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having spoken of the Son together with the Spirit, he added, “in which alone we apprehend the one to be distinguished from the other,” manifestly forbidding the Latin innovation, that the Son is not only caused, but also cause, and in short shaking off all their contrived distinctions, that first the Father is cause with respect to the Spirit, and second the Son, and whatever is similar to these things; for, he says, we apprehend the divine nature only in the cause and the caused, and we do not contemplate the cause in two persons, but of the caused (p. 284) alone we understand this distinction in two persons, which is not that the one of these is also a cause, and the other only caused, as the Italians think, or rather, are mad, but that the one is Son, and the other is not Son. And this is not prevented by the Son's union with the Father according to nature. For having said earlier in the discourse what these three are, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that they are one super-essential essence, then showing how these three are, whether in a caused manner as also having a cause, or in every way uncaused, he says that one of them is cause, but the other has its being in a caused manner, and he says that the Son and the Holy Spirit have their being in a caused manner.

Did he not show from this here, that there is one sole cause taken from the three, that is, the Father alone? Then, wishing to show how each of these two persons exists in a caused manner, lest anyone should think, like the Latins, to introduce again that distinction of cause and caused also with respect to the Son and the Spirit, he says clearly, that regarding these we understand a different distinction. But the Latins, in opposition to him, say not another, but the same; and again, when the saint intended to say how the Son has his being in a caused manner, they slanderously claim he says how He is a cause. For that the Son is in any way a cause, this God-bearer is nowhere shown to say or to think, and especially in his sayings just set forth. But that this one also subsists in a caused manner, just like the Holy Spirit, yet in a caused manner by generation; and the Holy Spirit also subsists in a caused manner, but not by generation.

For when both are spoken of, the Father and what is from the Father, that is, the Son and the Spirit, the great-minded one said the Son is immediate to the Father, and through him, who is immediate to the Father, he said the Spirit is understood as from the Father, but not as proceeding through the Son, (p. 286) again saying something like this, that the Father of lights being and being called the cause and first as cause, that is, of the Son and the Spirit (for both, and not the Son alone, are second to the Father, as Gregory the Theologian also says in the *Carmina*) the first, then, being called Father of lights with respect to both of these (for from the oracles you would not find another name for him) of those who are from this cause, the light which comes forth from light by generation is immediately understood as immediate to the Father, just as Nyssa himself also maintains in the second of his *Against Eunomius*, writing, “as the Father could not be understood as separate from himself without the Son being joined through the utterance of 'Father'”, and again, “having faith in the Father, upon hearing 'the Father' we at the same time receive with our mind also the Son”.

The Son, therefore, both is and is understood from the Father, but the Holy Spirit through himself might be and be understood from a projector, but not from the Father, but through the Son who is immediately understood from the Father, the Spirit also might be from the Father, who makes that Spirit proceed, but begets the Son. For how could the unbegotten Spirit be said to be from the one who begets? Is it not through the Son, who is both only-begotten and for this reason is immediately co-understood with the one who begets, and who makes his own the state of being begotten

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ὁμοῦ μετά τοῦ Πνεύματος καί τόν Υἱόν εἰπών, ἐπήνεγκεν, «ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ διακρίνεσθαι τό ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνομεν», φανερῶς ἀπαγορεύων, τήν λατινικήν καινοτομίαν, ὡς οὐ μόνον αἰτιατός, ἀλλά καί αἴτιός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, καί πάσας τούτων ἐν βραχεῖ τάς ἐπινενοημένας διαφοράς ἀποσειόμενος, ὅτι πρῶτον μέν ὁ Πατήρ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τοῦ Πνεύματος, δεύτερον δέ ὁ Υἱός, καί ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια˙ ἐν μόνῳ γάρ, φησί, τῷ αἰτίῳ καί τῷ αἰτιατῷ τήν θείαν φύσιν κατανοοῦμεν, καί τό μέν αἴτιον οὐκ ἐν δυσί προσώποις θεωροῦμεν, τοῦ δέ αἰτιατοῦ (σελ. 284) μόνου ταύτην τήν ἐν δυσί προσώποις διαφοράν ἐννοοῦμεν, ἥτις ἐστίν οὐχ ὅτι τό μέν τούτων καί αἴτιόν ἐστι, τό δέ μόνον αἰτιατόν, ὡς Ἰταλοί φρονοῦσι, μᾶλλον δέ παραφρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι τό μέν Υἱός ἐστι, τό δέ οὐχ Υἱός. Καί οὐκ ἀπείργεται τοῦτο παρά τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρός τόν Πατέρα κατά φύσιν ἑνώσεως. Εἰπών γάρ ἀνωτέρω τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστι τά τρία ταῦτα, ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Υἱός καί τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, ὅτι μία ὑπερούσιος οὐσία, δεικνύς ἔπειτα πῶς ἐστι τά τρία ταῦτα, ἆρα αἰτιατῶς ὡς ἔχοντά τι καί αἴτιον, ἤ ἀναιτίως πάντῃ, φησίν ὅτι τό μέν αὐτῶν ἐστιν αἴτιον, τό δέ αἰτιατῶς ἔχει τό εἶναι, αἰτιατῶς δέ φησιν ἔχει τό εἶναι ὁ Υἱός τε καί τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον.

Ἆρ᾿ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ἔδειξεν ἐνταῦθα, ἕν εἶναι μόνον αἴτιον τό ληφθέν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν, δηλονότι τόν Πατέρα μόνον; Εἶτα θέλων δεῖξαι πῶς τῶν δύο τούτων προσώπων ἑκάτερον αἰτιατῶς ἐστιν, ἵνα μή τις νομίσῃ, καθάπερ οἱ Λατῖνοι, πάλιν ἐκείνην τήν τοῦ αἰτίου καί αἰτιατοῦ διαφοράν καί ἐπί Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος εἰσάγειν, φησί σαφῶς, ὅτι ἐπί τούτων ἄλλην διαφοράν ἐννοῦμεν. Λατῖνοι δέ ἀντιθεϊκῶς τούτῳ φασίν οὐκ ἄλλην, ἀλλά τήν αὐτήν˙ καί τοῦ ἁγίου πάλιν, πῶς αἰτιατῶς ἔχει τό εἶναι ὁ Υἱός φάναι προθεμένου, αὐτοί πῶς αἴτιός ἐστι φάναι συκοφαντοῦσιν αὐτόν. Τό μέν γάρ εἶναι τόν Υἱόν ὁπωσοῦν αἴτιον, οὐδαμῇ δείκνυται λέγων ἤ φρονῶν ὁ θεοφόρος οὗτος, καί μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἀρτίως προκειμένοις ρήμασιν αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλά τό αἰτιατῶς μέν καί τοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, καθάπερ καί τό πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, αἰτιατῶς μέντοι γεννητῶς, αἰτιατῶς δέ καί τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ γεννητῶς δέ.

Ἀμφοτέρων γάρ λεγομένων, τοῦ Πατρός καί ἐκ Πατρός, Υἱοῦ δηλονότι καί Πνεύματος, τῷ Πατρί προσεχές ὁ μεγαλόνους εἶπε τόν Υἱόν, διά μέσου δέ αὐτοῦ, προσεχοῦς ὄντος τῷ πατρί, ἐκ Πατρός εἴρηκε τό Πνεῦμα νοούμενον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐκπορευόμενον διά μέσου τοῦ Υἱοῦ, (σελ. 286) πάλιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο λέγων, ὅτι τοῦ αἰτίου καί πρώτου ὡς αἰτίου Πατρός φώτων ὄντος τε καί λεγομένου, τουτέστιν Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος (ἄμφω γάρ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὁ Υἱός μόνος δευτερεύει τοῦ Πατρός, ὡς καί Γρηγόριος ὁ θεολόγος ἐν τοῖς Ἔπεσι φησι) τοῦ γοῦν πρώτου πρός ἀμφότερα ταῦτα Πατρός τῶν φώτων λεγομένου (ἐκ γάρ τῶν λογίων οὐκ ἄν εὕροις ἑτέραν αὐτοῦ ἐπωνυμίαν) τῶν ἐξ αἰτίου τούτου ὄντων, τό γεννητῶς ἐκ φωτός προερχόμενον φῶς προσεχῶς τῷ Πατρί νοεῖται πάραυτα, καθάπερ καί αὐτός ὁ Νύσσης ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Πρός Εὐνόμιον διατείνεται γράφων, «ὡς οὐκ ἄν Πατήρ κεχωρισμένος ἀφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ νοηθείη μή υἱοῦ συνημμένου διά τῆς τοῦ Πατρός ἐκφωνήσεως», καί πάλιν, «εἰς τόν Πατέρα τήν πίστιν ἔχοντες, ὁμοῦ τῷ ἀκοῦσαι τόν Πατέρα συμπαραδεξόμεθα τῇ διανοίᾳ καί τόν Υἱόν».

Ὁ μέν οὖν Υἱός ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός καί ἔστι καί νοεῖται, τό δέ Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον δι᾿ ἑαυτό μέν ἐκ προβολέως εἴη ἄν καί νοηθείη, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐκ Πατρός, διά δέ τοῦ προσεχῶς νοουμένου ἐκ Πατρός Υἱοῦ, καί ἐκ Πατρός εἴη ἄν τό Πνεῦμα, ἐκπορεύοντος μέν αὐτό τό Πνεῦμα, γεννῶντος δέ τόν Υἱόν. Ἐκ γοῦν τοῦ γεννῶντος τό μή γεννητόν Πνεῦμα πῶς ἄν ρηθείη; Οὐ διά τόν Υἱόν μονογενῆ τε ὄντα καί διά τοῦτο προσεχῶς εὐθύς τῷ γεννῶντι συνοούμενον καί τό γεννητόν ἑαυτοῦ ποιοῦντα