proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause, being indistinct; for with distinction comes procession. But if it only proceeded, it would be unconnected to it and unsympathetic, in no way sharing in the cause. But if it only returned, how can that which does not have its substance from it make its return in substance to something alien? But if it remained and proceeded, but did not return, what of the natural desire of each thing for the one and the good? But if it proceeded and returned, but did not remain, how is it that what has departed from the cause hastens to be joined to it, yet was unconnected before the departure? But if it remained and returned, but did not proceed, how is it possible for what has been distinguished to return? For everything that returns seems to resolve into that from which it was divided in substance. It remains, therefore, that everything both remains in its cause and proceeds from it and returns to it. And this single principle of Greek theology seems to me to have some contribution also to our dogma; for the only-begotten Word both proceeds from the Father timelessly and incorporeally and remains in the Father and returns to the Begetter, and neither in proceeding is it distinguished according to the principle of divinity, nor in returning is it separated, nor in remaining is it confused according to its hypostatic perfection. And since he has once mentioned return, this must be decided thus: that every being returns either only substantially, or also vitally, or also gnostically. For it either possesses only being from its cause, or life along with being, or it has also received from there a gnostic power. Insofar, then, as it only is, it makes a substantial return; insofar as it also lives, a vital one; insofar as it also knows, a gnostic one. For as each thing proceeded, so has it returned, and the measures of return are determined by the measures of procession. And this principle 119 was formerly interpreted more broadly by Dionysius the Areopagite, and later was also precisely defined by Proclus of Lycia with the syllogistic method. But the proposition “everything that is participated in separably is present to the participant through some inseparable power which it imparts,” which was declared by the same philosopher, is in some respects true according to our dogmatic assumptions, and in some respects it is false; for that a forerunner illumination of the Word's union with us proceeds, preparing the soul for the reception of the first light, our own doctrine does not ignore, but of soul and body it knows no intermediaries, no inseparable entelechies, no natural hypostases in bodies, no opinative lives, no appetitive ones, nor a particular hypostasis of an irrational soul. For these reasons I accept this principle of Proclus in part, and in part I reject it. But I have also divined the meaning of this principle. For he says, “of all things that have subsisted from limit and infinity, there pre-exist in itself the first limit and the first infinity”; for that beings are finite and infinite I have learned also from our scriptures, and I have known the limits and infinities in the finite and infinite things themselves, but limit and infinity separate from those things of which they are said I have not yet grasped, since it is not in their nature to subsist in themselves. But that all things are in all things, but appropriately in each (for he says “both life and intellect are in being, and being and thinking are in life, but in one place intellectually, in another vitally, in another substantially”) I accept as befitting a philosopher's thought, since it does no harm to our scriptures, being neither false nor true in respect to them. But the proposition “every partial intellect participates in the one beyond intellect and first one through both the whole intellect and through the partial one of the same rank as itself, and every partial soul participates in the whole intellect through both the whole soul and the partial intellect, and every nature of a partial body participates in the whole soul through both the whole nature and the partial soul” I do not accept; for among the

πρόεισιν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτήν.» εἶτα δὴ τὸν τόπον ἐκ διαιρέσεως ἐπεργάζεται. εἰ γὰρ μένοι μόνον, οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς αἰτίας, ἀδιάκριτον ὄν· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ διακρίσει πρόοδος. εἰ δὲ προΐοι μόνον, ἀσύναπτον πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀσυμπαθές, μηδαμῇ τῇ αἰτίᾳ κοινωνοῦν. εἰ δὲ ἐπιστρέφοιτο μόνον, πῶς τὸ μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔχον κατ' οὐσίαν ποιεῖται τὴν πρὸς ἀλλότριον ἐπιστροφήν; εἰ δὲ μένοι καὶ πρόεισι, μὴ ἐπιστρέφοιτο δέ, πῶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὄρεξις ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; εἰ δὲ προΐοι καὶ ἐπιστρέφοι, {εἰ} μὴ μένοι δέ, πῶς τὸ ἀποστὰν μὲν τῆς αἰτίας συνάπτεσθαι σπεύδει πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀσύναπτον δὲ ἦν πρὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως; εἰ δὲ μένοι καὶ ἐπιστρέφοι, μὴ προέρχοιτο δέ, πῶς τὸ διακριθὲν ἐπιστρέφειν δυνατόν; τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστρέφον πᾶν ἀναλύοντι ἔοικεν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ διῄρηται κατ' οὐσίαν. λείπεται ἄρα καὶ μένειν πᾶν ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ καὶ προϊέναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς αὐτό. τοῦτο δέ μοι καὶ μόνον τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς θεολογίας φαίνεταί τινα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα ἔχειν συντέλειαν· ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς λόγος καὶ πρόεισιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀσωμάτως καὶ μένει ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὸν γεννήτορα, καὶ οὔτε προϊὼν διακέκριται κατὰ τὸν τῆς θεότητος λόγον οὔτε ἐπιστρέφων διέστη οὔτε μένων συγκέχυται κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν τελειότητα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἅπαξ ἐπιστροφῆς ἐμνήσθη, οὑτωσὶ δὲ τοῦτο διαιτητέον, ὡς πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἢ οὐσιωδῶς ἐπιστρέφει μόνον ἢ καὶ ζωτικῶς ἢ καὶ γνωστικῶς. ἢ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι μόνον ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας κέκτηται, ἢ τὸ ζῆν μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ καὶ γνωστικὴν ἐκεῖθεν ὑπεδέξατο δύναμιν. καθὸ μὲν οὖν ἔστι μόνον, οὐσιώδη ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιστροφήν· καθὸ δὲ καὶ ζῇ, ζωτικήν· καθὸ δὲ καὶ γινώσκει, γνωστικήν. ὡς γὰρ προῆλθεν ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἐπέστραπται, καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς ὥρισται τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πρόοδον μέτροις. τοῦτο 119 δὲ τὸ κεφάλαιον πρότερον μὲν τῷ Ἀρεοπαγίτῃ ∆ιονυσίῳ πλατύτερον διερμήνευται, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τῷ Λυκογενεῖ Πρόκλῳ συλλογιστικῇ μεθόδῳ ἠκρίβωται. Τὸ δὲ «πᾶν τὸ χωριστῶς μετεχόμενον διά τινος ἀχωρίστου δυνάμεως, ἣν ἐνδίδωσι, τῷ μετέχοντι πάρεστι», τῷ αὐτῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἀπεφασμένον, ἔστι μὲν οὗ ἀληθές ἐστι κατὰ τὰς ἡμέτερας δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις, ἔστι δὲ οὗ ψεύδεται· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦ λόγου ἑνώσεως πρόδρ[ομος] προέρχεται ἔλλαμψις ἑτοιμάζουσα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ πρώτου φωτός, οὐδὲ ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς λόγος ἀγνοεῖ, ψυχῆς δὲ καὶ σώματος οὐκ οἶδε μεσότητας, οὐκ ἀχωρίστους ἐντελεχείας, οὐ φυσικὰς ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποστάσεις, οὐ δοξαστικὰς ζωάς, οὐκ ὀρεκτικάς, οὐδὲ ἀλόγου ψυχῆς ὑπόστασιν ἰδιάζουσαν. διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ μέρους μὲν δέχομαι τὸ Πρόκλειον τουτὶ κεφάλαιον, ἐκ μέρους δὲ ἀποπέμπομαι. Μεμάντευται δέ μοι καὶ τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου ἡ ἔννοια. «πάντων» γάρ φησι «τῶν ἐκ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας ὑποστάντων προϋπάρχει καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία»· πεπερασμένας μὲν γὰρ οὔσας καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων λογίων μεμάθηκα καὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ τὰς ἀπειρίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πεπερασμένοις καὶ ἀπείροις ἔγνωκα, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν χωριστὰ ὧν ταῦτα λέγεται οὔπω συνείληφα, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ φύσιν ἔχει ὑποστῆναι ταῦτα καθ' ἑαυτά. Τὸ δὲ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ («καὶ» γάρ φησιν «ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν νοερῶς, ὅπου δὲ ζωτικῶς, ὅπου δὲ οὐσιωδῶς») ὡς φιλοσόφου ἐννοίας ἐχόμενον ἀποδέχομαι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἡμετέροις λογίοις οὔτε ψευδῶς οὔτε ἀληθῶς ἔχον λυμαίνεται. Τὸ δὲ «πᾶς μερικὸς νοῦς μετέχει τῆς ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ πρωτίστης ἑνάδος διά τε τοῦ ὅλου νοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ὁμοταγοῦς αὐτῷ μερικῆς ἑνάδος, καὶ πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ τοῦ ὅλου μετέχει νοῦ διά τε τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ νοῦ, καὶ πᾶσα σώματος μερικοῦ φύσις μετέχει τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς διά τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως καὶ τῆς μερικῆς ψυχῆς» οὐ προσίεμαι· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖς