Chapter 58

The act of the one had and of the one having, as that of the arms and the armed or that of the wearer and the worn, is called a habit. In the second place, habits are adventitious acts which are stable, whether physical or spiritual. Such would be physical, as heat in heated things, or spiritual, as knowledge. Thirdly, habit is that which one does not yet have, but for having which one does have a suitability. And this is the first meaning of being in potency. Fourthly, there is the natural quality or habit, as the heat of the fire and the dream of the sleeper. And this is the second meaning of being in potency and the first meaning of being in act, for the fire can burn but actually does not. Fifthly, habit is the perfect act, as with the sight which is now seeing and the heat which is now heating.

Privation is the absence of the habit. Thus, the privation of arms or clothing is opposed to the first meaning of habit. To the second meaning of habit is opposed the absence of extrinsic habits, as when the object which has been heated becomes cold. Opposed to the third meaning is the absence of that which the genus definitely does not have naturally, as we say that, while the child has a suitability for music, the fig tree definitely has not. Thus, the fig tree suffers a privation, because the genus of plants does not have any suitability for music. However, some one of the species may not have the suitability which the genus has. Thus, the animal has the suitability for seeing, but the mole, which is a species of animal, does not. Opposed to the fourth meaning of habit is the absence of habitual potency. And to the fifth is opposed the absence of the perfect act, or of the power, whether active or passive, and this is what we spoke of above as the opposition of opposites by privation and habit. This last has the three following characteristics: that what it is natural to have is not had at all, but is completely absent; that it is not had, when it is natural to have it; and that it is not had, where it is natural to have it. For example, we do not say that the stone is blind, for it is not of its nature to have the habit of sight. Neither do we say that the newly bom puppy is blind, nor the new born child toothless, because is not of their nature to have these at this particular time. Neither do we say that the foot is blind, because it is not of the nature of the animal to have the habit of sight in its foot. So, when it is natural for one to have in these three ways, yet one does not, then this is called privation.

[45] {Περὶ ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως.} Ἕξις λέγεται ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἐχομένου καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ὡς τοῦ ὅπλου καὶ τοῦ ὡπλισμένου ἤγουν τοῦ ἐνδύοντος καὶ τοῦ ἐνδυομένου: _δεύτερον αἱ ἐπείσακτοι ἐνέργειαι μόνιμοι οὖσαι εἴτε φυσικαὶ εἴτε ψυχικαί: καὶ φυσικαὶ μὲν ὡς ἡ θερμότης ἐν τοῖς θερμαινομένοις, ψυχικαὶ δὲ ὡς ἐπιστήμη: _τρίτον, ὅπερ οὔπω μὲν ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ ἐπιτηδειότητα δέξασθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει: _τέταρτον ἡ φυσικὴ ποιότης ἤγουν φυσικὴ ἕξις ὡς ἡ θερμότης τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ καθεύδοντος ἡ ὄψις, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει, δύναται γὰρ καίειν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐ καίει, πρῶτον δὲ σημαινόμενον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ: _πέμπτον ὡς ἡ τελικὴ ἐνέργεια ὡς ἡ ὅρασις ἡ ἤδη ὁρῶσα καὶ ἡ θερμότης ἡ ἤδη θερμαίνουσα. Στέρησις δὲ τῆς ἕξεως ἀποβολή. Ἀντίκειται οὖν τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ σημαινομένῳ τῆς ἕξεως ἡ στέρησις τοῦ ὅπλου ἤγουν τοῦ ἐνδύματος, _τῷ δὲ δευτέρῳ ἡ ἀποβολὴ τῶν ἐπεισάκτων ἕξεων, ὅτε τὸ θερμανθὲν ψυχρανθῇ: _ τῷ τρίτῳ, ὅπερ οὐδὲ ὅλως πέφυκεν ἔχειν τὸ γένος, ὡς λέγομεν ἔχειν ἐπιτηδειότητα τὸ βρέφος πρὸς μουσικήν, τὴν δὲ συκῆν οὐδαμῶς. Ἐστέρηται οὖν ἡ συκῆ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γένος τῶν φυτῶν οὐκ ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα δέξασθαι μουσικήν. Καὶ ὅπερ τὸ μὲν γένος ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα, τὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἔχει: τὸ γὰρ ζῷον ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα ὁρᾶν, ὁ δὲ ἀσπάλαξ εἶδος ὢν τοῦ ζῴου οὐκ ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα τοῦ ὁρᾶν: _τῷ δὲ τετάρτῳ ἡ ἀποβολὴ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς καθ' ἕξιν: _τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ ἡ ἀποβολὴ τῆς τελικῆς ἐνεργείας, ὅπερ ἀνωτέρω εἴρηκε τὴν κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσιν ἤγουν τῆς δυνάμεως εἴτε τῆς ποιητικῆς εἴτε τῆς παθητικῆς: αὕτη δὲ χαρακτηρίζεται τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις, ὅπερ πέφυκεν ἔχειν οὐδὲ ὅλως δὲ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τελείως ἐστέρηται, καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν, καὶ ἔνθα πέφυκεν ἔχειν. Οἷον τὸν λίθον οὐ λέγομεν εἶναι τυφλόν, οὐ πέφυκε γὰρ ἔχειν ἕξιν ὁράσεως: οὐδὲ τὸν ἀρτιγέννητον κύνα λέγομεν εἶναι τυφλὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀρτιγέννητον βρέφος νωδόν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ πεφύκασι κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἔχειν: οὐδὲ τὸν πόδα λέγομεν τυφλόν, οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ποδὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ὁράσεως. Ὅτε οὖν κατὰ τὰ τρία ταῦτα πέφυκεν ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἔχει, λέγεται στέρησις.