain this against them, that the effect did not follow their honest and well-directed will, because they neither knew what was true in itself, nor how, nor where, nor with what mind it is to be sought. And thus, while they desire to remedy the errors of men, they have become entangled in snares and the greatest errors. I have therefore been led to this task of refuting philosophy by the very order of the subject which I have undertaken.  

For since all error arises either from false religion or from wisdom,347    Materia is especially used in the sense of wood or timber.  348    Stipem jaciunt, “they throw a coin.” The word properly means a “coin,” money bearing a stamped impression; hence stipendium, “soldiers’ pay.”      [i.e., false sophia = “philosophy falsely so called.” Vol. v. p. 81.]   in refuting error it is necessary to overthrow both. For inasmuch as it has been handed down to us in the sacred writings that the thoughts of philosophers are foolish, this very thing is to be proved by fact and by arguments, that no one, induced by the honourable name of wisdom, or deceived by the splendour of empty eloquence, may prefer to give credence to human rather than to divine things. Which things, indeed, are related in a concise and simple manner. For it was not befitting that, when God was speaking to man, He should confirm His words by arguments, as though He would not otherwise349    Fucus, “colouring juice;” hence anything not genuine, but artificial. Others read succum, “juice.”      Aliter. This word is usually read in the former clause, but it gives a better meaning in this position.   be regarded with confidence: but, as it was right, He spoke as the mighty Judge of all things, to whom it belongs not to argue, but to pronounce sentence. He Himself, as God, is truth. But we, since we have divine testimony for everything, will assuredly show by how much surer arguments truth may be defended, when even false things are so defended that they are accustomed to appear true. Wherefore there is no reason why we should give so much honour to philosophers as to fear their eloquence. For they might speak well as men of learning; but they could not speak truly, because they had not learned the truth from Him in whose power it was. Nor, indeed, shall we effect anything great in convicting them of ignorance, which they themselves very often confess. Since they are not believed in that one point alone in which alone they ought to have been believed, I will endeavour to show that they never spoke so truly as when they uttered their opinion respecting their own ignorance.  

CAPUT PRIMUM. Veritatis collatio cum eloquentia; cur eam non sunt assecuti philosophi: de stylo simplici Scripturarum.

Vellem mihi, quando veritas in obscuro latere adhuc existimatur, vel errore atque imperitia vulgi, variis et ineptis superstitionibus servientis, vel philosophis pravitate ingeniorum turbantibus eam potius quam illustrantibus, etsi non qualis in Marco Tullio 0347D fuit, quia praecipua et admirabilis fuit, aliquam tamen proximam eloquentiae contingere facultatem; ut 0348C quantum veritas vi sua propria valet, tantum ingenii quoque viribus nixa, exereret se aliquando, et discussis convictisque tam publicis, quam eorum, qui sapientes putantur erroribus, humano generi clarissimum lumen inferret. Quod quidem duabus ex causis fieri vellem: vel quod magis possent credere homines ornatae veritati, qui etiam mendacio credunt, capti orationis ornatu, lenocinioque verborum; vel certe, ut ipsi philosophi suis armis potissimum, quibus 0348D placere sibi et confidere solent, opprimerentur a nobis.

0349A Sed quoniam Deus hanc voluit rei esse naturam, ut simplex 0349A et nuda veritas esset luculentior, quia satis ornata per se est, ideoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur, mendacium vero specie placeret aliena, quia per se corruptum vanescit ac diffluit, nisi ornatu aliunde quaesito circumlitum fuerit ac politum: aequo animo fero, ingenium mihi mediocre fuisse concessum. Verum ego non eloquentiae, sed veritatis fiducia suscepi hoc opus, fortasse majus quam ut possit meis viribus sustineri: quod tamen, etiamsi ego defecerim, Deo (cujus est hoc munus) adjuvante, veritas ipsa complebit. Etenim cum sciam maximos quoque oratores a causidicis mediocribus saepe victos, quod tanta est potentia veritatis, ut seipsam, quamvis in rebus exiguis, sua claritate defendat: 0349B cur hanc ego in maxima causa, ab ingeniosis quidem illis ac disertis viris, sed tamen falsa dicentibus, oppressum iri putem? ac non illa, si minus oratione nostra, quae de tenui fonte admodum exilis emanat, lumine tamen suo clara et illustris appareat? Nec si philosophi doctrina litterarum mirabiles extiterunt, ego etiam illis scientiam veri cognitionemque concesserim, quam nemo cogitando, aut disputando assequi potest. Ne que ego nunc reprehendo 0350A eorum studium, qui veritatem scire voluerunt, quia naturam hominis Deus veri adipiscendi cupientissimam fecit: sed id arguo, id revinco, quod honestam illorum et optimam voluntatem non sit secutus effectus; quia neque quid esset verum ipsum sciebant, neque quomodo, aut ubi, aut qua mente quaerendum. Ita dum succurrere humanis erroribus cupiunt, ipsi se in plagas, et errores maximos induxerunt. Ad hoc igitur me opus coarguendi philosophiam, susceptae materiae ordo ipse deduxit.

Nam cum error omnis, aut ex religione falsa oriatur, aut ex sapientia, in eo convincendo necesse est utrumque subvertere. Cum enim sit nobis divinis litteris traditum, cogitationes philosophorum stultas esse, id ipsum re et argumentis docendum est: ne 0350B quis honesto sapientiae nomine inductus, aut inanis eloquentiae splendore deceptus, humanis malit quam divinis credere; quae quidem tradita sunt breviter ac nude. Nec enim decebat aliter, ut cum Deus ad hominem loqueretur, argumentis assereret suas voces, tanquam fides ei non haberetur: sed, ut oportuit, est locutus, quasi rerum omnium maximus judex, cujus est non argumentari, sed pronuntiare. Verum ipse, ut Deus. Nos autem, cum ad res singulas 0351A testimonia divinae vocis habeamus, profecto monstrabimus, 0351A quanto certioribus argumentis possint vera defendi, cum etiam falso sic defendantur, ut vera soleant videri. Quare non est, quod philosophis tantum honoris habeamus, aut eorum eloquentiam pertimescamus. Loqui enim bene potuerunt, ut homines eruditi, vere autem loqui, nullo modo, quia veritatem non didicerant ab eo, qui ejus potens esset. Nec sane magnum aliquid efficiemus, quod illos ignorantiae redarguemus, quam ipsi saepissime confitentur in eo solo, quoniam his non creditur, in quo solo credi debuit; conabor ostendere, nunquam illos tam veridicos fuisse, quam cum sententiam de sua ignoratione dixerunt.