and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for you anything more than what has been said, I will not set forth for you what seems right to me, but as if divining the soul of the one who first spoke it, I am making the explanation more precise than the others. For Plato indeed said that the forms of bodies here are adventitious. Thinking this rightly, he inquired who is the one who produced them and impressed them upon their subjects. For example, just as in the case of artificial forms, considering the form of the couch to be adventitious, he found that art, and the artisan, have put it into the couch and that art found the principles from the soul, but the soul not from itself, but it too from some other, so indeed also in the case of natural things, nature immediately gives them form, and the soul does so by giving the principles to nature, and the intellect does so by first supplying the soul with the starting-points of the form. And one must not proceed further, so that 113 we do not seek principles of principles ad infinitum. For the form upon the body is not like the intelligible form itself, but is adventitious and has come to the body from another; whence it also changes into beauty and finally into formlessness. Therefore the form upon the body is not pure form; for it would not have changed nor shifted into its opposite. But neither is the soul this form itself and nothing else; for every soul would then be something stable and unchanging; but we see some changing into mindlessness. Therefore, beyond these is the unchangeable and most pure form. What then is this, if not the immaterial and demiurgic intellect? For the intellect is twofold, the one being like the form of the soul, giving it form from eternity, the other being entirely separate and transcendent over the other intellects, which is at once both substance and activity, a pure intellect, set forth in the vestibule of the Good and being itself intelligible beauty. This, therefore, both is the first things and was the first to think them, being not other than they. The first ideas, therefore, are its concepts and the simple existences of beings. And the very things which it first conceived, these conceptions are also the things that truly are; for they are of themselves and have not come from others, while the second and third forms are configurations and impressions of them. And in a certain way, beings and ideas are the same thing; for the idea there is the very thing that is primary and truly and archetypally, a demiurgic idea. But beings seem to be prior to the ideas. For we divide these and show them as set forth to the intellect by the Good through the making of the intelligible; for sensible things exist by participation, which are spoken of the underlying nature possessing a form from above, through an image of art entering into them, while art itself remains outside matter in identity and possesses the true statue. But the intellect is the beings themselves and all things are in it, not as in a place, but as itself possessing them; and all things are there together and no less distinct and again not together, because each is a particular power. The powers of 114 seeds bear an image of this principle; for in the whole all things are indistinct and as if in one center. And the soul directs its attention as not possessing, or acquires, or goes through, but the intellect stands in itself, being all things together. And the whole intellect is all the forms, and each form is each intellect, just as the whole of science is all the theorems, and each is a part of the whole, not as separated by place, but each having power within the whole. But one must pre-conceive Being before intellect, because it is necessary to place beings in a thinking intellect, and the activity of both is one. But the dividing intellect is other; while the indivisible and non-dividing intellect is the one and the all. It is necessary for the archetype to be in the intellect, and to suppose this intellect to be an intelligible world, a paradigm of the visible one. For just as when there is a principle of a certain animal, and there is also matter that has received the spermatic principle, it is necessary for an animal to come into being, in the same way also, when there is an intellectual and all-powerful nature

καὶ οὕτω τὴν Πλατωνικὴν γνώμην ἐφερμηνεύοντες, οὔ μοι δὲ δοκοῦσι κατειληφέναι τῆς ἐκείνου δόξης τὸ ἀκριβές. ἐγὼ δὲ εἴ τι πλέον σοι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐξακριβώσομαι, οὐ <τὸ> δοκοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐπέξειμί σοι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ πρώτως εἰρηκότος καταμαντευόμενος ἀκριβεστέραν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιοῦμαι τὴν ἐπεξήγησιν. Ὁ γάρ τοι Πλάτων τὰς ἐνταῦθα μορφὰς τῶν σωμάτων ἐπικτήτους εἶναι <ἔφη>. τοῦτο καλῶς οἰηθεὶς ἐζήτησε, τίς ὁ παραγαγὼν καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐντυπωσάμενος. οἷον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν εἰδῶν τὸ τῆς κλίνης εἶδος ἐπίκτητον ἡγησάμενος εὗρεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἡ τέχνη, τὸ δὲ ὁ τεχνίτης τῇ κλίνῃ ἐντέθεικε καὶ ὅτι ἡ τέχνη παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τοὺς λόγους εὕρατο, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ παρ' ἑτέρου τινός, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἡ φύσις προσεχῶς εἰδοποίησε, τὰ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ φύσει τοὺς λόγους ἐνδοῦσα, τὰ δὲ ὁ νοῦς τῇ ψυχῇ πρῶτος χορηγήσας τοῦ εἴδους τὰς ἀφορμάς. καὶ οὐ χρὴ περαιτέρω προϊέναι, ἵνα 113 μὴ ἀρχῶν ἀρχὰς ζητῶμεν ἐπ' ἄπειρον. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος οὐχ οἷον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοητόν, ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητον καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ἐφῆκον τῷ σώματι· ὅθεν καὶ εἰς εὐμορφίαν μεθίσταται καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸ ἀνείδεον. οὔκουν καθαρὸν εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαλλεν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεθίστατο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶδος καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον· ἦν γὰρ ἂν πᾶσα ψυχὴ χρῆμά τι σταθηρὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόμενον· ὁρῶμεν δ' ἐνίας εἰς τὸ ἄνουν μεταβαλλομένας. ἄλλο οὖν παρὰ ταύτας τὸ ἀμετάθετον εἶδος καὶ καθαρώτατον. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο ἢ ὁ ἄυλος καὶ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς; διττὸς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν οἷον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος ἐξ ἀιδίου ταύτην εἰδοποιοῦν, ὁ δὲ ὁ παντάπασι χωριστὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νόων ὑπερκείμενος, ὃς ὁμοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν νοῦς ἐστι καθαρός, ἐν προθύροις ἐκκείμενος τἀγαθοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος. οὗτος τοιγαροῦν καὶ τὰ πρῶτά ἐστι καὶ πρῶτος αὐτὰ ἐνόησεν οὐκ ἄλλος ὢν παρ' ἐκεῖνα. αἱ οὖν ἰδέαι αἱ πρῶται ἐκείνου ἔννοιαι καὶ ἁπλαῖ τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρξεις. καὶ ἅπερ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἐνθυμηθείς, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ κυρίως ὄντα ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐνθυμήματα· αὐτὰ γὰρ ἑαυτῶν εἰσι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων γεγόνασι, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα εἴδη καὶ τρίτα ἐκείνων μορφώματα καὶ τυπώματα. καὶ τρόπον μέν τινα τὸ αὐτό εἰσιν ὄντα καὶ ἰδέαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐκεῖσε ἰδέα αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ κυρίως καὶ ἀρχέτυπον ὄν, ἰδέα δημιουργική. δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ ὄντα πρῶτα τῶν ἰδεῶν εἶναι. μερίζομεν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα καὶ ὡς ἐκκείμενα τῷ νῷ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀναδείκνυμεν διὰ τῆς τοῦ νοητοῦ ποιήσεως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὰ μεθέξει ἐστίν, ἃ λέγεται τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως μορφὴν ἰσχούσης ἄνωθεν, διὰ εἰδώλου τῆς τέχνης εἰς αὐτὰ εἰσιούσης, τῆς τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔξω ὕλης ἐν ταυτότητι μενούσης καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ ἀνδριάντα ἐχούσης. ὁ δὲ νοῦς αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα καὶ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς ἔχων· καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον διακεκριμένα καὶ αὖ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδία. εἰκόνα δὲ φέρουσι τοῦ λόγου αἱ τῶν 114 σπερμάτων δυνάμεις· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ ἀδιάκριτα πάντα καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ἑνὶ κέντρῳ. καὶ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐπιβάλλει ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσα ἢ ἐπικτᾶται ἢ διεξοδεύει, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἕστηκεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοῦ πάντα ὤν. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς πάντα τὰ εἴδη, ἕκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη ἐπιστήμη τὰ πάντα θεωρήματα, ἕκαστον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης, οὐχ ὡς διακεκριμένον τόπῳ, ἔχον δὲ δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. προεπινοεῖν δὲ δεῖ τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ὄν, ὅτι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν νῷ νοοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, μία δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἕτερος δὲ ὁ μερίζων νοῦς· ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πάντα. Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον εἶναι, καὶ κόσμον νοητὸν τοῦτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν παράδειγμα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. ὡς γὰρ ὄντος λόγου ζῴου τινός, οὔσης δὲ καὶ ὕλης τῆς τὸν λόγον σπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῷον γενέσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως νοερᾶς καὶ παντοδυνάμου οὔσης