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the principle of the opposition of the begotten to the unbegotten, and that the distinguishing marks of the begotten substance are contrary to those observed in the 1.1.515 unbegotten nature. For if they were to say the same things, the difference of the nature of the subjects will no longer be established through the identity of the things observed. For of things that are different, one must suppose that their characteristics are also entirely different, but as many things as are the same according to the principle of their substance, are characterized, of course, by the same signs. If then they attest the same things also for the Only-begotten, they conceive no difference concerning the subject, as has been said. 1.1.516 But if they should persist in their blasphemous arguments and should construct the difference of nature in the distinction between the begotten and the unbegotten, it is entirely easy to see what appears from the consequence, that, according to the opposition of the names, and the nature signified by the names being considered contrary to itself, it is absolutely necessary for the things observed in each to be carried to the opposite, so that the opposites of the things said of the Father are applied to the Only-begotten, the opposites of divinity, holiness, goodness, incorruptibility, eternity, and whatever else represents to us the God over all through pious thoughts; so that one considers all the repulsive things, and the things contrasted with each of the things conceived as better, to be properties of the begotten substance. 1.1.517 But for the sake of clarity, we must spend more time on this topic. Just as with the hot and the cold, being opposite by nature (let fire and ice be supposed for the argument, each being that which the other is not) also the things that appear as properties of each of these are in every way different from one another (for coldness is the property of ice, and heat of fire), so, if according to the opposition in the names of the unbegotten and the begotten, the nature indicated by the names also were to stand in opposition, it is not possible for the powers of things naturally contrary to be similar to each other, just as it is not possible for coldness to be in fire nor for heating to occur in ice. 1.1.518 If, therefore, goodness is conceived in the unbegotten substance, and the unbegotten stands apart, as they say, in the principle of its nature from the begotten, then the property of the unbegotten will also in every way stand apart from what is proper to the begotten; so that if in that one there is goodness, in this one is conceived that which is opposite to the good. And so for us, through these wise dogmatists, Manes will live again, setting up the nature of evil in opposition to the good and teaching as dogma, by the otherness of the substances, the opposition in their powers. 1.1.519 But if I must speak with boldness, holding nothing back, 1.1.519 Manes would reasonably be considered more pardonable than these, whom they say was the first to venture upon the doctrines of the Manichaeans and name the heresy after himself. I say these things, as if someone between a viper and an asp were to choose the more humane one; but nevertheless, since even among beasts there is a judgment of the worse, do not their doctrines, when examined, show that those men are more tolerable than these? 1.1.520 For the one thought he was defending the cause of good things, in that no cause of evils took its origin from him, and for this reason he attached the cause of all things reckoned as worse to another, separate principle, as if making a defense on behalf of the God of all, since it was not holy to blame the source of good things also for the irrational transgressions, not understanding, out of faint-heartedness, that it was possible neither to suppose God to be the creator of evils nor to imagine any other unoriginated thing 1.1.521 besides God. Concerning which things there is much to say, and it would not be for the present occasion. And the reason we have mentioned these things is that that man thought it necessary to separate the origin of evil from the God of all, but these men construct this outrageous 1.1.522 blasphemy against the Son, one even more grievous than those things. For they teach as dogma the nature of evils in a way similar to them, through the opposition according to substance

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λόγον τῆς τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀντιθέσεως καὶ τὰ γνωριστικὰ σημεῖα τῆς γεννητῆς οὐσίας ὑπεναντίως ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιθεωρουμένοις τῇ 1.1.515 ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει. εἰ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγοιεν, οὐκέτι τὸ ἑτε ροῖον τῆς τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσεως διὰ τῆς ταὐτότητος τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων συστήσεται. τῶν γὰρ ἑτεροίως ἐχόντων ἕτερα χρὴ πάντως εἶναι καὶ τὰ γνωρίσματα οἴεσθαι, ὅσα δὲ ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας ἔχει, τοῖς αὐτοῖς δηλαδὴ σημείοις χαρακτηρίζεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τῷ μονογενεῖ προσμαρτυροῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν, καθὼς εἴρηται, 1.1.516 περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῖς βλα σφήμοις ἐπιμένοιεν λόγοις καὶ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῆς φύσεως ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου κατασκευά ζοιεν, εὔκολον συνιδεῖν πάντως τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἀνα φαινόμενον, ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀντίθεσιν καὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένων ὑπεναντίως ἔχειν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν νομισθείσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὰ ἐπι θεωρούμενα ἑκατέροις πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον διενεχθῆναι, ὥστε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς λεγομένων τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῷ μονογενεῖ ἐφαρμόζεσθαι, θεότητος ἁγιασμοῦ ἀγαθότητος ἀφθαρσίας ἀϊδιότητος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸν διὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἡμῖν νοημάτων παρίστησιν· ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπεμ φαίνοντα καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ὑπειλημμένων ἀντιδιαστελλόμενα τῆς γεννητῆς ἴδια νομίζειν οὐσίας εἶναι. 1.1.517 Σαφηνείας δὲ χάριν προσδιατριπτέον ἡμῖν ἐστι τῷ τόπῳ. ὥσπερ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ ἐναντίοις οὖσι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν (ὑποκείσθω δὲ τῷ λόγῳ πῦρ τε καὶ κρύσταλλος, ἐκεῖνο ἑκάτερον ὂν ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον) καὶ τὰ ἰδίως ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ἐπιφαινόμενα παρηλλαγμένως ἔχει πάντως πρὸς ἄλληλα (ἴδιον γὰρ τοῦ μὲν κρυστάλλου ἡ ψῦξις, τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς ἡ θερμότης), οὕτως εἴπερ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὀνό μασιν ἐναντίωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου καὶ γεννητοῦ καὶ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων δηλουμένη φύσις πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον δια σταίη, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπεναν τίων ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι, ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε ἐν πυρὶ τὴν ψύξιν οὔτε ἐν κρυστάλλῳ γενέσθαι τὴν πύρωσιν. 1.1.518 εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ οὐσίᾳ ἡ ἀγαθότης νοεῖται, διέστηκε δέ, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὴν γεννητὴν ἡ ἀγέννητος, συνδιαστήσεται πάντως καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὸ ἴδιον ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ γεννητὸν ἰδιάζοντος· ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τούτῳ νοεῖσθαι τὸ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν διὰ τῶν σοφῶν τού των δογματιστῶν πάλιν ὁ Μάνης ἀναβιώσεται, τὴν τῆς κακίας φύσιν ἀντιπαρεξάγων τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑτερότητι δογματίζων τὸ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτῶν ἀντικεί μενον. 1.1.519 Εἰ δὲ χρὴ μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενον μετὰ παρρησίας 1.1.519 εἰπεῖν, συγγνωστότερος τούτων ὁ Μάνης εἰκότως ἂν εἶναι νομίζοιτο, ὃν πρῶτόν φασι τοῖς δόγμασι τῶν Μανιχαίων ἐπιτολμήσαντα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατονομάσαι τὴν αἵρεσιν. λέγω δὲ ταῦτα, ὡς ἂν εἴ τις ἐχίδνης καὶ ἀσπίδος τὴν φιλαν θρωποτέραν ἐκλέγοιτο· πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ ἐν θη ρίοις τοῦ χείρονος κρίσις, οὐχὶ τούτων ἐκείνους ἀνεκτοτέ 1.1.520 ρους εἶναι δοκιμαζόμενα τὰ δόγματα δείκνυσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ συναγορεύειν ᾤετο τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίῳ, ὡς οὐδεμιᾶς κακῶν αἰτίας ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβούσης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ἰδιάζουσαν τῶν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀριθμουμένων πάντων τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνῆψεν οἷον ἀπολογού μενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων, ὡς οὐκ εὐαγὲς ὂν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πηγὴν καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον πλημμελουμένων ἐπαι τιᾶσθαι, οὐ συνιεὶς ὑπὸ μικροψυχίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἦν μήτε κακῶν δημιουργὸν τὸν θεὸν οἴεσθαι μήτε ἄλλο τι ἄναρχον 1.1.521 παρὰ τὸν θεὸν φαντασθῆναι. περὶ ὧν πολὺς ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἂν εἴη καιροῦ. καὶ οὗ χάριν τῶν εἰρη μένων ἐμνήσθημεν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀφιστᾶν ᾤετο δεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων τὴν τῆς κακίας ἀρχήν, οὗτοι δὲ κἀ κείνων χαλεπωτέραν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν ἔκτοπον ταύτην 1.1.522 κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ βλασφημίαν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ κακῶν τὴν φύσιν παραπλησίως ἐκείνοις διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐναντιότητος δογματίζουσιν