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of justice and all virtue, but less, 6.36 so that such a person might live for the shortest possible time." And a little later: "For I say clearly that the things called evil are good for the just, but evil for the unjust; and the good things are good for the good, but evil for the evil." And I for my part greatly admire this distinction. For it is truly a very great good to know what is good in the proper sense, and what is so called, but becomes in one way such, and in another the opposite, by those who either pursue it well and nobly or embrace the contrary opinion. 6.37 For indeed health and beauty and strength of body, and certainly wealth too, have both benefited some and shown them worthy of their possessions, but for others they have become instruments of wickedness and intemperance; but moderation and justice and all other things similar to these, are possessions of the soul, which are beneficial to all who have them and harm none of those who possess them. And for such people even the so-called goods are advantageous possessions; for they fall to just and moderate stewards. But the things which become best through these appear worst when they have fallen to wicked and lawless men; for they see what they ought not, and hear what they ought not, and train their other senses to intemperance. 6.38 Therefore, my friends, let us not confuse the natures of things, but let us distinguish what is truly good, and what is evil, and what has obtained the middle rank between them; and let us not call happy the rich and the strong and those clothed with some power; for it is fitting to call truly unfortunate and thrice-wretched those who have a share of these things, but have made them the material 6.39 of vice and wickedness. When, therefore, we see a thoroughly wicked man surrounded by wealth, let us not call him thrice-blessed, but miserable, because he has many resources for living lawlessly; and when we behold another who seems to be virtuous joined with some hardship and poverty, let us neither suppose him wretched 6.40 nor consider the providence of God unjust. For in the first place, not in every case is he truly just who seems to be just; for differently does he see and discern these things, the eye that indeed sees all. And this the Seer of all things himself taught Samuel the prophet; "For not as a man" he says "sees, does God see; 6.41 for man looks at the face, but God at the heart." But even if we should suppose the one afflicted by some misfortune to be truly just, this at least is plain to all, that he will receive no harm from his adversity, having been trained as an athlete of virtue to bear hardships. For just as those who live with wickedness make even the so-called goods into instruments of wickedness, so those who love virtue fashion even what is considered evil into materials of true philosophy. 6.42 Thus indeed, by distinguishing each of these things, we will never call God unjust, but we will agree that what Plato wrote in the Theaetetus is correct, that "God is in no way and in no manner unjust, but as just as possible, and there is nothing more like him than whoever among us becomes as just as possible concerning this." And again in the tenth book of the Laws he attempts to heal those who do not accept the doctrine of divine 6.43 providence; and he says these things: "The one who believes that gods exist, but that they do not care for human affairs, must be admonished thus: O best of men, let us say, that you believe gods exist, a certain divine kinship leads you toward your kin to honor and believe that they exist; but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, in private and in public, in truth not happy, but deemed happy in opinion 6.44 very much but not harmoniously, lead you toward impiety." Then, after discussing the supposed good fortune of the unjust, he adds these things also: "But perhaps it would not be at all difficult to show this, that the gods are careful of small things no less, but rather more so, than of those that are distinguished by their greatness. For you were listening, I suppose, and were present at what has just now been said, that being good with all virtue they possess the care of 6.45 all things, it being most proper to them." Then, having strengthened the argument with reasonings, he added: "Let us, then, never deem God of mortals

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δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης, ἔλαττον 6.36 δέ, ὡς ἂν ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῴη." Καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα· "Ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ λέγω σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς δικαίοις εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ ἀδίκοις κακά· τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά." Κἀγὼ δὲ κομιδῇ τήνδε ἄγαμαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν τό γε εἰδέναι, τί μὲν κυρίως ἀγαθόν, τί δὲ τοῦτο λέγεται μέν, γίνεται δὲ πῇ μὲν τοιοῦτο, πῇ δὲ τοὐναντίον, ὑπὸ τῶν ἢ εὖ καὶ καλῶς μετιόντων ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν γνώμην ἀσπαζο 6.37 μένων. Καὶ γὰρ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ ῥώμη σώματος, καὶ μέν τοι καὶ πλοῦτος τοὺς μὲν ὤνησέ τε καὶ ἔδειξε τῶν κτημάτων ἀξίους, τοῖς δὲ ὄργανα πονηρίας καὶ ἀκρασίας ἐγένετο· σωφροσύνη δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι κτήματα, ἃ πᾶσίν ἐστι τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὀνησιφόρα καὶ οὐδένα σίνεται τῶν κεκτημένων, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ ξύμφορα κτήματα· δικαίων γὰρ καὶ σωφρόνων οἰκονόμων τυγχά νει, τὰ δέ γε διὰ τούτων ἄριστα γινόμενα κάκιστα φαίνεται, πονηροῖς περιπεσόντα καὶ παρανόμοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁρῶσιν ἃ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ ἀκούουσιν ὧν οὐ δεῖ, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἰς ἀκολασίαν παιδεύουσιν. 6.38 Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, ξυγχέωμεν τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς φύσεις, ἀλλὰ διαγνῶμεν, τί μὲν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν, τί δὲ κακόν, τί δέ γε τὴν μέσην τούτων κἀκείνων εἴληχε τάξιν· καὶ μὴ καλῶμεν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς πλουτοῦντας καὶ ῥωμαλέους καὶ δυναστείαν περιβεβλημένους τινά· κακοδαίμονας γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ τρισαθλίους προσαγορεύειν προσήκει τοὺς τούτων μὲν μετειληχότας, ὕλην δὲ 6.39 ἀποφήναντας αὐτὰ κακίας καὶ πονηρίας. Ὅταν οὖν ἴδωμεν παμ πόνηρον ἄνθρωπον πλούτῳ περιρεόμενον, μὴ τρισόλβιον ὀνομά ζωμεν, ἀλλὰ δείλαιον, ὅτι τοῦ παρανόμως βιοῦν ἔχει πολλὰς ἀφορμάς· καὶ ὅταν ἕτερον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι δοκοῦντα θεασώμεθα δυσκληρίᾳ τινὶ καὶ πενίᾳ ξυνεζευγμένον, μήτε ἄθλιον ὑπολάβωμεν 6.40 μήτε ἄδικον τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ προμήθειαν νομίσωμεν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πάντως τῷ ὄντι δίκαιος ὁ δοκῶν εἶναι δίκαιος· ἑτέρως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ὁρᾷ καὶ διακρίνει ὁ πάντα γε ὁρῶν ὀφθαλμός. Καὶ τοῦτο Σαμουὴλ τὸν προφήτην αὐτὸς ἐδίδαξεν ὁ τῶν ὅλων ὀπτήρ· "Οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος" γάρ φησιν "ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ὁρᾷ ὁ Θεός· 6.41 ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ εἰς πρόσωπον, Θεὸς δὲ εἰς καρδίαν." Ἵνα δὲ καὶ θῶμεν ἀληθῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸν δυσποτμίᾳ τινὶ κατεχό μενον, ἐκεῖνό γε πᾶσιν ἐπίδηλον, ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἐκ τῆς δυσημερίας εἰσδέξεται βλάβην, φέρειν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἀθλητὴς πεπαιδευμένος τὰ δυσχερῆ. Ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πονηρίᾳ ξυζῶντες καὶ τὰ καλούμενα ἀγαθὰ πονηρίας ἀποφαίνουσιν ὄργανα, οὕτως οἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐρῶν τες καὶ τὰ κακὰ νομιζόμενα φιλοσοφίας τῆς ἀληθοῦς κατα σκευάζουσιν ὕλας. 6.42 Οὕτω δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον διακρίνοντες, οὔποτε τὸν Θεὸν ἄδικον ὀνομάσομεν, ἀλλὰ ξυνομολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, ἅπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ ξυνέγραψεν, ὅτι "ὁ θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδι κος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος περὶ τούτου." Πάλιν δὲ κἀν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων ἰᾶσθαι πειρᾶται τοὺς τῆς θείας προ 6.43 νοίας οὐ προσιεμένους τὸν λόγον· λέγει δὲ ταῦτα· "Τὸν δὲ ἡγού μενον θεοὺς μὲν εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμά των, παραμυθητέον ὧδε· ὦ ἄριστε, δὴ φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεοὺς εἶναι, ξυγγένειά τις θεία πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτόν σε ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι, ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξῃ δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι 6.44 σφόδρα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν." Εἶτα διεξελθὼν τὴν νομιζομένην τῶν ἀδίκων εὐκληρίαν, ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταῦτα· "Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τάχα ἂν εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσι θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. Ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἁπάντων ἐπι 6.45 μέλειαν, οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν, κέκτηνται." Εἶτα ξυλλο γισμοῖς κρατύνας τὸν λόγον ἐπήγαγεν· "Μὴ τοίνυν τὸν θεὸν ἀξιῶμέν ποτε θνητῶν