Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.

Objection 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.

Objection 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."

I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (Question 4, Article 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know

singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (Article 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Question 44, Article 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply to Objection 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

Reply to Objection 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

Reply to Objection 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

Articulus 11

Argumentum 1

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod deus non cognoscat singularia. Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima, ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium.

Ergo deus non cognoscit singularia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed res in deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate.

Ergo deus non cognoscit singularia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem.

Sed similitudo singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in deo, quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis deo, qui est actus purus. Non ergo deus potest cognoscere singularia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, omnes viae hominum patent oculis eius.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in creaturis inventae, in deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut ex dictis patet.

Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad perfectionem nostram.

Unde necesse est quod deus singularia cognoscat.

Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a deo.

Unde contra empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III metaphys., quod accideret deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret.

Sed perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in deo simpliciter et unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit.

Sed qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt quod deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare omnes eclipses futuras.

Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret socratem per hoc quod est albus vel sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum praedictum, deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate.

Alii vero dixerunt quod deus cognoscit singularia, applicando causas universales ad particulares effectus.

Sed hoc nihil est. Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum deus sit causa rerum per suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia dei, inquantum se extendit eius causalitas.

Unde, cum virtus activa dei se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; necesse est quod scientia dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae per materiam individuantur.

Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari.

Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est dei essentia, non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam deus cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et materialia, ut dictum est.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a dei similitudine secundum suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.