The Fount of Knowledge I: The Philosophical Chapters

 Preface

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 4 (variant)

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 6 (variant)

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapters 9-10 (variants)

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 The term subject is taken in two ways: as subject of existence and as subject of predication. We have a subject of existence in such a case as that of

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 Chapter 31

 Chapter 32

 Chapter 33

 Chapter 34

 Chapter 35

 Chapter 36

 Chapter 37

 Chapter 38

 Chapter 39

 Chapter 40

 Chapter 41

 Chapter 42

 Chapter 43

 Chapter 44

 Chapter 45

 Chapter 46

 Substance, then, is a most general genus. The body is a species of substance, and genus of the animate. The animate is a species of body, and genus of

 Chapter 48

 Chapter 49

 Chapter 50

 Chapter 51

 Chapter 52

 Chapter 53

 Chapter 54

 Chapter 55

 Chapter 56

 Chapter 57

 Chapter 58

 Chapter 59

 Chapter 60

 Chapter 61

 Chapter 62

 Chapter 63

 Chapter 64

 Chapter 65

 Chapter 67 [!]

 Chapter 66 [!]

 Chapter 68

 Explanation of Expressions

Chapter 59

There are four distinct meanings of the term prior. Of these, the most proper is the prior in time. In the case of animate beings, this is properly called 'elder’ and with inanimate beings ‘older, but these terms are also used interchangeably, although improperly.

The second meaning is that of prior in nature. A thing having this kind of priority is implied in the positing of that to which it is prior, but its positing does not imply the other; when it is removed, the other is removed with it, but the removal of the other does not imply its removal. For example, the animal is prior to man. For, when there is an animal, although man is an animal, there will not necessarily be a man. But, if there is no man, there may still be an animal, because the horse and the dog are also animals. And if there is a man, there will necessarily be an animal, because man is an animal. If, however, there is no animal, then there will be no man at all, nor horse either, nor dog, nor anything else of the sort, because these are animals. (Thus far what concerns the second meaning.)

The third is that of prior in order, as for example, when we say that a comes first and b second, and that then come the syllables and then the whole phrases.

The fourth is that of prior in dignity, as when we say that the bishop comes first and then the priest. Some, however, reject this sense, because it is possible for the first in order to be posterior in dignity.

The fifth is as when we speak of the cause and the caused. Thus Socrates is prior to the picture of himself, because he is causative of his own picture. The father, too, is prior to and greater than the son, because the father is causative of the son, in so far as the son is begotten of the father. It is for this reason that the blessed Gregory took in this sense what was said by our Lord in the Gospels, namely, ‘the Father is greater than I.

Others add a priority in purpose, as, for example, the wall is prior to its foundations. However, this reduces to the fourth sense, which is that of priority in dignity. For, in this case, what is prior in intention is actually posterior. There are, moreover, as many kinds of posterior as there are of prior. Prior and posterior, and more and less, do not belong to the equivocal terms, but to those which are derivative.

[46] {Περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου.} Τὸ δὲ πρότερον διαιρεῖται εἰς τέσσαρα σημαινόμενα. Καὶ κυριώτατόν ἐστι τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον. Λέγεται δὲ κυρίως ἐπὶ μὲν ἐμψύχων τὸ πρεσβύτερον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων τὸ παλαιότερον: καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἀντ' ἀλλήλων λαμβάνονται. _δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει πρότερον, ὅπερ συνεισφέρεται μέν, οὐ συνεισφέρει δέ, καὶ συναναιρεῖ καὶ οὐ συναναιρεῖται ὡς τὸ ζῷον πρότερον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: ζῴου γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται, ζῷον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἀνθρώπου δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἔσται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἵππος γὰρ καὶ ὁ κύων ζῷά εἰσι: καὶ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος πάντως ἔσται ζῷον, ζῷον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ζῴου δὲ ὄντος οὐ πάντως ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἴσως ἵππος, κύων: καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ζῷά εἰσι. _τρίτον τὸ κατὰ τάξιν, ὥσπερ φαμὲν πρῶτον τὸ « α », δεύτερον τὸ « β », εἶτα τὰ συλλάβια, εἶτα αἱ ψῆφοι. _τέταρτον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, ὥς φαμεν: πρῶτον ἐπίσκοπος, εἶτα πρεσβύτερος. Ἐκβάλλουσι δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τινές: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον κατὰ τάξιν ὕστερον εἶναι κατ' ἀξίαν. _ πέμπτον, ὥς φαμεν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατόν, ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης πρότερος τῆς ἰδίας εἰκόνος: αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιος τῆς ἰδίας εἰκόνος. Καὶ ὁ πατὴρ πρότερος καὶ μείζων τοῦ υἱοῦ: ὁ γὰρ πατήρ ἐστιν αἴτιος τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς γεννᾶται. Διὸ καὶ ὁ μακάριος Γρηγόριος κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον ἔλαβε τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς εὐαγγελίοις ῥηθέν: «Ὁ πατήρ μου μείζων μού ἐστιν.» Ἄλλοι δὲ προστιθέασι τὸ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, ὡς πρότερον τῶν θεμελίων τὸν τοῖχον. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀνάγεται ὑπὸ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον, τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν: τὸ γὰρ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ πρότερον, τοῦτο τῷ πράγματι ὕστερον. Ὁσαχῶς δὲ τὸ πρότερον, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. Τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὔκ εἰσι τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀφ' ἑνός.