LECTURE 1 (208 a 27-209 a 1)

THE STUDY OF PLACE PERTAINS TO NATURAL SCIENCE. PROBABLE REASONS ARE GIVEN TO SHOW THAT PLACE EXISTS

             406. After the Philosopher in Book III has treated motion and the infinite, which pertains to motion intrinsically insofar as it is of the genus of the continuous, here in Book IV he intends to treat those things which pertain to motion extrinsically. First he treats those things which belong to motion extrinsically as measures of the mobile body. Secondly, where he says, 'Next for discussion . . .' (217 b 29), he treats time which is the measure of the motion itself.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he treats place, and secondly the void, where he says, 'The investigation of . . .' (213 a 11).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that place must be treated by natural science. Secondly he treats place, where he says, 'The existence of place . . .' (208 b 1).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth his intention. He says that just as it pertains to natural science to determine whether or not the infinite exists, and how it exists, and what it is, in the same way the treatment of place pertains to natural science.

             Secondly where he says, '. . . both because all suppose . . .' (208 a 30), he proves what he has said, first from the point of view of place itself, and secondly from our point of view, where he says, 'The question, what is place . . .' (208 a 33).

             407. He gives two arguments for the first point. The first is as follows. Things which are common to all natural beings pertain especially to the consideration of natural science. But place is such a thing. For all men have the common opinion that whatever is is in some place.

             To prove this they use the sophistical argument of positing the consequent. For they argue as follows.

             That which is not is nowhere, that is, it is in no place. For one cannot assign a place to a goat-stag or a sphinx, which are fictions or chimeras.

             Therefore they argue that if that which is in no place is not, then whatever is is in place.

             But if being in place is proper to all beings, it seems that place pertains to the consideration of the metaphysician rather than physicist.

             It must be said that the argument here is drawn from the opinion of those who, because they are unable to transcend the imagination of bodies, hold that all beings are sensible. According to them natural science is first philosophy, which is common to all beings, as is said in Metaphysics, IV.

             408. He gives the second argument where he says, '. . . and because "motion" . . .' (208 a 31). The argument is as follows.

             The consideration of motion pertains to natural philosophy. But motion in regard to place, which we call mutation of place, is the most common of all motions. For certain bodies, i.e., celestial bodies, are moved only by this motion, and nothing is moved by the other motions unless it is moved by this motion. Similarly this motion is more proper because only this motion is truly continuous and perfect, as will be proven in Book VIII. But motion in respect to place cannot be understood unless place is understood. Therefore natural science ought to consider place.

             409. Next where he says, 'The question, what is place . . .' (208 a 33) he comes to the same conclusion from our point of view.

             Those things about which there are problems must be determined by wise men. Now there are many problems about what place is.

             The cause of these problems is twofold. One cause is due to place itself. For not all properties of place lead to the same opinion about place, but from some properties of place it seems that place is one thing, and from other properties it seems that place is something else. The other cause is due to men. For the ancients have not stated the problem of place very well, nor have they sought after the truth very well.

             410. Next where he says, 'The existence of place . . .' (208 b 1), he begins to treat place. He does this first by means of disputation, and secondly by determining the truth, where he says, 'The next step . . .' (210 a 13).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he inquires by means of disputation whether place is, and secondly what place is, where he says, 'We may distinguish . . .' (209 a 31).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he gives arguments to show that place exists, and secondly that place does not exist, where he says, 'True, but even if . . .' (209 a 2).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that place exists by arguments taken from the truth of the thing, and secondly from the opinions of others, where he says, 'Again, the theory that the void . . .' (208 b 25).

             411. Concerning the first part he gives two arguments, the first of which is as follows.

             He says that it is clear that place is something because of the transmutation of bodies which are moved in respect to place. For just as transmutation in respect to forms has led men to a knowledge of matter, because it is necessary that there be some subject in which forms succeed each other, likewise transmutation in respect to place has led men to a knowledge of place. For it is necessary that there be something in which bodies succeed each other. This is what he means when he says that when water flows out from where it now is, as from a vase, then air enters. Therefore since the same place is sometimes occupied by another body, it seems to be clear that place is something other than the things which exist in place and are moved in respect to place. For air is now present where water formerly was, which could not be unless place were something other than both the water and the air. It follows, therefore, that place is something, and that it is a certain receptacle different from both of the things located within it, and that it is the terminus from which and to which of local motion.

             412. He gives the second argument where he says, 'Further, the typical locomotions . . .' (208 b 9).

             He says that, while the motion of any body shows that place exists, as was said, the local motion of simple natural bodies, such as fire and earth and other light and heavy things of this kind, shows not only that place is something but also that place has a certain potency and power.

             For we see that each of these things is carried to its own proper place if not impeded. Heavy things are carried downwards, and light things upwards. From this it is clear that place has a certain power of conserving that which is located in place. And because of this, that which is located in place tends toward its own place by a desire for its own conservation.

             From this it is not shown that place has an attracting power except as an end is said to attract.

             Moreover upwards and downwards and the rest of the six directions, that is, before and behind, right and left, are parts and species of place.

             For such directions are determined in the universe not only by us but also by nature.

             And this is clear because upwards or downwards or right or left is not always the same in those things which are denominated by us, but they vary insofar as we turn to the object in different ways. Whence something which remains immobile frequently changes from right to left, and similarly concerning the other directions, insofar as we turn toward objects in different ways.

             But in nature upwards and downwards in respect to the motion of light and heavy bodies is something determinate. And the other positions are determined by the motion of the heavens, as is said in Book III. For each part of the world is not upwards or downwards indifferently, but upwards is always where light things are carried, and downwards where heavy things are carried.

             But whatever has in itself determinate positions must have potencies by which it is determined. For the potency of right in an animal is other than the potency of left. Whence it follows that place exists and has some potency.

             Furthermore he shows by means of mathematical objects that in some things position is denominated only in respect to us. For although mathematical objects do not exist in place, nevertheless position is attributed to them, but only in respect to us. Whence there is no position in them according to nature but only according to understanding, that is, insofar as they are understood by us in some order, either above or below or right or left.

             413. Next where he says, 'Again, the theory that the void . . .' (208 b 25), he shows from the opinions of others that place exists.

             He does this first from the opinion of those who posit a void. Since each of them affirm that a void exists, they must necessarily say that place exists. For a void is nothing else than place deprived of body. And thus from this and from the previous arguments one can understand that place is something other than bodies and that all sensible bodies exist in place.

             414. Secondly, where he says, 'Hesiod too . . .' (208 b 29), he introduces the same opinion of Hesiod, who was one of the ancient theological poets, and who held that chaos was made first.

             For Hesiod said that prior to all things chaos was made as a certain disorder and receptacle of bodies, and afterwards broad earth was made in order to receive diverse bodies, as if it were necessary for the receptacle of things to exist first, and then the things themselves. Therefore they held this because they believed, as do many others, that everything which is is in place.

             If this is true, it follows that place not only is but that it has a wondrous potency which is the first of all beings. For that which can exist without the others, while the others cannot exist without it, seems to be first. But according to them place can exist without bodies, which they surmised from the fact that we see that place remains when that which is located in place is destroyed. Things, however, cannot exist without place. Hence it follows according to them that place is the first among all beings.