Chapter II.—The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.
Chapter III.—The Soul’s Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.
Chapter IV.—In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.
Chapter V.—Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.
Chapter VII.—The Soul’s Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.
Chapter VIII.—Other Platonist Arguments Considered.
Chapter IX.—Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.
Chapter X.—The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.
Chapter XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.
Chapter XIII.—The Soul’s Supremacy.
Chapter XV.—The Soul’s Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.
Chapter XVI.—The Soul’s Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.
Chapter XVII.—The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.
Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics. Functions of the Soul.
Chapter XXI.—As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.
Chapter XXII.—Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.
Chapter XXIII.—The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.
Chapter XXVI.—Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.
Chapter XXVII.—Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.
Chapter XXX.—Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory. The State of Contemporary Civilisation.
Chapter XXXI.—Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.
Chapter XXXIII.—The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.
Chapter XXXVI.—The Main Points of Our Author’s Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.
Chapter XXXIX.—The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.
Chapter XL.—The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.
Chapter XLII.—Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.
Chapter XLV.—Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul’s Activity. Ecstasy.
Chapter XLVIII.—Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.
Chapter XLIX.—No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.
Chapter LI.—Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.
Chapter LVII.—Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects. God Alone Can Raise the Dead.
Chapter LII.—All Kinds of Death a Violence to Nature, Arising from Sin.—Sin an Intrusion Upon Nature as God Created It.
Such, then, is the work of death—the separation of the soul from the body. Putting out of the question fates and fortuitous circumstances, it has been, according to men’s views, distinguished in a twofold form—the ordinary and the extraordinary. The ordinary they ascribe to nature, exercising its quiet influence in the case of each individual decease; the extraordinary is said to be contrary to nature, happening in every violent death. As for our own views, indeed, we know what was man’s origin, and we boldly assert and persistently maintain that death happens not by way of natural consequence to man, but owing to a fault and defect which is not itself natural; although it is easy enough, no doubt, to apply the term natural to faults and circumstances which seem to have been (though from the emergence of an external cause304 Ex accidentia.) inseparable to us from our very birth. If man had been directly appointed to die as the condition of his creation,305 In mortem directo institutus est. [See p. 227, supra.] then of course death must be imputed to nature. Now, that he was not thus appointed to die, is proved by the very law which made his condition depend on a warning, and death result from man’s arbitrary choice. Indeed, if he had not sinned, he certainly would not have died. That cannot be nature which happens by the exercise of volition after an alternative has been proposed to it, and not by necessity—the result of an inflexible and unalterable condition. Consequently, although death has various issues, inasmuch as its causes are manifold, we cannot say that the easiest death is so gentle as not to happen by violence (to our nature). The very law which produces death, simple though it be, is yet violence. How can it be otherwise, when so close a companionship of soul and body, so inseparable a growth together from their very conception of two sister substances, is sundered and divided? For although a man may breathe his last for joy, like the Spartan Chilon, while embracing his son who had just conquered in the Olympic games; or for glory, like the Athenian Clidemus, while receiving a crown of gold for the excellence of his historical writings; or in a dream, like Plato; or in a fit of laughter, like Publius Crassus,—yet death is much too violent, coming as it does upon us by strange and alien means, expelling the soul by a method all its own, calling on us to die at a moment when one might live a jocund life in joy and honour, in peace and pleasure. That is still a violence to ships: although far away from the Capharean rocks, assailed by no storms, without a billow to shatter them, with favouring gale, in gliding course, with merry crews, they founder amidst entire security, suddenly, owing to some internal shock. Not dissimilar are the shipwrecks of life,—the issues of even a tranquil death. It matters not whether the vessel of the human body goes with unbroken timbers or shattered with storms, if the navigation of the soul be overthrown.
CAPUT LII.
Hoc igitur opus mortis, separationem carnis atque animae, seposita quaestione fatorum et fortuitorum, bifariam distinxit humanus adfectus, in ordinariam et extraordinariam formam: ordinariam quidem naturae deputans placidae cujusque mortis; extraordinariam vero praeter naturam judicans violenti cujusque finis. Qui autem primordia hominis novimus, audenter determinamus, mortem non ex natura secutam hominem, sed ex culpa, ne ipsa quidem naturali: facile autem usurpari naturae nomen, in ea quae videntur a nativitate ex accidentia adhaesisse. Nam si homo in mortem directo institutus fuisset, tunc demum mors naturae adscriberetur. Porro, non 0738C in mortem institutum eum, probat ipsa lex, conditionali comminatione suspendens, et arbitrio hominis addicens mortis eventum . Denique, si non 0739A deliquisset, nequaquam obiisset. Ita non erit natura, quod ex oblationis potestate accidit per voluntatem, non ex instituti auctoritate per necessitatem. Proinde, etsi varii exitus mortis, ut est multimoda conditio caussarum, nullum ita dicimus lenem, ut non vi agatur. Ipsa illa ratio operatrix mortis, simplex licet, vis est. Quid enim? Quae tantam animae et carnis societatem, tantam a conceptu concretionem sororum substantiarum divellit ac dirimit. Nam etsi prae gaudio quis spiritum exhalet, ut Chilon spartanus, dum victorem Olympiae filium amplectitur; etsi prae gloria, ut Clidemus atheniensis, dum ab histrionibus ob praestantiam auro coronatur; etsi per somnium, ut Plato; etsi per risum, ut P. Crassus: multo violentior mors, quae per aliena grassatur, 0739B quae animam per commoda expellit, quae tunc mori adfert, cum jucundius vivere est, in exultatione, in honore, in requie, in voluptate. Vis est et illa navigiis, cum longe a Caphareis saxis, nullis depugnata turbinibus, nullis quassata decumanis, adulante flatu, labente cursu, laetante comitatu, intestino repente perculsu, cum tota securitate desidunt. Non secus naufragia sunt vitae, etiam tranquillae mortis eventus. Nihilo refert integram abire corporis navem, an dissipatam, cum animae navigatio evertatur.