Chap. VIII.—Of the Chief Good, and the Pleasures of the Soul and Body, and of Virtue.

What then remains, but that we leave raving and obstinate wranglers, and come to the judge, who is in truth the giver of simple and calm wisdom? which is able not only to mould us, and lead us into the way, but also to pass an opinion on the controversies of those men. This teaches us what is the true and highest good of man; but before I begin to speak on this subject, all those opinions must be refuted, that it may appear that no one of those philosophers was wise. Since the inquiry is respecting the duty of man, the chief good of the chief animal ought to be placed in that which it cannot have in common with the other animals. But as teeth are the peculiar property of wild beasts, horns of cattle, and wings of birds, so something peculiar to himself ought to be attributed to man, without which he would lose the fixed367    Rationem, “the plan or method of his condition.”   order of his condition. For that which is given to all for the purpose of life or generation, is indeed a natural good; but still it is not the greatest, unless it be peculiar to each class. Therefore he was not a wise man who believed that pleasure of the mind is the chief good, since that, whether it be freedom from anxiety or joy, is common to all. I do not consider Aristippus even worthy of an answer; for since he is always rushing into pleasures of the body, and is only the slave of sensual indulgences, no one can regard him as a man: for he lived in such a manner that there was no difference between him and a brute, except this only, that he had the faculty of speech. But if the power of speaking were given to the ass, or the dog, or swine, and you were to inquire from these why they so furiously pursue the females, that they can scarcely be separated from them, and even neglect their food and I drink; why they either drive away other males, or do not abstain from the pursuit even when vanquished, but often, when bruised by stronger animals, they are more determined in their pursuit; why they dread neither rain nor cold; why they undertake labour, and do not shrink from danger;—what other answer will they give, but that the chief good is bodily pleasure?—that they eagerly seek it, in order that they may be affected with the most agreeable sensations; and that these are of so much importance, that, for the sake of attaining them, they imagine that no labour, nor wounds, nor death itself, ought to be refused by them? Shall we then seek precepts of living from these men, who have no other feelings than those of the irrational creatures?  

The Cyrenaics say that virtue itself is to be praised on this account, because it is productive of pleasure. True, says the filthy dog, or the swine wallowing in the mire.368    [Sus ille lutulentus. 2 Pet. ii. 22.]   For it is on this account that I contend with my adversary with the utmost exertion of strength, that my valour may procure for me pleasure; of which I must necessarily be deprived if I shall come off vanquished. Shall we therefore learn wisdom from these men, who differ from cattle and the brutes, not in feeling, but in language? To regard the absence of pain as the chief good, is not indeed the part of Peripatetic and Stoic, but of clinical philosophers. For who would not imagine that the discussion was carried on by those who were ill, and under the influence of some pain? What is so ridiculous, as to esteem that the chief good which the physician is able to give? We must therefore feel pain in order that we may enjoy good; and that, too, severely and frequently, that afterwards the absence of pain may be attended with greater pleasure. He is therefore most wretched who has never felt pain, because he is without that which is good; whereas we used to regard him as most happy, because he was without evil. He was not far distant from this folly, who said that the entire absence of pain was the chief good. For, besides the fact that every animal avoids pain, who can bestow upon himself that good, towards the obtaining of which we can do no more than wish? But the chief good cannot make any one happy, unless it shall be always in his power; and it is not virtue, nor learning, nor labour, which affords this to man, but nature herself bestows it upon all living creatures. They who joined pleasure with virtuous principle, wished to avoid this common blending together of all, but they made a contradictory kind of good; since he who is abandoned to pleasure must of necessity be destitute of virtuous principle, and he who aims at principle must be destitute of pleasure.  

The chief good of the Peripatetics may possibly appear excessive, various, and—excepting those goods which belong to the mind, and what they are is a great subject of dispute—common to man with the beasts. For goods belonging to the body—that is, safety, freedom from pain, health—are no less necessary for dumb creatures than for man; and I know not if they are not more necessary for them, because man can be relieved by remedies and services, the dumb animals cannot. The same is true of those which they call the goods of fortune; for as man has need of resources for the support of life, so have they369    They, i.e., the beasts of prey and the tame animals.   need of prey and pasture. Thus, by introducing a good which is not within the power of man, they made man altogether subject to the power of another. Let us also hear Zeno, for he at times dreams of virtue. The chief good, he says, is to live in accordance with nature. Therefore we must live after the manner of the brutes. For in these are found all the things which ought to be absent from man: they are eager for pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they lie in wait, they kill; and that which is especially to the point, they have no knowledge of God. Why, therefore, does he teach me to live according to nature, which is of itself prone to a worse course, and under the influence of some more soothing blandishments plunges headlong into vices? Or if he says that the nature of brutes is different from the nature of man, because man is born to virtue, he says something to the purpose; but, however, it will not be a definition of the chief good, because there is no animal which does not live in accordance with its nature.  

He who made knowledge the chief good, gave something peculiar to man; but men desire knowledge for the sake of something else, and not for its own sake. For who is contented with knowing, without seeking some advantage from his knowledge? The arts are learned for the purpose of being put into exercise; but they are exercised either for the support of life, or pleasure, or for glory. That, therefore, is not the chief good which is not sought for on its own account. What difference, therefore, does it make, whether we consider knowledge to be the chief good, or those very things which knowledge produces from itself, that is, means of subsistence, glory, pleasure? And these things are not peculiar to man, and therefore they are not the chief goods; for the desire of pleasure and of food does not exist in man alone, but also in the brutes. How is it with regard to the desire of glory? Is it not discovered in horses, since they exult in victory, and are grieved when vanquished? “So great is their love of praises, so great is their eagerness for victory.”370    Virg., Georg., iii. 112, 102.   Nor without reason does that most excellent poet say that we must try “what grief they feel when overcome, and how they rejoice in victory.” But if those things which knowledge produces are common to man with other animals, it follows that knowledge is not the chief good. Moreover, it is no slight fault of this definition that bare knowledge is set forth. For all will begin to appear happy who shall have the knowledge of any art, even those who shall know mischievous subjects; so that he who shall have learned to mix poisons, is as happy as he who has learned to apply remedies. I ask, therefore, to what subject knowledge is to be referred. If to the causes of natural things, what happiness will be proposed to me, if I shall know the sources of the Nile, or the vain dreams of the natural philosophers respecting the heaven? Why should I mention that on these subjects there is no knowledge, but mere conjecture, which varies according to the abilities of men? It only remains that the knowledge of good and evil things is the chief good. Why, then, did he call knowledge the chief good more than wisdom, when both words have the same signification and meaning? But no one has yet said that the chief good is wisdom, though this might more properly have been said. For knowledge is insufficient for the undertaking of that which is good and avoiding that which is evil, unless virtue also is added. For many of the philosophers, though they discussed the nature of good and evil things, yet from the compulsion of nature lived in a manner different from their discourse, because they were without virtue. But virtue united with knowledge is wisdom.  

It remains that we refute those also who judged virtue itself to be the chief good, and Marcus Tullius was also of this opinion; and in this they were very inconsiderate.371    [De Finibus, book v. cap. 28.]   For virtue itself is not the chief good, but it is the contriver and mother of the chief good; for this cannot be attained without virtue. Each point is easily understood. For I ask whether they imagine that it is easy to arrive at that distinguished good, or that it is reached only with difficulty and labour? Let them apply their ingenuity, and defend error. If it is easily attained to, and without labour, it cannot be the chief good. For why should we torment ourselves, why wear ourselves out with striving day and night, seeing that the object of our pursuit is so close at hand, that any one who wishes may grasp it without any effort of the mind? But if we do not attain even to a common and moderate good except by labour, since good things are by their nature arduous and difficult,372    Literally, “since the nature of good things is placed on a steep ascent, that of evil things on a precipitous descent.”   whereas evil things have a downward tendency, it follows that the greatest labour is necessary for the attainment of the greatest good. And if this is most true, then there is need of another virtue, that we may arrive at that virtue which is called the chief good; but this is incongruous and absurd, that virtue should arrive at itself by means of itself. If no good can be reached unless by labour, it is evident that it is virtue by which it is reached, since the force and office of virtue consist in the undertaking and carrying through of labours. Therefore the chief good cannot be that by which it is necessary to arrive at another. But they, since they were ignorant of the effects and tendency of virtue, and could discover nothing more honourable, stopped at the very name of virtue, and said that it ought to be sought, though no advantage was proposed from it; and thus they fixed for themselves a good which itself stood in need of a good. From these Aristotle was not far removed, who thought that virtue together with honour was the chief good; as though it were possible for any virtue to exist unless it were honourable, and as though it would not cease to be virtue if it had any measure of disgrace. But he saw that it might happen that a bad opinion is entertained respecting virtue by a depraved judgment, and therefore he thought that deference should be paid to what in the estimation of men constitutes a departure from what is right and good, because it is not in our power that virtue should be honoured simply for its own deserts. For what is honourable373    Honestas is used with some latitude of meaning, to express respectability of character, or honourable feeling, or the principle of honour, or virtue itself. [See Philipp. iv. 8.]   character, except perpetual honour, conferred on any one by the favourable report of the people? What, then, will happen, if through the error and perverseness of men a bad reputation should ensue? Shall we cast aside virtue because it is judged to be base and disgraceful by the foolish? And since it is capable of being oppressed and harassed, in order that it may be of itself a peculiar and lasting good, it ought to stand in need of no outward assistance, so as not to depend by itself upon its own strength, and to remain stedfast. And thus no good is to be hoped by it from man, nor is any evil to be refused.  

CAPUT VIII. De summo bono, et animi corporisque voluptatibus et virtute.

Quid ergo superest, nisi ut, omissis litigatoribus furiosis ac pertinacibus, veniamus ad judicem illum, 0365B scilicet datorem simplicis et quietae sapientiae? Quae non tantum formare nos, ac inducere in viam possit, verum etiam de controversiis istorum ferre sententiam. Haec nos docet, quid sit hominis verum ac summum bonum: de quo priusquam dicere incipio, illae omnes sententiae sunt refellendae, ut appareat neminem illorum fuisse sapientem. Cum de officio hominis agatur, oportet summum summi animalis bonum in eo constitui, quod commune cum caeteris animalibus esse non possit. Sed ut feris dentes, armentis cornua, volucribus pennae, propria sunt: sic homini aliquid suum debet adscribi, sine quo rationem suae conditionis amittat. Nam quod vivendi aut generandi causa datum est omnibus, est quidem bonum naturale; summum tamen non est, nisi quod 0365C est unicuique generi proprium. Sapiens ergo non 0366A fuit qui summum bonum credidit animi voluptatem, quoniam illa sive securitas, sive gaudium est, communis est omnibus. Aristippo ne respondendum quidem duco, quem semper in corporis voluptates ruentem, nihilque aliud quam ventri et Veneri servientem, nemini dubium est hominem non fuisse; sic enim vixit, ut nihil inter eum pecudemque distaret, nisi unum, quod loquebatur. Quod si asino, aut cani, aut sui facultas loquendi tribuatur, quaerasque ab his, quid sibi velint, cum feminas tam rabide consectantur, ut vix divelli queant, cibos etiam, potumque negligant? cur aut alios mares violenter abigant, aut ne victi quidem absistant, sed a fortioribus saepe contriti, eo magis insectentur? cur nec imbres, nec frigora pertimescant, laborem suscipiant, 0366B periculum non recusent? Quid aliud respondebunt, nisi summum bonum esse corporis voluptatem? eam se appetere, ut afficiantur suavissimis sensibus; eosque esse tanti, ut assequendorum causa, nec laborem sibi ullum, nec vulnera, nec mortem ipsam recusandam putent. Ab hisne igitur praecepta vivendi petemus, qui hoc idem sentiunt, quod animae rationis expertes?

Aiunt Cyrenaici virtutem ipsam ex eo esse laudandam, quod sit efficiens voluptatis. Verum, inquit obscoenus canis, aut sus ille lutulentus. Nam ideo cum adversario summa virium contentione depugno, ut virtus mea pariat mihi voluptatem, cujus expers sim necesse est, si victus abcessero. Ab his ergo sapere discemus, quos a pecudibus ac belluis, non sententia, 0366C sed lingua discernit? Privationem doloris 0367A summum bonum putare, non plane peripateticorum 0367A ac stoicorum, sed clinicorum philosophorum est. Quis enim non intelligat ab aegrotis et in aliquo dolore positis esse hoc disputatum? Quid tam ridiculum, quam id habere pro summo bono, quod medicus possit dare? Dolendum est ergo, ut fruamur bono, et quidem graviter ac saepe, ut sit postea, non dolere, jucundius. Miserrimus est igitur, qui nunquam doluit; quia bono caret: quem nos felicissimum putabamus, quia malo caruit. Ab hac vanitate non longe abfuit, qui, omnino nihil dolere, summum bonum dixit. Nam praeter quod omne animal doloris est fugiens, quis potest sibi hoc bonum praestare, quod nobis ut eveniat, nihil aliud possumus quam optare? Summum autem bonum non potest efficere 0367B quemquam beatum, nisi semper fuerit in ipsius potestate: hoc autem non virtus homini, non doctrina, non labor, sed natura ipsa cunctis animantibus praestat. Qui voluptatem cum honestate junxerunt, communionem hanc effugere voluerunt, sed effecerunt repugnans bonum; quoniam qui voluptati deditus est, honestate careat necesse est, qui honestati studet, voluptate.

Peripateticorum bonum nimium multiplex, et exceptis animi bonis, quae ipsa quae sint, magna contentio est, commune cum belluis potest videri. Nam corporis bona, id est, incolumitas, indolentia, valetudo, non minus sunt mutis, quam homini necessaria; ac nescio an etiam magis, quia homo et medelis, et ministeriis sublevari potest, muta non 0367C possunt. Item, quae appellant fortunae bona; nam sicut homini opibus ad vitam tuendam, ita illis 0368A praeda et pabulis opus est. Ita inducendo bonum, quod non sit in hominis potestate, totum hominem alienae ditioni subjugarunt. Audianeus etiam Zenonem; nam is interdum virtutem somniat. Summum, inquit, est bonum, cum natura consentanee vivere. Belluarum igitur nobis more vivendum est. Nam quae abesse debent ab homine, in iis omnia deprehenduntur: voluptates appetunt, metuunt, fallunt, insidiantur, occidunt; et, quod ad rem maxime attinet, Deum nesciunt. Quid ergo me docet, ut vivam secundum naturam, quae ipsa in deterius prona est, et quibusdam blandimentis lenioribus in vitia praecipitat? Vel si aliam mutorum, aliam hominis dicit esse naturam, quod homo ad virtutem sit genitus, nonnihil dicit: sed tamen non erit definitio summi boni; quia 0368B nullum est animal, quod non secundum naturam suam vivat.

Qui scientiam summum bonum fecit, aliquid homini proprium dedit: sed scientiam alterius rei gratia homines appetunt, non propter ipsam. Quis enim scire contentus est, non expetens aliquem fructum scientiae? Artes ideo discuntur, ut exerceantur: exercentur autem, vel ad subsidia vitae, vel ad voluptatem, vel ad gloriam. Non est igitur summum bonum, quod non propter se expetitur. Quid ergo interest utrum scientiam summum bonum putemus, an illa ipsa, quae scientia ex se parit, id est, victum, gloriam, voluptatem? quae non sunt homini propria, et ideo ne summa quidem bona. Nam voluptatis et victus appetentia non homini solum, sed etiam mutis inest. Quid cupiditas 0368C gloriae? nonne in equis deprehenditur, cum victores exultant, victi dolent? 0369A Tantus 0369A amor laudum, tantae est victoria curae.Nec immerito summus poeta experiendum esse ait, Et quis cuique dolor victo, quae gloria palmae.Quod si ea, quae parit scientia, communia sunt cum aliis animalibus, non est ergo summum bonum scientia. Praeterea non mediocre hujus definitionis est vitium quod scientia nuda ponitur. Incipient enim beati omnes videri, qui artem aliquam scierint, immo vero qui et res malas scierint; ut tam beatus sit, qui venena didicerit temperare, quam qui mederi. Quaero igitur, ad quam rem scientia referenda sit? Si ad causas rerum naturalium, quae beatitudo erit mihi proposita, si sciero unde Nilus oriatur, vel quidquid de coelo physici delirant? Quid, quod earum 0369B rerum non est scientia, sed opinatio, quae pro ingeniis varia est. Restat ut scientia bonorum ac malorum summum bonum sit. Cur ergo scientiam maluit, quam ipsam sapientiam summum bonum dicere, cum sit utriusque significatio et vis eadem? Nemo tamen usque adhuc summum bonum dixit esse sapientiam, quod melius dici potuit. Nam scientia parum est ad bonum suscipiendum, malumque fugiendum nisi accedat et virtus. Multi enim philosophorum, cum de bonis, malisque dissererent, aliter tamen, quam loquebantur, natura cogente, vixerunt, quia virtute caruerunt. Virtus autem cum scientia conjucta est sapientia.

Superest ut eos etiam refellamus qui virtutem ipsam summum bonum putaverunt, in qua opinione etiam M. Tullius fuit; in quo multum inconsiderati 0369C fuerunt. Non enim virtus ipsa est summum bonum, sed effectrix et mater est summi boni; quoniam perveniri ad illud sine virtute non potest. Utrumque intellectu est facile. Quaero enim, utrumne ad praeclarum 0370A illud bonum facile perveniri putent, an cum difficultate ac labore? Expediant acumen suum, erroremque defendant. Si facile ad illud, ac sine labore perveniri potest, summum bonum non est. Quid enim nos cruciemus, quid conficiamus, enitendo diebus et noctibus? quandoquidem tam in promptu id quod quaerimus jacet, ut illud quilibet sine ulla contentione animi comprehendat. Sed si commune quoque ac mediocre quodlibet bonum non nisi labore assequimur quoniam bonorum natura in arduo posita est, malorum in praecipiti, summo igitur labore summum bonum assequi necesse est. Quod si verissimum est, ergo altera virtute opus est, ut perveniamus ad eam virtutem quae dicitur summum bonum; quod est incongruens, et absurdum, ut virtus per seipsam perveniat 0370B ad seipsam. Si non potest ad ullum bonum nisi per laborem perveniri, apparet virtutem esse, per quam perveniatur; quoniam in suscipiendis perferendisque laboribus, vis officiumque virtutis est.

Ergo summum bonum non potest esse id, per quod necesse est ad aliud perveniri. Sed illi, cum ignorarent quid efficeret virtus, aut quo tenderet, honestius autem nihil reperirent, substiterunt in ipsius virtutis nomine, quam nullo proposito emolumento, appetendam esse dixerunt, et bonum sibi constituerunt, quod bono indigeret. Aristoteles ab iis non longe recessit, qui virtutem cum honestate summum bonum putavit: quasi possit ulla esse virtus nisi honesta, ac non, si quid habuerit turpitudinis, virtus esse desinat. Sed vidit fieri posse, ut de virtute pravo judicio male sentiatur; et ideo existimatione hominum serviendum 0370C putavit, quod qui facit, a recto bonoque discedit, quia non est in nostra potestate ut virtus pro suis meritis honestetur. Nam quid est honestas, nisi honor perpetuus ad aliquem secundo populi rumore delatus? 0371A Quid ergo fiet, si errore ac pravitate hominum, mala existimatio subsequatur? abjiciemusne virtutem, quia flagitiosa et turpis ab insipientibus judicetur? Quae quoniam invidia premi, ac vexari potest, ut sit ipsa 0371A proprium ac perpetuum bonum, nullo extrinsecus adjumento indigere debet, quin suis per se viribus nitatur, et constet. Itaque nec ullum ei ab homine bonum sperandum est, nec ullum malum recusandum.