ARTICLE I

This Question Treats Providence. In the First Article We Ask: TO WHICH ATTRIBUTE CAN GOD'S PROVIDENCE BE REDUCED?

Difficulties:

It seems that it belongs only to His knowledge, for

1. Boethius says: "It is certainly clear that Providence is the immovable and simple form of things to be done." Now, in God the form of things that should be done is an idea, and an idea pertains to His knowledge. Providence, therefore, pertains to His knowledge.

2. But it was said that providence also pertains to God's will in so far as it is the cause of things.--To the contrary, in us practical knowledge causes the things that we know. Practical knowledge, however, consists merely in knowledge. The same is true, therefore, of providence.

3. In the same section as cited above, Boethius writes: "The plan of carrying things out, when considered in the purity of God's understanding, is called Providence." Now, purity of understanding seems to pertain to speculative knowledge. Providence, therefore, pertains to speculative knowledge.

4. Boethius writes: "Providence is so called because, standing at a distance from the lowest things, it looks upon all things from their highest summit." Now, to look upon is to know, especially to know speculatively. Providence, therefore, seems to belong to speculative knowledge.

5. As Boethius says: "Fate is related to Providence as reasoning is to understanding." Now, understanding and reasoning are common to both speculative and practical knowledge. Providence, therefore, also belongs to both types of knowledge.

6. Augustine writes: "An unchangeable law controls all changeable things, governing them gloriously." Now, control and government belong to providence. Consequently, that unchangeable law is providence itself. But law pertains to knowledge. Therefore, providence also belongs to knowledge.

7. The natural law as it exists within us is caused by divine providence. Now, a cause acts to bring about an effect in its own likeness. For this reason we also say that God's goodness is the cause of goodness in things, His essence, the cause of their being, and His life, the cause of their living. Divine providence, therefore, is a law; hence, our former position stands.

8. Boethius says: "Providence is the divine plan set up within the ruler of all things." Now, as Augustine says, the divine plan of a thing is an idea. Providence, therefore, is an idea; and since an idea pertains to knowledge, providence also pertains to knowledge.

9. Practical knowledge is ordained either to bring things into existence or to order things already in existence. Now, it does not belong to providence to bring things into existence. It rather presupposes the things over which it is exercised. Nor does it order things that are in existence. This belongs to God's disposal of things. Providence, therefore, pertains not to practical, but only to speculative knowledge.

To the Contrary:

1'. Providence seems to belong to the will, because, as Damascene says: "Providence is the will of God, which brings all existing things to a suitable end."

2'. We do not call those people provident who know what to do but are unwilling to do it. Providence, therefore, is related more to the will than to knowledge.

3'. As Boethius says, God governs the world by His goodness. Now, goodness pertains to the will. Therefore, providence also pertains to the will, since the role of providence is to govern.

4'. To dispose things is a function, not of knowledge, but of will. Now, according to Boethius, providence is the plan according to which God disposes all things. Providence, therefore, pertains to the will, not to knowledge.

5'. What is provided for, taken simply as such, is neither a wise thing nor a known thing. It is merely a good. Consequently, one who provides, taken as such, is not wise, but good. Hence, providence does not pertain to wisdom, but to goodness or to the will.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. Furthermore, it seems that providence pertains to power. For Boethius says: "Providence has given to the things it has created the greatest reason for enduring, so that as far as they are able, all things naturally desire to endure." Providence, therefore, is a principle of creation. But, since creation is appropriated to God's power, providence pertains to power.

2'. Government is the effect of providence, for the Book of Wisdom (14:3) says: "But thy providence, O Father, governeth all." But, as Hugh of St. Victor says, the will commands, wisdom directs, and power executes. Power, therefore, is more closely related to government than is knowledge or will. Consequently, providence pertains more to power than to knowledge or will.

REPLY:

Because our intellects are weak, what we know of God we have to learn from creatures around us. Consequently, to know how God is said to be provident, we have to see how creatures are provident.

We should first note that Cicero makes providence a part of prudence. Providence, as it were, completes prudence, since the other two parts of prudence, memory and understanding, are merely preparations for the prudent act. Moreover, according to the Philosopher, prudence is the reasoned plan of doing things. Now, things to be done differ from things to be made, because the latter start from an agent and terminate in some extrinsic matter, as, for example, a bench and a house; and the reasoned plan of making them is called art. On the other hand, things to be done are actions which do not go outside the agent, but, instead, are acts that perfect him, as, for example, chaste living, bearing oneself patiently, and the like. The reasoned plan of performing these is called prudence. With respect to action, two things should be considered: the end and the means.

However, it is especially the role of prudence to direct the means to the end; and, as we read in the Ethics, one is called prudent if he deliberates well. But, as we also read in the Ethics, deliberation "is not concerned with ends, but only with means." Now, the end of things to be done pre-exists in us in two ways: first, through the natural knowledge we have of man's end. This knowledge, of course, as the Philosopher says, belongs to the intellect, which is a principle of things to be done as well as of things to be studied; and, as the Philosopher also points out, ends are principles of things to be done. The second way that these ends pre-exist in us is through our desires. Here the ends of things to be done exist in us in our moral virtues, which influence a man to live a just, brave, or temperate life. This is, in a sense, the proximate end of things to be done. We are similarly perfected with respect to the means towards this end: our knowledge is perfected by counsel, our appetite, by choice; and in these matters we are directed by prudence.

It is clear, therefore, that it belongs to prudence to dispose, in an orderly way, the means towards an end. And because this disposing of means to an end is done by prudence, it can be said to take place by a kind of reasoning process, whose first principles are ends. The very reason for the sequence described above--and found in all things to be done--is taken from ends, as is clear in the case of art products. Consequently, if one would be prudent, he must stand in the proper relation to the ends themselves, for a reasoned plan cannot exist unless the principles of reason are maintained. Hence, prudence requires not only the understanding of ends but also moral virtues by which the will is settled in a correct end. For this reason, the Philosopher says that the prudent man must be virtuous. Finally, this is common to all rightly ordered powers and acts of the soul: the virtue of what is first is maintained in all the rest. Consequently, in prudence, in some way, are included both the will as directed towards an end and the knowledge of the end itself.

From what has been said it is now clear how providence is related to God's other attributes. His knowledge is related both to ends and to means toward ends, because through knowledge God knows Himself and creatures. But providence pertains only to that knowledge which is concerned with means to ends and in so far as these means are ordained to ends. Consequently, in God providence includes both knowledge and will, although, taken essentially, it belongs only to knowledge, that is, to practical, not to speculative, knowledge. Providence, moreover, also includes the power of execution; hence, an act of power presupposes an act of providence, as it were, directing it, and for this reason power is not included in providence as the will is.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Two aspects of a creature can be considered: first, its species taken absolutely; second, its relation to an end. The form of each exists previously in God. The exemplary form of a thing considered absolutely in its species is an idea; but the form of a thing considered as directed to an end is called providence. Moreover, according to Boethius, the order divine providence implants in things is called fate. Consequently, providence is related to fate as an idea is related to the species of a thing. An idea, however, can in some way pertain to speculative knowledge; but providence is related only to practical knowledge, since it implies an ordering to an end, and, consequently, to something to be done, by means of which the end will be reached.

2. Providence pertains more to the will than does practical knowledge taken absolutely, because the latter is concerned in general only with the knowledge of an end and of the means to achieve it. Consequently, practical knowledge does not presuppose that an end has been willed. If this were true, then the will would be included in knowledge, as has been said with regard to providence.

3. Purity of understanding is mentioned, not to exclude the will from the concept of providence, but to exclude change and mutability.

4. In this passage Boethius is not giving a complete description of the nature of providence. He is merely giving the reason for its name. Consequently, even though looking upon things may be considered as speculative knowledge, it does not follow that providence may be considered to be such. Besides, Boethius explains providence, or foresight, as though it were far-sight, because "God Himself surveys all things from their highest summit." But God is on the highest summit of things for the very reason that He causes and directs all things. So, even in the words of Boethius something pertaining to practical knowledge can be noted.

5. The comparison Boethius makes is taken from the resemblance had by the proportion between the simple and the composite to the proportion between a body at rest and a body in motion. For, just as understanding is simple and non-discursive but reason is discursive, passing from one thing to another, similarly, providence is simple and unchangeable but fate is multiple and changeable. The conclusion, therefore, does not follow.

6. Properly speaking, God's providence is not the eternal law; it is something that follows upon the eternal law. The eternal law should be thought of as existing in God as those principles of action exist in us which we know naturally and upon which we base our deliberation and choice. These belong to prudence or providence. Consequently, the law of our intellect is related to prudence as an indemonstrable principle is related to a demonstration. Similarly, the eternal law in God is not His providence, but, as it were, a principle of His providence; for this reason one can, without any inconsistency, attribute an act of providence to the eternal law in the same way that he attributes every conclusion of a demonstration to self-evident principles.

7. There are two types of causality to be found in the divine attributes. The first type is exemplary causality. Because of this type, we say that all living beings come from the first living being. This type of causality is common to all the divine attributes. The second type of causality is according to the relation the attributes have to their objects. We say, for example, that divine power is the cause of the possibles, divine knowledge is the cause of what is known. An effect of this type of causality need not resemble its cause; for the things that are made by knowledge need not be knowledge, but merely known. It is according to this type of causality that the providence of God is said to be the cause of all things. Consequently, even though the natural law within our understanding is derived from providence, it does not follow that divine providence is the eternal law.

8. "That divine plan within the highest ruler" is not called providence unless one includes in it the notion of direction to an end, which, in turn, presupposes that an end has been willed. Consequently, even though providence may essentially belong to knowledge, it also, in some way, includes the divine will.

9. A twofold ordering may be found in things. First, there is that order according to which things come from their principles. Second, there is the order according to which they are directed to an end. Now, the divine disposing pertains to that order according to which things proceed from their principles; for things are said to be disposed inasmuch as they are put on different levels by God, who is like an artist arranging the different parts of his work in different ways. Consequently, disposition seems to pertain to art. Providence, however, implies the ordering which directs to an end; for this reason it differs from the divine art and disposition. For divine art is so called because of its relation to the production of things, but divine disposition is so called because of its relation to the order of what has already been produced. Providence, however, implies the ordination to an end. Now, we can gather from the end of an art product whatever exists in the thing itself. Moreover, the ordering of a thing to an end is more closely related to the end than is the ordering of its parts to each other. In fact, their ordering to an end is, in a sense, the cause of the ordering of the parts to each other. Consequently, divine providence is, in a sense, the cause of God's disposition of things, and for this reason an act of His disposition is sometimes attributed to His providence. Therefore, even if providence is not an art related to the production of things or a disposition related to the ordering of things one to another, it does not follow that providence does not belong to practical knowledge.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. With reference to the difficulty about the will, we reply that Damascene calls providence will inasmuch as providence includes and presupposes the will, as we have pointed out previously.

2'. As the Philosopher says, no man can be prudent unless he has moral virtues which rightly dispose him toward his ends, just as no one can demonstrate properly unless he knows well the principles of demonstration. It is for this reason that no one is said to be provident unless he has a correct will--not because providence is in the will.

3'. God is said to govern through His goodness, not because His goodness is providence, but because, having the nature of an end, His goodness is a principle of providence. He is also said to govern through His goodness because the divine goodness is related to God as moral virtues are to us.

4'. Even though the disposition of things presupposes the will, it is not an act of the will, because, as the Philosopher says, ordering, which is what is meant by disposition, is the act of one who is wise. Consequently, both disposition and providence really belong to knowledge.

5'. Providence is compared to what is provided for as knowledge is compared to what is known--not as knowledge is compared to the knower. Consequently, it is not necessary that what is foreseen, taken as such, be wise, but rather that it be known.

The other two arguments we concede.