Chap. XI.—Of Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good.

It is agreed upon, therefore, by the general consent of all mankind, that religion ought to be undertaken; but we have to explain what errors are committed on this subject. God willed this to be the nature of man, that he should be desirous and eager for two things, religion and wisdom. But men are mistaken in this, that they either undertake religion and pay no attention to wisdom, or they devote themselves to wisdom alone, and pay no attention to religion, though the one cannot be true without the other. The consequence is, that they fall into a multiplicity of religions, but false ones, because they have left wisdom, which could have taught them that there cannot be many gods; or they devote themselves to wisdom, but a false wisdom, because they have paid no attention to the religion of the Supreme God, who might have instructed them to the knowledge of the truth. Thus men who undertake either of these courses follow a devious path, and one full of the greatest errors, inasmuch as the duty of man, and all truth, are included in these two things which are inseparably connected. I wonder, therefore, that there was none at all of the philosophers who discovered the abode and dwelling-place of the chief good. For they might have sought it in this manner. Whatever the greatest good is, it must be an object proposed to all men. There is pleasure, which is desired by all; but this is common also to man with the beasts, and has not the force of the honourable, and brings a feeling of satiety, and when it is in excess is injurious, and it is lessened by advance of age, and does not fall to the lot of many: for they who are without resources, who constitute the greater part of men, must also be without pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not the chief good; but it is not even a good. What shall we say of riches? This is much more384    Multo magis is the reading of the mss.; but multo minus—“much less”—seems preferable.   true of them. For they fall to the lot of fewer men, and that generally by chance; and they often fall to the indolent, and sometimes by guilt, and they are desired by those who already possess them. What shall we say of sovereignty itself? That does not constitute the chief good: for all cannot reign, but it is necessary that all should be capable of attaining the chief good.  

Let us therefore seek something which is held forth to all. Is it virtue? It cannot be denied that virtue is a good, and undoubtedly a good for all men. But if it cannot be happy because its power and nature consist in the endurance of evil, it assuredly is not the chief good. Let us seek something else. But nothing can be found more beautiful than virtue, nothing more worthy of a wise man. For if vices are to be avoided on account of their deformity, virtue is therefore to be desired on account of its beauty. What then? Can it be that that which is admitted to be good and honourable should be requited with no reward, and be so unproductive as to procure no advantage from itself? That great labour and difficulty and struggling against evils with which this life is filled, must of necessity produce some great good. But what shall we say that it is? Pleasure? But nothing that is base can arise from that which is honourable. Shall we say that it is riches? or commands? But these things are frail and uncertain.385    Liable to fall, perishable.   Is it glory? or honour? or a lasting name? But all these things are not contained in virtue itself, but depend upon the opinion and judgment of others. For virtue is often hated and visited with evil. But the good which arises from it ought to be so closely united with it as to be incapable of being separated or disunited from it; and it cannot appear to be the chief good in any other way than if it belongs peculiarly to virtue, and is such that nothing can be added to it or taken from it. Why should I say that the duties of virtue consist in the despising of all these things? For not to long for, or desire, or love pleasures, riches, dominions, and honours, and all those things which are esteemed as goods, as others do overpowered by desire, that assuredly is virtue. Therefore it effects something else more sublime and excellent; nor does anything struggle against these present goods but that which longs for greater and truer things. Let us not despair of being able to find it, if we turn our thoughts in all directions; for no slight or trifling rewards are sought.  

CAPUT XI. De religione, sapientia, ac summo bono.

Constat igitur, totius humani generis consensu, religionem suscipi oportere: sed quomodo in ea erretur explicandum est. Naturam hominis hanc Deus esse voluit, ut duarum rerum cupidus et appetens esset, religionis et sapientiae. Sed homines ideo falluntur, 0376B quod aut religionem suscipiunt, omissa sapientia, aut sapientiae soli student, omissa religione, cum alterum sine altero esse non possit verum. Cadunt ergo ad multiplices religiones, sed ideo falsas, quia sapientiam reliquerunt, quae illos docere poterat deos multos esse non posse: aut student sapientiae, sed ideo falsae, quia religionem summi Dei omiserunt, qui eos ad veri scientiam potuit erudire. Sic homines, qui alterutrum suscipiunt, viam deviam, maximisque erroribus plenam sequuntur, quoniam in his duobus inseparabiliter connexis, et officium hominis, et veritas omnis inclusa est. Miror itaque nullum omnino philosophorum extitisse, qui sedem, 0377A ac domicilium summi boni reperiret. Potuerunt enim sic quaerere. Quodcumque est summum bonum, necesse est omnibus esse propositum. Voluptas est, quae appetitur a cunctis: sed haec et communis est cum belluis, 0377A et honesti vim non habet, et satietatem affert, et nimia nocet, et processu minuitur aetatis, et multis non contingit; nam qui opibus carent, quorum major est numerus, etiam voluptate careant necesse est. Non est igitur summum bonum, sed ne bonum quidem voluptas. Quid divitiae? Multo magis. Nam et paucioribus, et plerumque casu, et inertibus saepe, et nonnumquam scelere contingunt, et optantur ab iis qui eas jam tenent. Quid regnum ipsum? Ne id quidem. Non enim cuncti homines regnare possunt; et necesse est universos summi boni capaces esse.

0377B Quaeramus igitur aliquid, quod propositum sit omnibus. Num virtus? Negari non potest, quin et bonum sit, et omnium certe bonum. Sed si beata esse non potest, quia vis et natura ejus in malorum perferentia posita est, non est profecto summum bonum. Quaeramus aliud. At nihil virtute pulchrius, nihil sapiente dignius inveniri potest. Si enim vitia ob turpitudinem fugienda sunt, virtus igitur appetenda est ob decorem. Quid ergo? Potestne fieri, ut quod bonum, quod honestum esse constat, mercede ac praemio careat, sitque tam sterile, ut nihil ex se commodi pariat? Labor ille magnus, et difficultas, et eluctatio adversus mala, quibus haec vita plena est, aliquid magni boni pariat necesse est. Id vero quid esse dicemus? 0378A Num voluptatem? at nihil turpe ex honesto nasci potest. Num divitias? num potestates? at ea quidem fragilia sunt, et caduca. Num gloriam? num honorem? num memoriam nominis? at haec omnia non sunt in ipsa virtute, sed in aliorum existimatione atque arbitrio posita. Nam saepe virtus et invisa est, et malo afficitur. Debet autem id bonum, quod ex ea nascitur, ita cohaerere, ut divelli atque abstrahi nequeat; nec aliter summum bonum videri potest, quam si et proprium sit virtutis, et tale, ut neque adjici quidquam, nec detrahi possit. Quid, quod in his omnibus contemnendis virtutis officia consistunt. Nam voluptates, opes, potentias, honores, eaque omnia, quae pro bonis habentur, non concupiscere, non appetere, non amare, quod caeteri faciunt victi cupiditate, 0378B id est profecto virtutis. Aliud ergo sublimius atque praeclarius efficit; nec frustra his praesentibus bonis reluctatur, nisi quod majora, et veriora desiderat: non desperemus inveniri posse, modo verset se cogitatio in omnia. Neque enim levia aut ludicra petuntur praemia.