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he who has suffered good things by his will is naturally disposed to suffer at their hands, and to be wholly overcome by them, and having received the fulfillment of his longing, the perfect conquest in himself of that which is longed for, and a cessation of movement, the ever-moving stability, in which death, which long ago held sway over nature, vanishes, since nature is not overcome by it through transgression. For you no longer endure agitation, because of the prevailing grace of the Spirit, by which, holding fast through prayers you are held fast, and knowingly traversing its paths, you show by your activity how many royal and divine paths there are for those who wish to travel straight along the unerring path of piety; and you define their deviations to either side (15A_244>; and you reveal the threatened sorrows of the one and the promised sacred rewards of the other; so that by fear and longing you may lead them to godly perfection. And admiring your work, I fittingly praise your understanding; or rather, amazed at your vigor in both, I glorify God who empowers and gives you wisdom, beseeching you to use the same methods toward those who are lacking in sense, and not to grow weary; for virtue has no weariness, being productive of all good things, until you create in them the mind of Christ, and train them to search the depths of the Spirit, whose manifest things encompass all the wisdom and power of beings, and He reveals that which is spoken in a mystery to those who, like you, have attached themselves to Him, and have preferred nothing more precious than living with Him.

But since you possess the virtue that is first and last of all, radiant as both a guide and a seal; I mean, humility, you have deigned to ask your servant and disciple, concerning the definition of the natural will, which the pious monk has made, whether it is correct or not, saying, “It is a power appetitive of what exists by nature, and cohesive of all the properties essentially belonging to the nature.” And, that this is one thing, and the gnomic will another, I consider to be correct, and not discordant with the teaching of the divinely-judged Fathers, even if it has seemed to some not to be so, who assert that the Fathers define the will as willing and what is willed or willable 0188. And who defines it so, and which of the Fathers, I would gladly have asked them. For if it is so, what else has this become but a reciprocal proof, which does not clarify its own definition, (15A_246> but improbably posits the same definition for each through the other, and proposes, which is what happens, to define willing by will, and this in turn by that. For the things defined revert to their own definition. For it is clear that they also call the will "willing." But they do not say this as a definition of will. For who can show this; since according to those who say this, "counseling" will be the definition of "counsel", and "movement" of "motion", and "humanity" of "man". But whether they signify the thing signified in this way or that, they in no way damage its existence, whether the thing indicated be a movement or a substance. For if this were so, the existence of all universals and particulars would surely fall away. For in all things we use different significations. And I also say this, that even if they call the will "willing", they by no means call it "willed" or "willable." For how can appetite and the object of appetite be the same? For if this were so, toward what will it be moved, since it is properly this very thing toward which it is moved, and its nature is nothing other than that? For this is a medial relation between the extremes; uniting them through itself, but not coinciding with them in existence. And my witness is the divine and great Gregory, who does not at all reduce what is willed and what is begotten to the same as the will and the begetting; but through these, as natural relations, he leads up to the one who begets and wills. For if he did not accept making the reference of what is willed or begotten to the will and the begetting, although it is naturally a medial relation, “For it does not follow at all,” he says, how could he reduce them to the same, and declare them to be one?”.

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πέφυκε πρός ἐκείνων πάσχειν ὁ γνώμῃ πεπονθώς τά καλά, καί πρός ἐκείνων δι᾿ ὅλου κρατούμενος, πόθου τε πλήρωσιν εἰληφώς, τήν ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ποθουμένου τελείαν ἐκνίκησιν, καί παύλαν κινήσεως τήν ἀεικίνητον στάσιν, καθ᾿ ἥν ὁ πάλαι τῆς φύσεως κρατήσας ἐξαφανίζεται θάνατος, οὐχ ἠττωμένης τούτῳ διά παραβάσεως. Οὐ γάρ ἔτι σάλον ὑφίστασαι, διά τήν ἐπικρατήσασαν χάριν τοῦ Πνεύματος, ὑφ᾿ ἧς τῷ ἀντέχεσθαι κατ᾿ εὐχάς ἀντεχόμενος, καί τάς ταύτης ἐπιστημόνως ἐξανύων τρίβους, ὑποδεικνύεις μέν κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν, ὅσαι βασιλικαί καί θεῖαι τυγχάνουσιν, τοῖς πρός ἀπλανῆ τρίβον τήν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἰθυπορεῖν βουλομένοις· τούτων δέ τάς παρ᾿ ἑκάτερον (15Α_244> ἐκτροπάς διορίζεις· καί τῶν μέν τάς ἠπειλημένας ἀνίας· τῶν δέ τάς ἐπηγγελμένας ἱεράς ἀμοιβάς ὑποφαίνεις· ὡς ἄν δέει καί πόθῳ πρός τήν ἔνθεον ἀγάγοις τελείωσιν. Καί σοῦ τήν ἐργασίαν ἀποθαυμάσας ἐπαινῶ προσηκόντως τήν σύνεσιν· μᾶλλον δέ τήν περί ἑκατέρα καταπλαγείς εὐτονίαν, τόν δυναμοῦντά σε καί σοφίζοντα δοξάζω Θεόν, λιπαρῶν ταῖς αὐταῖς χρῆσθαι μεθόδοις πρός τούς ἐνδεεῖς φρενῶν, καί μή κάμνειν· οὐ γάρ ἔχει κάματον ἡ ἀρετή, πάντων οὖσα κατεργαστική τῶν καλῶν, μέχρις ὅτου νοῦν ἐμποιήσῃς Χριστοῦ, καί τά βάθη τοῦ Πνεύματος διερευνᾷν ἐκπαιδεύσῃ, οὗ καί τά ἐμφανῆ, πᾶσαν τῶν ὄντων περιγράφει σοφίαν καί δύναμιν, καί τήν ἐν μυστηρίῳ λαλουμένην ἀποκαλύπτει, τοῖς κατά σέ προσθεμένοις αὐτῷ, καί μηδέν εἰς συμβίωσιν τούτου προκρίνασι τιμιώτερον.

Ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδή τήν πασῶν πρωτίστην ὁμοίως καί τελευταῖαν, ὡς πραγωγόν καί σφραγίδα περιλάμπουσαν ἀρετήν κεκτημένος· λέγω δή τήν ταπείνωσιν, πυθέσθαι κατηξίωσας τόν σόν οἰκέτην καί μαθητήν, διά τόν περί φυσικοῦ θελήματος ὁρισμόν, ὅν ὁ εὐλαβής πεποίηκε μοναχός, εἰ εὖ ἔχει, ἤ μή, φήσας, "∆ύναμιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικήν, καί τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικήν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων». Καί, ὅτι ἄλλο τοῦτο, καί τό γνωμικόν ἄλλο, καλῶς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, καί τῆς τῶν θεοκρίτων οὐκ ἀπᾴδοντα διδασκαλίας Πατέρων, εἰ καί τισιν ἐνομίσθη μή οὕτως ἔχειν, θέλησιν καί θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν 0188 ἰσχυριζομένοις τό θέλημα τούς Πατέρας ὁρίζεσθαι. Καί τίς οὕτως ὁρίζεται, καί ποῖος τῶν Πατέρων, ἠδέως ἄν ἠρόμην αὐτούς. Εἰ γάρ οὕτως, τί ποτε ἄλλο τοῦτο καθέστηκεν, ἤ διάλληλος δεῖξις, ἡ τόν αὐτοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτόν μή διευκρινοῦσα λόγον, (15Α_246> ἀλλ᾿ ἑκατέρου τόν αὐτόν δι᾿ ἑκατέρου τιθεμένη παρά τό εἰκός, καί προΐσχουσα, ὅπερ ὑπάρχει τό, θέλησιν ὁρίζειν τό θέλημα, καί τοῦτο αὖθις ἐκείνην. Ἀντιστρέφει γάρ πρός τόν οἰκεῖον ὅρον τά ὁριζόμενα. Ὅτι γάρ καί θέλησιν τό θέλημα λέγουσιν, δῆλον. Οὐ μήν ὡς ὁρισμόν θελήματος τοῦτό φασι. Τίς γάρ ὁ δεῖξαι δυνάμενος· ἐπεί καί βουλήματος βούλησις, καί κίνησις αὖθις κινήματος, καί ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπότης ἔσται, κατά τούς λέγοντας, ὁρισμός. Εἴτε δέ οὕτως, εἴτ᾿ ἐκείνως σημαίνουσι τό σημαινόμενον, οὐδαμῶς τήν ὕπαρξιν αὐτοῦ παραβλάπτουσι, εἴτε κίνησις, εἴτε οὐσία τό δηλούμενον ᾗ. Καί γάρ εἰ τοῦτο, πάντων καθολικῶν ἅμα καί μερικῶν διαπεσεῖται πάντως ἡ ὕπαρξις. ∆ιαφόροις γάρ ἐν πᾶσι προσχρώμεθα σημασίαις. Κἀκεῖνο δέ φημι, ὡς εἰ καί θέλησιν τό θέλημα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδαμῶς θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν. Πῶς γάρ ταυτόν ἔφεσις, καί ἐφετόν; Εἰ γάρ τοῦτο, πρός τί κινηθήσεται, αὐτό τοῦτο κυρίως ὑπάρχουσα πρός ὅπερ ἄν καί κινεῖται, καί μή ἄλλο παρ᾿ ἐκεῖνο τήν φύσιν τυγχάνουσα; Μέση γάρ αὕτη τῶν ἄκρων σχέσις ἐστίν· ἑνωποιοῦσα μέν ταῦτα δι᾿ ἑαυτῆς, οὐ συμβαίνουσα δέ τούτοις κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν. Καί μάρτυς ὁ θεῖος καί μέγας Γρηγόριος, τό θεληθέν καί γεννηθέν, οὐκ εἰς ταυτόν ἄγων τῇ θελήσει καί τῇ γεννήσει καθάπαξ· ἀλλά διά τούτων ὡς σχέσεων φυσικῶν, ἀνάγων ἐπί τόν γεννῶντα καί θέλοντα. Εἰ γάρ μήτε τήν ἀναφοράν τοῦ θεληθέντος ἤ γεννηθέντος πρός τήν θέλησιν καί τήν γέννησιν ποιῆσαι κατεδέξατο, καίτοι μέσης κατά φύσιν οὔσης, "Οὐ γάρ ἕπεται πάντως, φησί, πῶς ἔμελλεν εἰς ταὐτόν ἀγαγεῖν, καί ἕν εἶναι ταῦτα διαγορεύειν».