Two books of soliloquies.

 As I had been long revolving with myself matters many and various, and had been for many days sedulously inquiring both concerning myself and my chief

 2. O God, Framer of the universe, grant me first rightly to invoke Thee then to show myself worthy to be heard by Thee lastly, deign to set me free.

 3. Thee I invoke, O God, the Truth, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are true which anywhere are true. God, the Wisdom, in whom and f

 4. Whatever has been said by me, Thou the only God, do Thou come to my help, the one true and eternal substance, where is no discord, no confusion, no

 5. Henceforth Thee alone do I love, Thee alone I follow, Thee alone I seek, Thee alone am I prepared to serve, for Thou alone art Lord by a just title

 Translation absent.

 7. A . Behold I have prayed to God. R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A

 8. R . I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give t

 9. But let that go, and now answer to this: if those things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it enough for thee to know

 10. R. It is then plain to you that a line cannot possibly be longitudinally divided into two? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 11. A. Pardon me, however vehemently thou urge and argue, yet I dare not say that I wish so to know God as I know these things. For not only the objec

 12. R. Thou art moved to good effect. For the Reason which is talking with thee promises so to demonstrate God to thy mind, as the sun demonstrates hi

 13. When therefore the mind has come to have sound eyes, what next? A. That she look. R.

 14. Therefore when the soul has obtained to see, that is, to apprehend God, let us see whether those three things are still necessary to her. Why shou

 15. Now listen, so far as the present time requires, while from that similitude of sensible things I now teach also something concerning God. Namely,

 16. But why do we delay? Let us set out: but first let us see (for this comes first) whether we are in a sound state. A. Do thou see to it, if either

 17. R. Do you not see that these eyes of the body, even when sound, are often so smitten by the light of this visible sun, as to be compelled to turn

 18. R. Thou hast made great progress: yet those things which remain in order to the seeing of that light, very greatly impede. But I am aiming at some

 19. R. You speak as if I were now inquiring what you hope. I am not inquiring what, denied, delights not, but what delights, obtained. For an extingui

 20. But I ask of thee, why thou dost desire, either that the persons whom thou affectest should live, or that they should live with thee. A. That toge

 21. R. We have pain of body left, which perhaps moves thee of its proper force. A. R.

 22. Now let us inquire concerning this, what sort of lover of wisdom thou art, whom thou desirest to behold with most chaste view and embrace, and to

 23. R. Such lovers assuredly it is, whom Wisdom ought to have. Such lovers does she seek, the love of whom has in it nothing but what is pure. But the

 24. And, another day having come, A. Give now, I pray, if thou canst, that order. Lead by what way thou wilt, through what things thou wilt, how thou

 25. R. In this way too the bodily eye might say: I shall not love the darkness, when I shall have seen the sun. For this too seems, as it were, to per

 26. A. Peace, I pray thee, peace. Why tormentest thou me? Why diggest thou so remorselessly and descendest so deep? Now I weep intolerably, henceforth

 27. R. Let us conclude, if you will, this first volume, that in a second we may attempt some such way as may commodiously offer itself. For this dispo

 28. R. What? When a chaste person dies, do you judge that Chastity dies also? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 29. R. Does this proposition seem to you to be true: Whatever is, is compelled to be somewhere? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 30. A. I thank thee much, and will diligently and cautiously review these things in my own mind, and moreover with thee, when we are in quiet, if no d

 Book II.

 1. A. Long enough has our work been intermitted, and impatient is Love, nor have tears a measure, unless to Love is given what is loved: wherefore, le

 2. A. I see a very plain and compendious order. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 3. R. Now I will have you answer me, does the soul seem to you to feel and perceive, or the body? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R

 4. R. Give answer now to this, whether it appears to you possible that at some time hereafter falsity should not be. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 5. A. O leaden dagger! For thou mightest conclude that man is immortal if I had granted thee that this universe can never be without man, and that thi

 6. R. Do any corporeal, that is, sensible things, appear to you to be capable of comprehension in the intellect? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 7. R. Give now still greater heed. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 8. R. Define therefore the True. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 9. R. God, to whom we have commended ourselves, without doubt will render help, and set us free from these straits, if only we believe, and entreat Hi

 10. R. First let us again and yet again ventilate this question, What is falsity? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 11. R. But all this forest of facts, unless I am mistaken, may be divided into two kinds. For it lies partly in equal, partly in inferior things. They

 12. R. We must, however, wait patiently, until the remaining senses also make report to us that falsity dwells in the similitude of the true. For in t

 13. R. Now give heed, while we run over the same things once more, that what we are endeavoring to show may come more plainly to view. A. R. A. R. A.

 14. R. It is ridiculous if you are ashamed, as if it were not for this very reason that we have chosen this mode of discourse: which, since we are tal

 15. A. Thou speakest rightly but what I have granted amiss I altogether fail to see: unless perchance that that is rightly called false which has som

 16. R. Attend rather for never can I be persuaded, that we have implored the Divine aid in vain. For I see that, having tried all things as far as we

 17. A. Proceed, I pray for now perchance thou hast begun to teach concerning falsities not falsely: but now I am considering of what sort that class

 18. A. Thou speakest rightly but I wonder why thou wouldst separate from this class those poems and jests, and other imitative trifles. R. A. R. A. R

 19. R. What then think you? Is the science of debate true, or false? A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 20. R. How as to Grammar itself? if it is true, is it not so far true as it is a discipline? For the name of Discipline signifies something to be lear

 21. R. Tell me now what science contains the principles of definitions, divisions and partitions. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 22. R. Attend therefore to the few things that remain. A. R. A. R. A.

 23. But as to thy question, who would grant, or to whom could it appear possible, that that which is in the subject should remain, while the subject p

 24. R. Groan not, the human mind is immortal. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 25. A. And now I am ready to plunge into the expected joys, but yet I am held hesitating by two thoughts. For, first, it makes me uneasy that we have

 26. R. Thou mayest note that it is not for naught that our reasoning has taken so wide a round. For we were inquiring what is Truth, which not even no

 27. What shall we say to this, that we have entreated God and do entreat, that He will show us a way, not to riches, not to bodily pleasures, not to p

 28. R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that not only if the whole world should perish, but even if Truth

 29. R. Is Truth then so called for any other reason than as being that by which everything is true which is true? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 30. R. You apprehend the matter well. But consider this, whether we can also with propriety call silver by the name of false lead. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 31. A. Go on to what remains for of this I am well convinced. R A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A.

 32. R. What sayest thou concerning the rest? A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 33. R. What need is there any longer than that we should inquire concerning the science of disputation? For whether the figures of Geometry are in the

 34. A. It is as thou sayest, and I willingly yield compliance with thine injunctions. But this at least I would entreat, before thou decreest a term t

 35. R. Such are those who are well instructed in the liberal arts since they by learning disinter them, buried in oblivion, doubtless, within themsel

 36. These points will be treated with more pains and greater subtilty, when we shall have begun to discuss the faculty of intelligence, which part of

20. R. How as to Grammar itself? if it is true, is it not so far true as it is a discipline? For the name of Discipline signifies something to be learnt: but no one who has learned and who retains what he learns, can be said not to know; and no one knows falsities. Therefore every discipline and science is true. A. I see not what rashness there can be in assenting to this brief course of reasoning. But I am disturbed lest it should bring any one to suppose those dramas to be true; for these also we learn and retain. R. Was then our master unwilling that we should believe what he taught, and know it? A. Nay, he was thoroughly in earnest that we should know it. R. And did he, pray, ever set out to have us believe that Dædalus flew? A. That, indeed, never. But assuredly unless we remembered the poem, he took such order that we were scarcely able to hold anything in our hands. R. Do you then deny it to be true that there is such a poem, and that such a tradition is spread abroad concerning Dædalus? A. I do not deny this to be true. R. You do not then deny that you learned the truth, when you learned these things. For if it is true that Dædalus flew, and boys should receive and recite this as a feigning fable, they would be laying up falsities in mind by the very fact that the things were true which they recited. For from this results what we were admiring above, that there could not be a true fiction turning on the flight of Dædalus, unless it were false that Dædalus flew. A. I now grasp that; but what good is to come of it, I do not yet see. R. What, unless that that course of reasoning is not false, whereby we gather that a science, unless it is true, cannot be a science? A. And what does this signify? R. Because I wish to have you tell me on what the science of Grammar rests: for the truth of the science rests on that very principle which makes it a science. A. I know not what to answer thee. R. Does it not seem to you, that if nothing in it had been defined, and nothing distributed and distinguished into classes and parts, it could not in any wise be a true science? A. Now I grasp thy meaning: nor does the remembrance of any science whatever occur to me, in which definitions and divisions and processes of reasoning do not, inasmuch as it is declared what each thing is, as without confusion of parts its proper attributes are ascribed to each class, nothing peculiar to it being neglected, nothing alien to it admitted, perform that whole range of functions from which it has the name of Science. R. That whole range of functions therefore from which it has the name of true. A. I see this to be implied.

20. R. Quid ipsa grammatica? nonne si vera est, eo vera est quo disciplina est? Disciplina enim a discendo dicta est: nemo autem quae didicit ac tenet, nescire dici potest; et nemo scit falsa. Omnis ergo vera est disciplina. A. Non video quidem quid in ista ratiuncula temere concedatur. Movet me tamen ne per istam cuipiam videatur etiam illas fabulas veras esse; nam et has discimus et tenemus. R. Numquidnam magister noster nolebat nos credere quae docebat, et nosse? A. Imo vehementer ut nossemus instabat. R. Numquid aliquando institit ut Daedalum volasse crederemus? A. Hoc quidem nunquam. Sed plane nisi teneremus fabulam, vix nos posse aliquid manibus tenere faciebat. R. Tu ergo negas verum esse quod ista fabula sit, et quod ita sit Daedalus diffamatus? A. Hoc non nego verum esse. R. Non negas ergo te didicisse verum, cum ista didiceris. Nam si volasse Daedalum verum est, et hoc pueri pro ficta fabula acciperent atque redderent, eo ipso falsa retinerent, quo vera essent illa quae redderent. Hinc enim exstitit illud quod superius mirabamur, de volatu Daedali veram fabulam esse non potuisse, nisi Daedalum volasse falsum esset. A. Jam teneo istud; sed quid ex eo proficiamus exspecto. R. Quid, nisi non esse falsam illam rationem, qua collegimus disciplinam, nisi vera doceat, disciplinam esse non posse? A. Et hoc quid ad rem? R. Quia volo dicas mihi unde sit disciplina grammatica: inde enim vera est, unde disciplina est. A. Nescio quid tibi respondeam. R. Nonne tibi videtur, si nihil in ea definitum esset, et nihil in genera et partes distributum atque distinctum, eam nullo modo disciplinam esse potuisse? A. Jam intelligo quid dicas; nec ulla mihi occurrit cujusvis facies disciplinae, in qua non definitiones ac divisiones et ratiocinationes, dum quid quidque sit declaratur, dum sine confusione partium sua cuique redduntur, dum nihil praetermittitur proprium, nihil annumeratur alienum, totum hoc ipsum quo disciplina dicitur egerint. R. Ergo et totum ipsum quo 0895 vera dicitur. A. Video consequi.