Chapter 18.—The Desire of Good is God’s Gift.

For they have thought that it was to be objected to us that we say “that God inspires into unwilling and resisting man the desire,” not of any very great good, but “even of imperfect good.” Possibly, then, they themselves are keeping open, in some sense at least, a place for grace, as thinking that man may have the desire of good without grace, but only of imperfect good; while of perfect, he could not easily have the desire with grace, but except with it they could not have it at all. Truly, even in this way, too, they are saying that God’s grace is given according to our merits, which Pelagius, in the ecclesiastical meeting in the East, condemned, in the fear of being condemned. For if without God’s grace the desire of good begins with ourselves, merit itself will have begun—to which, as if of debt, comes the assistance of grace; and thus God’s grace will not be bestowed freely, but will be given according to our merit. But that he might furnish a reply to the future Pelagius, the Lord does not say, “Without me it is with difficulty that you can do anything,” but He says, “Without me ye can do nothing.”130    John xv. 5. And, that He might also furnish an answer to these future heretics, in that very same evangelical saying He does not say, “Without me you can perfect nothing,” but “do” nothing. For if He had said “perfect,” they might say that God’s aid is necessary not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for perfecting it. But let them hear also the apostle. For when the Lord says, “Without me ye can do nothing,” in this one word He comprehends both the beginning and the ending. The apostle, indeed, as if he were an expounder of the Lord’s saying, distinguished both very clearly when he says, “Because He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it even to the day of Christ Jesus.”131    Phil. i. 6. But in the Holy Scriptures, in the writings of the same apostle, we find more about that of which we are speaking. For we are now speaking of the desire of good, and if they will have this to begin of ourselves and to be perfected by God, let them see what they can answer to the apostle when he says, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.”132    2 Cor. iii. 5. “To think anything,” he says,—he certainly means, “to think anything good;” but is it less to think than to desire. Because we think all that we desire, but we do not desire all that we think; because sometimes also we think what we do not desire. Since, then, it is a smaller thing to think than to desire,—for a man may think good which he does not yet desire, and by advancing may afterwards desire what before without desire he thought of,—how are we not sufficient as of ourselves to that which is less, that is, to the thinking of something good, but our sufficiency is of God; while to that which is greater,—that is, to the desire of some good thing—without the divine help, we are sufficient of free will? For what the apostle says here is not, “Not that we are sufficient as of ourselves to think that which is perfect;” but he says, “to think anything,” to which “nothing” is the contrary. And this is the meaning of what the Lord says, “Without me ye can do nothing.”

18. Hoc enim nobis objiciendum putarunt, quod invito et reluctanti homini Deum dicamus inspirare, non quanticumque boni, sed et ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem. Fortassis ergo ipsi eo modo saltem servant locum gratiae, ut sine illa putent hominem posse habere boni, sed imperfecti cupiditatem; perfecti autem non facilius per illam posse, sed nisi per illam omnino non posse. Verum et sic gratiam Dei dicunt secundum merita nostra dari: quod in Oriente Pelagius ecclesiasticis Gestis damnari timendo damnavit. Si enim sine Dei gratia per nos incipit cupiditas boni; ipsum coeptum erit meritum, cui tanquam ex debito gratiae veniat adjutorium: ac sic gratia Dei non gratis donabitur, sed secundum meritum nostrum dabitur. Dominus autem ut responderet futuro Pelagio, non ait, Sine me difficile potestis aliquid facere; sed ait, Sine me nihil potestis facere (Joan. XV, 5). Et ut responderet futuris etiam istis in eadem ipsa evangelica sententia, non ait, Sine me nihil potestis perficere; sed, facere. Nam si Perficere dixisset, possent isti dicere, non ad incipiendum bonum, quod a nobis est; sed ad perficiendum, esse Dei adjutorium necessarium. Verum audiant et Apostolum. Dominus enim cum ait, Sine me nihil potestis facere; hoc uno verbo initium finemque comprehendit. Apostolus vero, tanquam sententiae dominicae expositor, apertius utrumque distinxit, dicens: Quoniam qui in vobis opus bonum coepit, perficiet usque in diem Christi Jesu (Philipp. I, 6). Sed in Scripturis sanctis apud eumdem apostolum, isto unde loquimur, amplius invenimus. Loquimur enim nunc de boni cupiditate, quam si volunt a nobis incipere, a Domino perfici, videant quid respondeant dicenti Apostolo: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquidquasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est (II Cor. III, 5). Cogitare, ait, aliquid, utique bonum: minus est autem cogitare quam cupere. Cogitamus quippe omne quod cupimus, nec tamen cupimus omne quod cogitamus; quoniam nonnunquam et quod non cupimus cogitamus. Cum igitur minus sit cogitare quam cupere: potest enim homo cogitare bonum, quod nondum cupit; et proficiendo postea cupere, quod antea non cupiendo cogitavit: quomodo ad id quod minus est, id est, ad cogitandum aliquid boni non sumus idonei tanquam ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est; et ad id quod est amplius, id est, ad cupiendum aliquid boni sine divino adjutorio idonei sumus ex libero arbitrio? Neque enim et hic Apostolus ait, Non quia idonei sumus cogitare quod perfectum est, tanquam ex nobismetipsis: sed cogitare, ait, aliquid; cui contrarium est nihil. Unde est illud Domini: Sine me nihil potestis facere.