A Treatise on Nature and Grace, against Pelagius
Chapter 1 [I.]—The Occasion of Publishing This Work What God’s Righteousness is.
Chapter 3 [III.]—Nature Was Created Sound and Whole It Was Afterwards Corrupted by Sin.
Chapter 5 [V.]—It Was a Matter of Justice that All Should Be Condemned.
Chapter 6 [VI.]—The Pelagians Have Very Strong and Active Minds.
Chapter 8.—A Distinction Drawn by Pelagius Between the Possible and Actual.
Chapter 9 [VIII.]—Even They Who Were Not Able to Be Justified are Condemned.
Chapter 11 [X.]—Grace Subtly Acknowledged by Pelagius.
Chapter 13 [XII.]—The Scope and Purpose of the Law’s Threatenings “Perfect Wayfarers.”
Chapter 14 [XIII.]—Refutation of Pelagius.
Chapter 15 [XIV.]—Not Everything [of Doctrinal Truth] is Written in Scripture in So Many Words.
Chapter 16 [XV.]—Pelagius Corrupts a Passage of the Apostle James by Adding a Note of Interrogation.
Chapter 17 [XVI.]—Explanation of This Text Continued.
Chapter 18 [XVII.]—Who May Be Said to Be in the Flesh.
Chapter 19.—Sins of Ignorance To Whom Wisdom is Given by God on Their Requesting It.
Chapter 20 [XVIII.]—What Prayer Pelagius Would Admit to Be Necessary.
Chapter 21 [XIX.]—Pelagius Denies that Human Nature Has Been Depraved or Corrupted by Sin.
Chapter 22 [XX.]—How Our Nature Could Be Vitiated by Sin, Even Though It Be Not a Substance.
Chapter 23 [XXI.]—Adam Delivered by the Mercy of Christ.
Chapter 24 [XXII.]—Sin and the Penalty of Sin the Same.
Chapter 26 [XXIV.]—Christ Died of His Own Power and Choice.
Chapter 27.—Even Evils, Through God’s Mercy, are of Use.
Chapter 30 [XXVII.]—Sin is Removed by Sin.
Chapter 32 [XXVIII.]—God Forsakes Us to Some Extent that We May Not Grow Proud.
Chapter 33 [XXIX.]—Not Every Sin is Pride. How Pride is the Commencement of Every Sin.
Chapter 34 [XXX.]—A Man’s Sin is His Own, But He Needs Grace for His Cure.
Chapter 37 [XXXIII.]—Being Wholly Without Sin Does Not Put Man on an Equality with God.
Chapter 39.—Pelagius Glorifies God as Creator at the Expense of God as Saviour.
Chapter 41.—Whether Holy Men Have Died Without Sin.
Chapter 43 [XXXVII.]—Why Scripture Has Not Mentioned the Sins of All.
Chapter 44.—Pelagius Argues that Abel Was Sinless.
Chapter 46 [XXXIX.]—Shall We Follow Scripture, or Add to Its Declarations?
Chapter 47 [XL.]—For What Pelagius Thought that Christ is Necessary to Us.
Chapter 48 [XLI.]—How the Term “All” Is to Be Understood.
Chapter 50 [XLIII.]—God Commands No Impossibilities.
Chapter 52.—The Whole Discussion is About Grace.
Chapter 53 [XLV.]—Pelagius Distinguishes Between a Power and Its Use.
Chapter 54 [XLVI.]—There is No Incompatibility Between Necessity and Free Will.
Chapter 55 [XLVII.]—The Same Continued.
Chapter 56 [XLVIII.]—The Assistance of Grace in a Perfect Nature.
Chapter 58 [L.]—Even Pious and God-Fearing Men Resist Grace.
Chapter 59 [LI.]—In What Sense Pelagius Attributed to God’s Grace the Capacity of Not Sinning.
Chapter 60 [LII.]—Pelagius Admits “Contrary Flesh” In the Unbaptized.
Chapter 61 [LIII.]—Paul Asserts that the Flesh is Contrary Even in the Baptized.
Chapter 63 [LIV.]—Does God Create Contraries?
Chapter 64.—Pelagius’ Admission as Regards the Unbaptized, Fatal.
Chapter 65 [LV.]—“This Body of Death,” So Called from Its Defect, Not from Its Substance.
Chapter 66.—The Works, Not the Substance, of the “Flesh” Opposed to the “Spirit.”
Chapter 67 [LVII.]—Who May Be Said to Be Under the Law.
Chapter 68 [LVIII.]—Despite the Devil, Man May, by God’s Help, Be Perfected.
Chapter 69 [LIX.]—Pelagius Puts Nature in the Place of Grace.
Chapter 70 [LX.]—Whether Any Man is Without Sin in This Life.
Chapter 72 [LXI.]—Hilary. The Pure in Heart Blessed. The Doing and Perfecting of Righteousness.
Chapter 73.—He Meets Pelagius with Another Passage from Hilary.
Chapter 75.—Augustin Adduces in Reply Some Other Passages of Ambrose.
Chapter 76 [LXIV.]—John of Constantinople.
Chapter 79 [LXVI.]—A Certain Necessity of Sinning.
Chapter 80 [LXVII.]—Augustin Himself. Two Methods Whereby Sins, Like Diseases, are Guarded Against.
Chapter 81.—Augustin Quotes Himself on Free Will.
Chapter 82 [LXVIII.]—How to Exhort Men to Faith, Repentance, and Advancement.
Chapter 83 [LXIX.]—God Enjoins No Impossibility, Because All Things are Possible and Easy to Love.
Chapter 84 [LXX.]—The Degrees of Love are Also Degrees of Holiness.
Chapter 63 [LIV.]—Does God Create Contraries?
He next endeavours, by much quotation from the apostle, about which there is no controversy, to show “that the flesh is often mentioned by him in such a manner as proves him to mean not the substance, but the works of the flesh.” What is this to the point? The defects of the flesh are contrary to the will of man; his nature is not accused; but a Physician is wanted for its defects. What signifies his question, “Who made man’s spirit?” and his own answer thereto, “God, without a doubt?” Again he asks, “Who created the flesh?” and again answers, “The same God, I suppose.” And yet a third question, “Is the God good who created both?” and the third answer, “Nobody doubts it.” Once more a question, “Are not both good, since the good Creator made them?” and its answer, “It must be confessed that they are.” And then follows his conclusion: “If, therefore, both the spirit is good, and the flesh is good, as made by the good Creator, how can it be that the two good things should be contrary to one another?” I need not say that the whole of this reasoning would be upset if one were to ask him, “Who made heat and cold?” and he were to say in answer, “God, without a doubt.” I do not ask the string of questions. Let him determine himself whether these conditions of climate may either be said to be not good, or else whether they do not seem to be contrary to each other. Here he will probably object, “These are not substances, but the qualities of substances.” Very true, it is so. But still they are natural qualities, and undoubtedly belong to God’s creation; and substances, indeed, are not said to be contrary to each other in themselves, but in their qualities, as water and fire. What if it be so too with flesh and spirit? We do not affirm it to be so; but, in order to show that his argument terminates in a conclusion which does not necessarily follow, we have said so much as this. For it is quite possible for contraries not to be reciprocally opposed to each other, but rather by mutual action to temper health and render it good; just as, in our body, dryness and moisture, cold and heat,—in the tempering of which altogether consists our bodily health. The fact, however, that “the flesh is contrary to the Spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would,”158 Gal. v. 17. is a defect, not nature. The Physician’s grace must be sought, and their controversy must end.
CAPUT LIV.
63. Dialogismus. Deinde multis verbis Apostoli conatur ostendere, unde non est controversia, «quod caro ab illo ita saepe «nominetur, ut velit intelligi, non substantiam, sed opera carnis.» Quid hoc ad rem? Vitia carnis contraria sunt voluntati hominis: non natura accusatur; 0278 sed vitiis medicus quaeritur. Quid est quod interrogat, «Quis fecit homini spiritum?» et respondet sibi, «Sine dubio Deus.» Et item interrogat, «Carnem quis creavit?» itemque respondet, «Idem, credo, Deus.» Interrogat tertio, «Bonus est qui utrumque creavit Deus?» respondet, «Nulli dubium est.» Adhuc interrogat, «Et utrumque quod bonus auctor creavit, bonum est?» et ad hoc respondet, «Confitendum est.» Deinde concludit, «Si igitur et spiritus bonus est, et caro bona, ut a bono auctore condita; qui fieri potest ut duo bona possint sibi esse contraria?» Omitto dicere quia tota hujus ratiocinatio turbaretur, si quis ab eo quaereret, Aestum et frigus quis fecit? responderet enim, Sine dubio Deus. Non ego multa interrogo: ipse concludat, utrum aut ista possint dici non bona, aut non appareant inter se esse contraria. Hic forte dicit, «Qualitates sunt istae substantiarum, non substantiae.» Ita est, verum est; sed qualitates naturales, et ad Dei creaturam sine dubio pertinentes: substantiae quippe non per se ipsas, sed per suas qualitates, sicut aqua et ignis, dicuntur sibi esse contrariae. Quid, si ita sunt caro et spiritus? quod quidem non affirmamus; sed ut ratiocinationem ejus non necessaria illatione conclusam ostenderemus, hoc diximus. Possunt enim et contraria non invicem adversari, sed ex alterutro temperari et bonam valetudinem reddere: sicut in corpore siccitas et humiditas, frigus et calor, quorum omnium temperatione bona corporalis valetudo consistit. Sed quod contraria est caro spiritui, ut non ea quae volumus faciamus; vitium est, non natura: gratia medicinalis quaeratur, et controversia finiatur.
64. Duo quippe ista bona, a bono Deo condita, quomodo contra hujus ratiocinationem in non baptizatis hominibus possunt sibi esse contraria? An et hoc eum dixisse poenitebit, quod affectu aliquo fidei christianae locutus est? Cum enim dixit, «Qui fieri potest ut cuicumque jam baptizato sit caro contraria;» significavit non baptizatis carnem posse esse contrariam. Nam cur addidit, «jam baptizato;» cum posset etiam hoc non addito dicere, «Qui fieri potest ut cuicumque sit caro contraria:» atque ad hoc probandum subjicere illam ratiocinationem suam, quia utrumque bonum est a bono conditum, et ideo non potest inter se esse contrarium? Si ergo non baptizati, quibus certe fatetur carnem esse contrariam, suis illum interrogationibus urgeant et dicant, Quis fecit homini spiritum? iste respondebit Deus. Itemque illi, Carnem quis creavit? respondet iste, Idem, credo, Deus. Illi tertio, Bonus est qui utrumque creavit Deus? et iste, Nulli dubium est. Atque illi unum quod restat inquirant, Et utrumque quod bonus auctor creavit bonum est? iste fatebitur. Tunc illi eum suo gladio jugulabunt inferentes conclusionem ejus et dicentes: Si igitur spiritus bonus, et caro bona, ut a bono auctore condita, qui fieri potest ut duo bona sibi possint esse contraria? Hic forte ille respondebit: Date veniam, quia non debui dicere, cuicumque baptizato carnem 0279 non posse esse contrariam, ut hoc modo vobis non baptizatis contrariam confiterer; sed sine ulla exceptione dicere debui, carnem nulli esse contrariam. Ecce quo se ipse compingit; ecce quae loquitur, qui non vult clamare cum Apostolo, Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus? Gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum. «Sed cur,» inquit, «clamem, jam baptizatus in Christo? Illi hoc clament, qui nondum tale beneficium perceperunt, quorum in se voces figurabat Apostolus: si tamen vel hoc dicunt.» Sed naturae ista defensio, nec illos hac voce exclamare permittit. Neque enim in baptizatis natura est, et in non baptizatis natura non est. Aut si vel in illis vitiata esse conceditur, ut non sine causa clament, Infelix homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus? eisque subveniatur in eo quod sequitur, Gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum: concedatur jam tandem aliquando humanam medico Christo indigere naturam.