LECTURE 3 (209 a 31-210 a 13)

HE ARGUES WHETHER PLACE IS FORM OR MATTER

             422. After the Philosopher has inquired whether place is by means of disputation, he here inquires what it is.

             First he gives disputatious arguments to show that place is either form or matter. Secondly, where he says, 'But it is at any rate . . .' (209 b 22), he gives arguments to the contrary.

             Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he gives an argument to show that place is form, and secondly, where he says, 'But, if we regard . . .' (209 b 6), to show that place is matter. Thirdly he introduces a corollary from these arguments, where he says, 'In view of these facts . . .' (209 b 18).

             423. He says, therefore, first that just as in beings one thing is being per se and another is called being per accidens, likewise in regard to place a similar distinction must be made. Common place, in which all bodies are, is one thing. Proper place, which is called place primarily and per se, is another thing.

             Common place is not called place except per accidens and posteriorly. This is clear from the following.

             We can say that you are in the heavens because you are in the air which is in the heavens. And you are in the air and in the heavens because you are on the earth. And you are said to be on the earth because you are in a place which contains nothing more than yourself.

             424. Hence that which primarily and per se contains each thing is its place per se. But place in this sense is the terminus at which the thing is terminated. It follows, therefore, that place properly and per se is the terminus of the thing. However form is the terminus of each thing, because through the form the matter of each thing is determined to its proper being, and the magnitude to its determined measure. For the quantities of things are consequent upon their forms. It seems, therefore, according to this view, that place is form.

             But it must be realized that in this argument there is a sophism of consequent. For the syllogism is carried out in the second figure from two affirmatives.

             425. Next where he says, 'But if we regard . . .' (209 b 6), he gives Plato's argument according to which it seemed to Plato that place is matter.

             To understand this it must be known that the ancients thought that place is the space which is between the termini of a container which has the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth. Nevertheless this space does not seem to be identical with any sensible body. For when different sensible bodies come and go, the space remains the same. According to this, therefore, it follows that place is separated dimensions.

             426. And from this Plato wished to argue that place is matter. He says that insofar as place seems in some things to be the distance of spatial magnitude separated from any sensible body, it seems that place is matter. For distance itself or the dimension of magnitude is other than the magnitude. For magnitude signifies something terminated by some species, as a line is terminated by points, and a surface by a line, and a body by a surface, which are the species of magnitude. But the dimension of space is determined and contained under the form, as a body is determined by a plane, that is, by a surface, as a certain terminus. However, that which is contained under the termini seems to be undetermined in itself. But that which is not determined in itself, but is determined by form and the terminated, is matter, which has the nature [ratio] of infinity. For if the sensible passions and the termini by which the dimension of magnitude is formed are removed from a spherical body, nothing remains except matter. Hence it follows that these dimensions, which are indeterminate in themselves and determined by another, are matter.

             And this principally followed from the fundamental views of Plato, who held that numbers and quantities are the substances of things.

             427. Therefore, since place is dimensions and dimensions are matter, Plato said in the Timaeus that place and matter are the same. For every receptacle of something he called place, not distinguishing between the receptivity of place and of matter. Whence since matter is receptive of forms, it follows that matter is place.

             Nevertheless, it must be understood that Plato spoke of the receptacle in different ways. In the Timaeus he said that the receptacle is matter. However, in his unwritten and spoken teachings, that is, when he taught orally in the schools, he said that the receptacle is the great and the small, which he placed on the part of matter, as was said above. Nevertheless to whichever he attributed the receptacle, he always said that the receptacle and place are the same. Thus, therefore, although many have said that place is something, only Plato tried to establish what it is.

             428. Next where he says, 'In view of these facts . . .' (209 b 18), he concludes from what has been said that, if place is either matter or form, it seems reasonable that it be difficult to know what place is. For both matter and form involve the highest speculation and difficulty, and it is not easy to know one of them without the other.

             429. Next where he says, 'But it is at any rate . . .' (209 b 22), he gives five arguments to the contrary.

             In the first of these arguments he says that it is not difficult to see that place is neither matter nor form. For form and matter are not separated from the thing of which they are. But place does become separated, for water is now present in the place where air formerly was. And also other bodies change places with each other. Whence it is clear that place is neither a material nor formal part of a thing.

             Nor is place a habit or any accident. For the parts and accidents are not separable from the thing, but place is separable. He shows this by means of an example. Place seems to be related to that which is located in place as a kind of vase. But there is this difference. Place is immobile but the vase is mobile, as will be explained below.

             Thus by the fact that place is separable, it is shown that place is not form. But it is shown that place is not matter not only by the fact that place is separable, but also by the fact that place contains. Matter, however, does not contain, but is contained.

             430. He gives the second argument where he says, 'Also it is held . . .' (209 b 32). He has shown that place is neither matter nor form by the fact that place is separated from that which is located in place. Here he wishes to show that, even if place were never separated from that which is located in place, from the very fact that we say that something is in place it is apparent that place is neither matter nor form. Everything which is said to be somewhere seems to be something itself and also to be something other than that in which it is. Hence when something is said to be in place, it follows that place is outside of that which is located in place. But matter and form are not outside of the thing. Therefore neither matter nor form is place.

             431. He gives the third argument where he says, 'Plato of course . . .' (209 b 33). Here in a digression he gives a special argument against the position of Plato.

             It was said above in Book III that Plato held that the ideas and numbers are not in place. But it follows from his understanding of place that they are in place. For everything which is participated is in the participant. Now he held that species and numbers are participated either by matter or by the great and the small. It follows, therefore, that species and numbers are in matter or in the great and the small. If, therefore, matter or the great and the small is place, it follows that numbers and species are in place.

             432. He gives the fourth argument where he says, 'Further, how could a body . . .' (210 a 2).

             He says that it will not be possible to explain suitably how something is moved in respect to place if matter and form are place. For it is impossible to ascribe place to those things which are moved neither up nor down nor according to any other kind of place. Whence place must be sought in those things which are moved in respect to place. But if place exists in that which is moved as something intrinsic to it (which must be said if place is either matter or form), it follows that place will be in place. For everything which is moved in respect to place is in place. But those things which are in the being as the species and the infinite, that is, the matter, are moved together with the thing. For they are not always in the same place but are where the thing is. Therefore, it must be that matter and form are in place. If, therefore, either of them is place, it follows that place is in place, which is impossible.

             433. He gives the fifth argument where he says, 'Further, when water . . .' (210 a 9). The argument is as follows.

             Whenever something is corrupted, the parts of its species are corrupted in some way. But matter and form are parts of the species. Therefore, when the thing is corrupted, the matter and form are corrupted, at least per accidens. If, therefore, place is matter and form, it follows that place is corrupted, if place pertains to the species. For the body which is generated would not be in the same place if the place of air pertained to its species, as when water is generated from air. But this does not explain how place is corrupted. Therefore it cannot be said that place is either matter or form.

             Lastly he concludes what has already been said; namely, it seems necessary that there be place and one can have difficulties about its substance.