MONOLOGIUM

 PREFACE.

 CHAPTER I.

 CHAPTER II.

 CHAPTER III.

 CHAPTER IV.

 CHAPTER V.

 CHAPTER VI.

 CHAPTER VII.

 CHAPTER VIII.

 CHAPTER IX.

 CHAPTER X.

 CHAPTER XI.

 CHAPTER XII.

 CHAPTER XIII.

 CHAPTER XIV.

 CHAPTER XV.

 CHAPTER XVI.

 CHAPTER XVII.

 CHAPTER XVIII.

 CHAPTER XIX.

 CHAPTER XX.

 CHAPTER XXI.

 CHAPTER XXII.

 CHAPTER XXIII.

 CHAPTER XXIV.

 CHAPTER XXV.

 CHAPTER XXVI.

 CHAPTER XXVII.

 CHAPTER XXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXIX.

 CHAPTER XXX.

 CHAPTER XXXI.

 CHAPTER XXXII.

 CHAPTER XXXIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIV.

 CHAPTER XXXV.

 CHAPTER XXXVI.

 CHAPTER XXXVII.

 CHAPTER XXXVIII.

 CHAPTER XXXIX.

 CHAPTER XL.

 CHAPTER XLI.

 CHAPTER XLII.

 CHAPTER XLIII.

 CHAPTER XLIV.

 CHAPTER XLV.

 CHAPTER XLVI.

 CHAPTER XLVII.

 CHAPTER XLVIII.

 CHAPTER XLIX.

 CHAPTER L.

 CHAPTER LI.

 CHAPTER LII.

 CHAPTER LIII.

 CHAPTER LIV.

 CHAPTER LV.

 CHAPTER LVI.

 CHAPTER LVII.

 CHAPTER LVIII.

 CHAPTER LIX.

 CHAPTER LX.

 CHAPTER LXI.

 CHAPTER LXII.

 CHAPTER LXIII.

 CHAPTER LXIV.

 CHAPTER LXV.

 CHAPTER LXVI.

 CHAPTER LXVII.

 CHAPTER LXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXIX.

 CHAPTER LXX.

 CHAPTER LXXI.

 CHAPTER LXXII.

 CHAPTER LXXIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIV.

 CHAPTER LXXV.

 CHAPTER LXXVI.

 CHAPTER LXXVII.

 CHAPTER LXXVIII.

 CHAPTER LXXIX.

CHAPTER LXIV.

Though this truth is inexplicable, it demands belief.

IT seems to me that the mystery of so sublime a subject transcends all the vision of the human intellect126. And for that reason I think it best to refrain from the attempt to explain how this thing is. For it is my opinion that one who is investigating an incomprehensible object ought to be satisfied if this reasoning shall have brought him far enough to recognise that this object most certainly exists; nor ought assured belief to be the less readily given to these truths which are declared to be such by cogent proofs, and without the contradiction of any other reason, if, because of the incomprehensibility of their own natural sublimity, they do not admit of explanation.

But what is so incomprehensible, so ineffable, as that which is above all things? Hence, if these truths, which have thus far been debated in connection with the supreme Being, have been declared on cogent grounds, even though they cannot be so examined by the human intellect as to be capable of explanation in words, their assured certainty is not therefore shaken. For, if a consideration, such as that above, rationally comprehends that it is incomprehensible in what way supreme Wisdom knows its creatures, of which we necessarily know so many; who shall explain how it knows and expresses itself, of which nothing or scarcely anything can be known by man? Hence, if it is not by virtue of the self-expression of this Wisdom that the Father begets and the Son is begotten, who shall tell his generation?