LECTURE 4 (210 a 14-b 32)

VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE IN SOMETHING. WHETHER SOMETHING CAN BE IN ITSELF. CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF PLACE ARE ANSWERED

             434. After the Philosopher has inquired whether place is and what place is by means of disputation, he here begins to determine the truth.

             First he sets forth certain things which are necessary for the consideration of the truth. Secondly, where he says, 'What then after all is place?' (210 b 33), he determines the truth.

             Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he shows in how many ways something is said to be in something. Secondly, where he says, 'One might raise the question . . .' (210 a 25), he inquires whether something can be in itself. Thirdly, where he says, 'Zeno's problem . . .' (210 b 23), he solves a certain doubt that was previously raised.

             435. He posits eight modes in which something is said to be in something.

             The first of these is as a finger is said to be in a hand. And universally as any part is said to be in its whole.

             The second mode is as a whole is said to be in its parts. Since this mode is not as customary as the first, to clarify the point he adds that the whole is not outside of the parts and thus must be understood as being in the parts.

             The third mode is as man is said to be in animal, or as any species is in its genus.

             The fourth mode is as a genus is said to be in the species. And lest this mode seem extraneous, he signifies the reason why he says this. The genus as well as the differentia is part of the definition of the species. Hence in a certain way both the genus and the differentia are said to be in the species as parts in the whole.

             The fifth mode is as health is said to be in the hot and the cold, whose interaction constitute health. And universally as any form, accidental or substantial, is said to be in its matter or subject.

             The sixth mode is as the affairs of the Greeks are said to be in the king of Greece, and universally as everything which is moved is in a first mover. In this mode I can say that something is in me because it is in my power to make it.

             The seventh mode in which something is said to be in something is as in that which is most lovable and desirable, and universally as in an end. In this mode one's heart is said to be in something which one loves and desires.

             The eighth mode in which something is said to be in something is as in a vase, and universally as that which is located is in place.

             He seems to have omitted the mode in which something is in something as in time. But this is reduced to the eighth mode. For just as place is the measure of the mobile being, so time is the measure of the motion.

             436. Moreover he says that something is most properly said to be in something according to the eighth mode.

             Hence, according to the rule which he gives in Metaphysics, IV and V, it is necessary that all the other modes are reduced in some way to this mode--that something is in something as in a place. This is made clear as follows.

             That which is located is contained in or is included by a place in which it has rest and stability. Therefore, in a way most similar to this, a part is said to be in an integral whole in which it is actually included. Hence it will be said below that that which is located is like a separated part, and a part is like something that has a connected location.

             That which is a whole according to reason [ratio] is similar to the integral whole. Consequently it is said that that which is in the definition [ratio] of something is in it, as animal is in man.

             However it happens that the part of the integral whole is included actually in the whole, but the part of the universal whole is included potentially in the whole. For the genus extends potentially to more than the species, although the species has more in act. Consequently it is also said that the species is in the genus.

             And as the species is contained in the potency of the genus, likewise form is contained in the potency of matter. Hence form is said to be in matter.

             And since the whole has the nature of a form in respect to the parts, as was said in Book II, consequently the whole is said to be in the parts. Moreover as the form is included under the passive potency of matter, likewise the effect is included under the active potency of the agent. Hence a thing is said to be in its first mover.

             Furthermore it is clear that the appetite rests in the good which is desired and loved, and is made fast in it, as that which is located is in place. Hence the affection of the lover is said to be in that which is loved.

             And thus it is clear that all the other modes are derived from the last mode, which is the most proper.

             437. Next where he says, 'One might raise the question . . .' (210 a 25), he inquires whether something can be in itself. For Anaxagoras has said above that the infinite is in itself.

             Therefore he first raises the question whether one and the same thing can be in itself or whether nothing can be in itself. But everything is either nowhere or in something else.

             438. Secondly he answers this question where he says, 'The question is ambiguous' (210 a 27).

             First he shows how something can be in itself, and secondly, where he says, 'In this sense then . . .' (210 a 33), how it cannot be in itself.

             He says, therefore, first that a thing being in itself can be understood in two ways: first, primarily and per se; secondly, according to another, that is, according to a part.

             In this second way something can be said to be in itself. For when two parts of a whole are so related that one part is that in which something is and the other part is that which is in it, then it follows that the whole is said to be both that in which it is, by reason of one part, and that which is in this, by reason of the other part. Thus a whole is said to be in itself.

             For we find that something is said of a thing because of a part. Thus one is called white because his surface is white, and a man is called wise because there is wisdom in the rational part. If, therefore, we take a jar full of wine as a certain whole whose parts are the jar and the wine, neither of the parts, that is, neither the jar nor the wine, will be in itself. But the whole, that is, the jar of wine, will be in itself insofar as each is its part, both the wine which is in the jar and the jar in which the wine is.

             In this way, therefore, it happens that something is in itself.

             439. Next where he says, 'In this sense then . . .' (210 a 33), he shows that it does not happen that a thing is in itself primarily.

             First he states his intention, distinguishing the modes in which something is and is not in itself. Secondly, where he says, 'Thus if we look . . .' (210 b 8), he proves his position.

             He says, therefore, that it does not happen that something is in itself primarily.

             By stating the opposite view, he shows what it means for a thing to be in itself primarily. White is said to be in a body because the surface is in the body. Hence white is not primarily in the body, but in the surface. And similarly science is said primarily to be in the soul, but not in the man in whom it is through the soul. Because of these, that is, the soul and the surface, there are statements in which a man is called white or wise. For the soul and the surface are as parts in the man; not that the surface is a part, but because it is related to the nature of a part insofar as it is something of the man, that is, the terminus of the body.

             Moreover if we take wine and a jar independently of each other, they are not parts. Hence neither can be in itself. But when they are together, as when the jar is filled with wine, then, because the jar and the wine are then parts, the same thing will be in itself, as was explained, not primarily but through the parts. Likewise white is not in a man primarily, but through the body, and it is in the body through the surface. However it is not in the surface through anything else. Hence it is said to be primarily in the surface.

             That in which something is primarily and that which is in it, for example, white and surface, are not the same thing. For surface and white differ according to species, and the nature and potency of each is different.

             440. Having shown the difference between being in something primarily and not primarily, he next shows, where he says, 'Thus if we look . . .' (210 b 8), that nothing is in itself primarily.

             First he shows that nothing is primarily in itself per se, and secondly that nothing is primarily in itself per accidens, where he says, 'Nor is it possible . . .' (210 b 18).

             He establishes the first point in two ways, inductively and by reason.

             He says, therefore, first that by considering inductively the individual modes determined above in which a thing is said to be in something, it appears that nothing is in itself primarily and per se. For nothing is a whole or a part or a genus of itself, and likewise in regard to the other modes. He posits this by concluding from what has been set down above. For just as it is clear in regard to white and surface, which are related as form and matter, that they differ in species and power, likewise all the other modes can be considered in the same way.

             441. Next where he says, '. . . it can be seen by argument . . .' (210 b 9), he proves the same thing by reason.

             He says that it is clear through reasoning that it is impossible for a thing to be in itself primarily and per se. For if a thing is primarily and per se in itself, it is necessary that the nature [ratio] of that in which something is and the nature [ratio] of that which is in it belong to the same thing in the same respect. Hence it is necessary that each of them, that is, the container and the contained, be both--for example, the jar would be both the jar and the wine, and the wine would be both the wine and the jar, if it happens that something is in itself primarily and per se. Hence, having granted this, namely, that the wine is both the jar and the wine, and the jar is both the wine and the jar, then if you say that one of them is in the other, for example wine is in the jar, it follows that the wine is received in the jar not insofar as it is wine, but insofar as the wine is the jar. Hence, if being in the jar primarily and per se happens to the jar from the fact that something is primarily and per se in itself, it follows that nothing can be said to be in the jar except insofar as it itself is the jar. And thus, if wine is said to be in the jar, it follows that being in the jar happens to the wine, not because the wine is wine, but because the wine is the jar.

             And for the same reason, if the jar receives wine, it receives it not insofar as the jar is a jar, but insofar as the jar is wine. But this is impossible.

             Hence it is clear that 'that in which' and 'that which is in this' differ in nature [ratio]. For the nature [ratio] of that which is in something is other than the nature [ratio] of that in which something is. Therefore it is not possible that a thing be in itself primarily and per se.

             442. Next where he says, 'Nor is it possible . . .' (210 b 18), he shows that nothing is in itself primarily and per accidens.

             A thing is said to be in something per accidens when it is in it because of something else existing in it. For example, we say that a man is on the sea because he is on a ship which is on the sea. He is said to be on the sea primarily because this is not due to a part. Therefore, if it would happen that something is in itself primarily, although not per se but per accidens, it follows that it is in itself because something else is in it. And thus it follows that two bodies are in the same place, that is, the body which is in it and it itself which is in itself. Thus a jar will be in itself per accidens if the jar itself, whose nature is to receive something, is in itself and also that which is received--the wine--is in it. Therefore, if it follows that the jar is in itself because the wine is in the jar, then both the wine and the jar will be in the jar. And thus two bodies would be in the same place. Therefore it is clear that it is impossible for a thing to be in itself primarily.

             Nevertheless, it must be understood that sometimes a thing is said to be in itself, not according to an affirmative understanding, which the Philosopher here rejects, but according to a negative understanding. In this sense 'to be in itself' does not signify anything except 'not being in another'.

             443. Next where he says, 'Zeno's problem . . .' (210 b 23), he answers a certain difficulty.

             First he disposes of Zeno's argument which was brought in to prove that place does not exist. The argument is that if place exists, it must be in another place, and so forth to infinity. But, as he says, this is not difficult to answer now that the modes in which a thing is said to be in something have been distinguished.

             There is nothing to prevent one from saying that place is in something. Nevertheless, place is not in something as in a place, but rather according to one of the other modes, as form is in matter, or as an accident is in a subject, insofar as place is the terminus of that which contains.

             And he adds this: [Place is in something] 'as health is "in" the hot as a positive determination of it or as the hot is "in" body as an affection' (210 b 26). Hence it is not necessary to proceed to infinity.

             444. Next where he says, 'Another thing is . . .' (210 b 27), he answers the difficulties raised above as to whether it is the nature of place to be either form or matter. He does this from what has been shown, namely, that nothing is in itself primarily and per se. For from this it is clear that there can be no place or vase, as it were, of that which is contained in itself as a material or formal part. For it is necessary, as was shown, that 'that which is in something' and 'that in which something is' differ primarily and per se. Hence it follows that neither form nor matter is place. Rather place is something other than that which is located in place. For matter and form are intrinsic parts of that which is located in place.

             Finally he concludes that the objections raised above concern place. Some of these objections have already been answered and some will be answered after the nature of place is made clear.