ARTICLE II

In the Second Article We Ask: IS THE WORLD RULED BY PROVIDENCE?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. No agent that acts from natural necessity acts through providence. But God acts upon created things through the necessity of nature, because, as Dionysius says: "The divine goodness communicates itself to us like the sun, which, without previous choice or knowledge, pours out its rays upon all bodies." The world, therefore, is not ruled by the providence of God.

2. A principle having many forms is posterior to a principle having but one form. Now, the will is a multiform principle because it is related to opposites. Consequently, providence is also multiform, since it presupposes will. On the other hand, nature is a principle having but one form, because it is determined to one. Therefore, nature precedes providence. Consequently, the realm of nature is not ruled by providence.

3. But it was said that a principle having one form precedes a multiform principle in the same genus, not in other genera.--On the contrary, the greater the power that a principle has of exercising causality, the greater is its priority. But the more a principle has but one form, the greater is its power of causality, since, as said in The Causes: "A united power is more infinite than one that is multiplied." Consequently, a principle having but one form precedes a multiform principle whether they are in the same genus or in different genera.

4. According to Boethius, any inequality is reduced to an equality and any multitude to a unity. Therefore, any multiple act of the will ought to be reduced to an act of nature that is simple and equal. Hence, the first cause must work through its own essence and nature, and not through providence. Thus, our original argument stands.

5. What is, of itself, determined to one course of action does not need the direction of anything else, because direction is applied to a thing to prevent it from taking a contrary course. Natural things, however, are determined to one course of action by their own natures. Consequently, they do not need the direction of providence.

6. But it was said that natural things need the direction of providence to be kept in being.--On the contrary, if no possibility of corruption exists in a thing, it has no need of something extrinsic to conserve it. Now, there are some things in which there is no potency to corruption, since there is none to generation, as, for example, the celestial bodies and the spiritual substances, which are the most important things in the universe. Therefore, substances of this sort do not need providence to keep them in being.

7. There are certain things in the realm of nature that even God cannot change, such as the principle that "one cannot assert and deny the same thing under the same aspect," and "what has existed cannot not have existed," as Augustine says. Therefore, at least principles of this sort do not need divine rule and conservation.

8. Damascene points out that it would be illogical to say that the one who makes things is other than the one who exercises providence over them. Material bodies, however, are not made by God, since He is a spirit, and it seems no more possible for a spirit to produce a material body than for a material body to produce a spirit. Material bodies of this sort, therefore, are not ruled through divine providence.

9. The government of things involves distinguishing between things. But making things distinct does not seem to be the work of God, because, as said in The Causes, God is related to all things in one way. Therefore, things are not ruled through divine providence.

10. Things ordered of themselves need not be ordered by others. But natural things are ordered of themselves, because, as is said in The Soul: "For all things naturally constituted there is a term and proportion set to their size and growth." Natural things, therefore, are not ordered by divine providence.

11. If things were ruled by divine providence, we could know divine providence by studying the order of nature. But, as Damascene says: "We should wonder at all things, praise all things, and accept without question all the works of providence." The world, therefore, is not ruled by providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Boethius writes: "O Thou that dost the world in everlasting order guide!"

2'. Whatever has a fixed order must be ruled by a providence. But natural things have a fixed order in their motions. Hence, they are ruled by providence.

3'. Things which have different natures remain joined only if they are ruled by a providence. For this reason, certain philosophers were forced to say that the soul is a harmony, because contraries remain joined together in the bodies of animals. Now, we see that in the world contraries and things of different natures are kept together. Consequently, the world is ruled by providence.

4'. As Boethius says: "Fate directs the motion of all things and determines their places, forms, and time. This unfolding of the temporal order, united in the foresight of God's mind, is providence." Therefore, since we see that things have distinct forms, times, or places, we must admit the existence of fate and, consequently, that of providence.

5'. Whatever cannot keep itself in existence needs something else to rule it and keep it in existence. But created things cannot keep themselves in existence, for, as Damascene says, what is made from nothing tends, of itself, to return to nothing. There must, therefore, be a providence ruling over things.

REPLY:

Providence is concerned with the direction of things to an end. Therefore, as the Commentator says, whoever denies final causality should also deny providence. Now, those who deny final causality take two positions.

Some of the very ancient philosophers admitted only a material cause. Since they would not admit an efficient cause, they could not affirm the existence of an end, for an end is a cause only in so far as it moves the efficient cause. Other and later philosophers admitted an efficient cause, but said nothing about a final cause. According to both schools, everything was necessarily caused by previously existing causes, material or efficient.

This position, however, was criticized by other philosophers on the following grounds. Material and efficient causes, as such, cause only the existence of their effects. They are not sufficient to produce goodness in them so that they be aptly disposed in themselves, so that they could continue to exist, and toward others so that they could help them. Heat, for example, of its very nature and of itself can break down other things, but this breaking down is good and helpful only if it happens up to a certain point and in a certain way. Consequently, if we do not admit that there exist in nature causes other than heat and similar agents, we cannot give any reason why things happen in a good and orderly way.

Moreover, whatever does not have a determinate cause happens by accident. Consequently, if the position mentioned above were true, all the harmony and usefulness found in things would be the result of chance. This was actually what Empedocles held. He asserted that it was by accident that the parts of animals came together in this way through friendship--and this was his explanation of an animal and of a frequent occurrence! This explanation, of course, is absurd, for those things that happen by chance, happen only rarely; we know from experience, however, that harmony and usefulness are found in nature either at all times or at least for the most part. This cannot be the result of mere chance; it must be because an end is intended. What lacks intellect or knowledge, however, cannot tend directly toward an end. It can do this only if someone else's knowledge has established an end for it, and directs it to that end. Consequently, since natural things have no knowledge, there must be some previously existing intelligence directing them to an end, like an archer who gives a definite motion to an arrow so that it will wing its way to a determined end. Now, the hit made by the arrow is said to be the work not of the arrow alone but also of the person who shot it. Similarly, philosophers call every work of nature the work of intelligence.

Consequently, the world is ruled by the providence of that intellect which gave this order to nature; and we may compare the providence by which God rules the world to the domestic foresight by which a man rules his family, or to the political foresight by which a ruler governs a city or a kingdom, and directs the acts of others to a definite end. There is no providence, however, in God with respect to Himself, since whatever is in Him is an end, not a means to it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The metaphor used by Dionysius notes merely that, like the sun which, on its own part, keeps no body from sharing its light, the divine goodness keeps no creature from participating in itself. The metaphor does not mean that providence acts without choice or knowledge.

2. A principle can be said to be multiform in two senses. First, the multiformity can refer to the very essence of the principle--that is, the principle is composite. A principle that is multiform in this sense must be posterior to a principle having but one form. Second, the multiformity may refer to the principle's relation to its effects, so that a principle is said to be multiform because it extends its influence to many things. A principle that is multiform in this sense precedes one that has but a single form, because the more simple a principle is, the more extensive is its influence. It is in this sense, moreover, that the will is said to be a multiform, and nature, a uniform principle.

3. The argument given is based on the uniformity of a principle according to its essence.

4. God is the cause of things by His essence. Consequently, any plurality in things can be reduced to one simple principle. His essence, however, is the cause of things only in so far as it is known, and consequently, only in so far as it wills to be communicated to a creature by the creature's being made in its likeness. Hence, things proceed from the divine essence through the ordering of knowledge and will, and so through providence.

5. That determination by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about the suitable effect is, as has been said,* a proof of divine providence.

6. Generation and corruption can be understood in two senses. First, generation and corruption can arise from a contrary being and terminate in a contrary. In this sense, the potency to generation and corruption exists in a thing because its matter is in potency to contrary forms; and in this respect celestial bodies and spiritual substances have no potency to generation or corruption. Second, these terms are commonly used to indicate any coming into or passing out of existence that is found in things. Consequently, even creation, by which a thing is drawn from nothingness into existence, is called generation; and the annihilation of a thing is called corruption.

Moreover, a thing is said to be in potency to generation in this sense if an agent has the power to produce it; and it is said to be in potency to corruption if an agent has the power to reduce it to nothingness. In this way of speaking, every creature is in potency to corruption; for all that God has brought into existence He can also reduce to nothingness. For, as Augustine says, for creatures to subsist God must constantly work in them. This action of God, however, must not be compared to the action of a craftsman building a house, for, when his action ceases, the house still remains; it should rather be compared to the sun's lighting up the air. Consequently, when God no longer gives existence to a creature, whose very existence depends on His will, then this creature is reduced to nothingness.

7. The necessity of the principles mentioned depends upon God's providence and disposition, because the fact that created things have a particular nature and, in this nature, a determined act of existence, makes these things distinct from their negations; and upon this distinction is based the principle that affirmation and negation cannot be true simultaneously. Moreover, on this principle, as we read in the Metaphysics, the necessity of all the other principles is founded.

8. An effect cannot be stronger than its cause. It can, however, be weaker than its cause. Now, since body is naturally inferior to spirit, it cannot produce a spirit; but a spirit can produce a body.

9. God is similarly said to be related to all things, because there is no diversity in Him. He is, however, the cause of diversity in things inasmuch as by His knowledge He contains within Himself the intelligible characters of all things.

10. That order which is found in nature is not caused by nature but by something else. Consequently, nature needs providence to implant such an order in it.

11. Creatures fail to represent their creator adequately. Consequently, through them we cannot arrive at a perfect knowledge of God. Another reason for our imperfect knowledge is the weakness of our intellect, which cannot assimilate all the evidence of God that is to be found in creatures. It is for this reason that we are forbidden to scrutinize God's attributes overzealously in the sense of aiming at the completion of such an inquiry, an aim which is implied in the very notion of overzealous scrutiny. If we were to act thus, we would not believe anything about God unless our intellect could grasp it. We are not, however, kept from humbly investigating God's attributes, remembering that we are too weak to arrive at a perfect comprehension of Him. Consequently, Hilary writes as follows: "Even if a man who reverently seeks the infinite ways of God never reaches the end of his search, his search will always profit him."