The fount of knowledge i: the philosophical chapters

 Preface

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 4 (variant)

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 6 (variant)

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapters 9-10 (variants)

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 The term subject is taken in two ways: as subject of existence and as subject of predication. we have a subject of existence in such a case as that of

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 Chapter 31

 Chapter 32

 Chapter 33

 Chapter 34

 Chapter 35

 Chapter 36

 Chapter 37

 Chapter 38

 Chapter 39

 Chapter 40

 Chapter 41

 Chapter 42

 Chapter 43

 Chapter 44

 Chapter 45

 Chapter 46

 Substance, then, is a most general genus. the body is a species of substance, and genus of the animate. the animate is a species of body, and genus of

 Chapter 48

 Chapter 49

 Chapter 50

 Chapter 51

 Chapter 52

 Chapter 53

 Chapter 54

 Chapter 55

 Chapter 56

 Chapter 57

 Chapter 58

 Chapter 59

 Chapter 60

 Chapter 61

 Chapter 62

 Chapter 63

 Chapter 64

 Chapter 65

 Chapter 67 [!]

 Chapter 66 [!]

 Chapter 68

 Explanation of expressions

Chapter 50

Those things are relative which, in what they themselves are, are said to belong to other things, or they are those which in any other way whatsoever are related to another thing. Now, they are said to belong to others, as a father to a son, for the father is necessarily said to be father of a son. On the other hand, they are related to another, as great is to little or much to little. For ‘much is not said to belong to ‘little, but to be ‘much in relation to ‘little.’

One should know that, whenever a thing is considered in itself, it is not relative. When, however, it has a habitude to another thing, then it is said to be relative. Here, then, is the essence of relatives and here is their hypostasis; namely, in their being said to be relative to another, that is to say, in their having a habitude to another. For it is their mutual habitude which makes things relative.

Some relatives are called by the same name, as a friend is a friend of a friend and as an enemy is an enemy of an enemy. Others are called by different names, as a father is a father of a son and as a teacher is a teacher of a pupil.

And again, some things are relative by excess, as the greater is greater than the less. Others are relative according to the relation of the thing discerning to the thing discerned, as scientific knowledge is the knowledge of that which is scientifically knowable. For science discerns that which is scientifically knowable, or, in other words, cognition discerns that which is knowable. And also, sensation is a feeling of the sensible object, placing is a placing of that which is placeable, standing is a standing of that which can stand, reclining is a reclining of that which can recline, and so on. Still others are relative according to potency and impotency. They are relative according to potency, as are the thing heating and the thing heated; according to impotency, or the privation of potency, as when we say that the eye does not have the power to see the sphere without stars. Others are relative according to the relation between the cause and the thing caused, as a father is a father of a son.

Proper to relatives is the fact that they may be affirmed convertibly. Thus, a friend is a friend of a friend, and the second