Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
Epicurus, in placing happiness in not being hungry, or thirsty, or cold, uttered that godlike word, saying impiously that he would fight in these points even with Father Jove; teaching, as if it were the case of pigs that live in filth and not that of rational philosophers, that happiness was victory. For of those that are ruled by pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epicurus; for these expressly said that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good. Epicurus also says that the removal of pain is pleasure; and says that that is to be preferred, which first attracts from itself to itself, being, that is, wholly in motion. Dinomachus and Callipho said that the chief end was for one to do what he could for the attainment and enjoyment of pleasure; and Hieronymus the Peripatetic said the great end was to live unmolested, and that the only final good was happiness; and Diodorus likewise, who belonged to the same sect, pronounces the end to be to live undisturbed and well. Epicurus indeed, and the Cyrenaics, say that pleasure is the first duty; for it is for the sake of pleasure, they say, that virtue was introduced, and produced pleasure. According to the followers of Calliphon, virtue was introduced for the sake of pleasure, but that subsequently, on seeing its own beauty, it made itself equally prized with the first principle, that is, pleasure.
But the Aristotelians lay it down, that to live in accordance with virtue is the end, but that neither happiness nor the end is reached by every one who has virtue. For the wise man, vexed and involved in involuntary mischances, and wishing gladly on these accounts to flee from life, is neither fortunate nor happy. For virtue needs time; for that is not acquired in one day which exists [only] in the perfect man since, as they say, a child is never happy. But human life is a perfect time, and therefore happiness is completed by the three kinds of good things. Neither, then, the poor, nor the mean nor even the diseased, nor the slave, can be one of them.
Again, on the other hand, Zeno the Stoic thinks the end to be living according to virtue; and, Cleanthes, living agreeably to nature in the right exercise of reason, which he held to consist of the selection of things according to nature. And Antipatrus, his friend, supposes the end to consist in choosing continually and unswervingly the things which are according to nature, and rejecting those contrary to nature. Archedamus, on the other hand, explained the end to be such, that in selecting the greatest and chief things according to nature, it was impossible to overstep it. In addition to these, Panætius pronounced the end to be, to live according to the means given to us by nature. And finally, Posidonius said that it was to live engaged in contemplating the truth and order of the universe, and forming himself as he best can, in nothing influenced by the irrational part of his soul. And some of the later Stoics defined the great end to consist in living agreeably to the constitution of man. Why should I mention Aristo? He said that the end was indifference; but what is indifferent simply abandons the indifferent. Shall I bring forward the opinions of Herillus? Herillus states the end to be to live according to science. For some think that the more recent disciples of the Academy define the end to be, the steady abstraction of the mind to its own impressions. Further, Lycus the Peripatetic used to say that the final end was the true joy of the soul; as Leucimus, that it was the joy it had in what was good. Critolaus, also a Peripatetic, said that it was the perfection of a life flowing rightly according to nature, referring to the perfection accomplished by the three kinds according to tradition.
We must, however, not rest satisfied with these, but endeavour as we best can to adduce the doctrines laid down on the point by the naturalist; for they say that Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ affirmed contemplation and the freedom flowing from it to be the end of life; Heraclitus the Ephesian, complacency. The Pontic Heraclides relates, that Pythagoras taught that the knowledge of the perfection of the numbers603 The text has ἀρετῶν, virtues, for which, in accordance with Pythagoras’ well-known opinion, ἀριθμῶν has been substituted from Theodoret. was happiness of the soul. The Abderites also teach the existence of an end. Democritus, in his work On the Chief End, said it was cheerfulness, which he also called well-being, and often exclaims, “For delight and its absence are the boundary of those who have reached full age;” Hecatæus, that it was sufficiency to one’s self; Apollodotus of Cyzicum, that it was delectation; as Nausiphanes, that it was undauntedness,604 For κατάπληξιν of the text, Heinsius reads ἀκατάπληξιν, which corresponds to the other term ascribed to Democritus—ἁθαμβίην. for he said that it was this that was called by Democritus imperturbability. In addition to these still, Diotimus declared the end to be perfection of what is good, which he said was termed well-being. Again, Antisthenes, that it was humility. And those called Annicereans, of the Cyrenaic succession, laid down no definite end for the whole of life; but said that to each action belonged, as its proper end, the pleasure accruing from the action. These Cyrenaics reject Epicurus’ definition of pleasure, that is the removal of pain, calling that the condition of a dead man; because we rejoice not only on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while Epicurus thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations of the flesh. Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?
Ἐπίκουρος δέ, ἐν τῷ μὴ πεινῆν μηδὲ διψῆν μηδὲ ῥιγοῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμενος τὴν ἰσόθεον, ἐπεφώνησε φωνὴν ἀσεβῶς εἰπών, ἐν τούτοις κἂν ∆ιὶ πατρὶ μάχεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑῶν σκατοφάγων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων τὴν μακαρίαν νίκην δογματίζων. τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀρχομένων * τούς τε Κυρηναϊκοὺς εἶναι καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον· τούτους γὰρ τέλος εἶναι λέγειν διαρρήδην τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, τέλειον δὲ ἀγαθὸν μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἡδονὴν εἶναι λέγει· αἱρετὸν δὲ εἶναί φησιν ὃ πρῶτον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ ἐπισπᾶται πάντως δηλονότι ἐν κινήσει ὑπάρχον. ∆εινόμαχος δὲ καὶ Καλλιφῶν τέλος εἶναι ἔφασαν πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἐπιτυγχάνειν ἡδονῆς καὶ τυγχάνειν, ὅ τε Ἱερώνυμος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἀοχλήτως ζῆν, τελικὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μόνον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ ∆ιόδωρος ὁμοίως ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς αἱρέσεως γενόμενος τέλος ἀποφαίνεται τὸ ἀοχλήτως καὶ καλῶς ζῆν. Ἐπίκουρος μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖόν φασιν ἡδονὴν εἶναι· ἕνεκα γὰρ ἡδονῆς παρελθοῦσα. φασίν, ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡδονὴν ἐνεποίησε. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς περὶ Καλλιφῶντα ἕνεκα μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς παρεισῆλθεν ἡ ἀρετή, χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλος κατιδοῦσα ἰσότιμον ἑαυτὴν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τουτέστι τῇ ἡδονῇ, παρέσχεν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τέλος ἀποδιδόασιν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν κατ' ἀρετήν, οὔτε δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὔτε τὸ τέλος παντὶ τῷ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι παρεῖναι· βασανιζόμενον γὰρ καὶ τύχαις ἀβουλήτοις περιπίπτοντα τὸν σοφὸν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσμένως ἐθέλοντα διαφεύγειν μὴ εἶναι μήτε μακάριον μήτ' εὐδαίμονα. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ χρόνου τινὸς τῇ ἀρετῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ περιγίνεται, ἣ καὶ ἐν τελείῳ συνίσταται, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν, ὥς φασι, παῖς εὐδαίμων ποτέ· τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος. συμπληροῦσθαι τοίνυν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς τριγενείας τῶν ἀγαθῶν. οὔτ' οὖν ὁ πένης οὔθ' ὁ ἄδοξος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ ἐπίνοσος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν οἰκέτης ᾖ τις, κατ' αὐτοὺς ** . Πάλιν δ' αὖ Ζήνων μὲν ὁ Στωϊκὸς τέλος ἡγεῖται τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, [∆ιογένης δὲ τὸ τέλος κεῖσθαι ἡγεῖτο] ἐν τῷ εὐλογιστεῖν, ὃ ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ κεῖσθαι διελάμβανεν. ὅ τε Ἀντίπατρος ὁ τούτου γνώριμος τὸ τέλος κεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνει. Ἀρχέδημός τε αὖ οὕτως ἐξηγεῖτο εἶναι τὸ τέλος, [ζῆν] ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ κατὰ φύσιν μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα, οὐχ οἷόν τε ὄντα ὑπερβαίνειν. πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος ἀπεφήνατο· ἐπὶ πᾶσί τε ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς. τινὲς δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων Στωϊκῶν οὕτως ἀπέδοσαν, τέλος εἶναι τὸ ζῆν ἀκολούθως τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ. τί δή σοι Ἀρίστωνα [ἂν] καταλέγοιμι; τέλος οὗτος εἶναι τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορον ἁπλῶς ἀδιάφορον ἀπολείπει· ἢ τὰ Ἡρίλλου εἰς μέσον παράγοιμι; τὸ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ζῆν τέλος εἶναι τίθησιν Ἥριλλος. τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας νεωτέρους ἀξιοῦσί τινες τέλος ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας ἐποχήν. ναὶ μὴν Λύκων ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὡς † Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς. Κριτόλαος δέ, ὁ καὶ αὐτὸς Περιπατητικός, τελειότητα ἔλεγεν κατὰ φύσιν εὐροοῦντος βίου, τὴν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν συμπληρουμένην τριγενικὴν τελειότητα μηνύων. Οὔκουν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀρκουμένους καταπαυστέον, φιλοτιμητέον δὲ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τῶν φυσικῶν δογματιζόμενα περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου παραθέσθαι. Ἀναξαγόραν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κλαζομένιον τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν λέγουσιν Ἡρακλειτόν τε τὸν Ἐφέσιον τὴν εὐαρέστησιν. Πυθαγόραν δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς Ἡρακλείδης ἱστορεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τελειότητος τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι παραδεδωκέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἀβδηρῖται τέλος ὑπάρχειν διδάσκουσι, ∆ημόκριτος μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους τὴν εὐθυμίαν, ἣν καὶ εὐεστὼ προσηγόρευσεν (καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλέγει· τέρψις γὰρ καὶ ἀτερπίη οὖρος † τῶν περιηκμακότων), Ἑκαταῖος δὲ αὐτάρκειαν, καὶ δὴ Ἀπολλόδοτος ὁ Κυζικηνὸς τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν, καθάπερ Ναυσιφάνης τὴν ἀκαταπληξίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἔφη ὑπὸ ∆ημοκρίτου ἀθαμβίην λέγεσθαι. ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ∆ιότιμος τὴν παντέλειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἣν εὐεστὼ προσαγορεύεσθαι, τέλος ἀπέφηνεν. πάλιν Ἀντισθένης μὲν τὴν ἀτυφίαν, οἱ δὲ Ἀννικέρειοι καλούμενοι ἐκ τῆς Κυρηναϊκῆς διαδοχῆς τοῦ μὲν ὅλου βίου τέλος οὐδὲν ὡρισμένον ἔταξαν, ἑκάστης δὲ πράξεως ἴδιον ὑπάρχειν τέλος τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως κεριγινομένην ἡδονήν. οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τουτέστι τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, ἀθετοῦσιν, νεκροῦ κατάστασιν ἀποκαλοῦντες· χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται ἐπὶ πρωτοπαθούσῃ τῇ σαρκὶ γενέσθαι. ὅ τε Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ μείζονα εἶναι τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγαθὸν φησὶ ψυχῆς τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα;