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by some chance it sometimes happens that their prophecy is both useless and harmful. Hear, then, what he says word for word: 4.3.1 3. FROM THE WORKS OF DIOGENIANUS; THAT THEIR DIVINATION IS INCONSISTENT AND LARGELY FALSE AND THAT USELESS AND HARMFUL IS THE ACCORDING TO

THEM PROPHECY "He brings forward also another proof in the aforementioned book of the following sort. For he says that the prophecies of the seers would not be true, unless all things were contained by fate. And this itself is full of great foolishness; for it is as if it were evident that all the prophecies of the so-called seers come true, or as if it would be more readily granted by anyone that all things happen according to fate, and not as if this itself would similarly be called false, since clear evidence shows the contrary, I mean that not all things foretold come to pass, 4.3.2 but rather most of them do not. Thus has Chrysippus presented the proof to us, establishing each point by means of the other. For he wishes to show that all things happen according to fate from the existence of divination, but he could not prove the existence of divination in any other way, unless he first assumes that all things 4.3.3 happen according to fate. What worse method of proof than this could there be? For the fact that some of the things which the seers foretell evidently come to pass would not be a sign that divination is a science, but that the outcomes happen to coincide with the predictions by chance; which indicates to us no 4.3.4 science at all. For we would not call an archer skillful who once hit the target but missed many times, nor a physician who kills the majority of those treated by him, but was once able to save one; nor, in general, do we call it a science which does not succeed in all or at least most 4.3.5 of its proper tasks. And that the so-called seers fail in most things, the whole life of men would be a witness, and these men themselves who profess the art of divination, not helping themselves through this art in the needs of life, but sometimes using their own judgment and the counsel and cooperation of those considered to have experience in each of their 4.3.6 affairs. But concerning the inconsistency of this thing which we have decided to call divination, we shall treat more fully in other places, setting forth what Epicurus also thought about this. But for now we shall add this much to what has been said, that for the so-called seers to be right sometimes in their predictions would not be the work of science, but of a chance cause; for we who have distinguished for ourselves the clear concepts arranged under each name have decided to call it the work of chance, not when one never hits the mark, but when one does not always, nor for the most part, nor as from science, hit it, even if one sometimes does. Then, even if it were true by hypothesis that divination is observant and predictive of all future things, it would thus be inferred that all things are according to fate, yet its utility and benefit to life could never be shown, for which reason Chrysippus seems especially 4.3.7 to praise divination. For what benefit was it to us to learn beforehand the unpleasant things that will certainly be, which it would not even be possible to guard against? For how could anyone guard against things that happen by fate? So that divination is of no benefit to us, but rather it would even be a cause of some evil, causing men to grieve beforehand in vain over difficulties revealed to be coming 4.3.8 by necessity. For no one will say that the foretelling of future goods provides an equal gladness in turn, since man is not so constituted by nature as to rejoice in expected goods

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συντυχίας ποτέ τινα συμβαίνει ὅτι τε ἄχρηστος αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιβλαβὴς ἡ πρόρρησις. ἄκουε δ' οὖν ἅ φησιν κατὰ λέξιν· 4.3.1 γʹ. ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ∆ΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΑΝΟΥ· ΟΤΙ ΑΣΥΣΤΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ Η ΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΨΕΥ∆ΟΜΕΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΤΙ ΑΧΡΗΣΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΒΛΑΒΗΣ Η ΚΑΤ'

ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΡΡΗΣΙΣ «Φέρει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν ἐν τῷ προειρημένῳ βιβλίῳ τοιαύτην τινά. μὴ γὰρ ἂν τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρήσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναί φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιείχοντο. ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ πολλῆς εὐηθείας μεστόν ἐστιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐναργοῦς ὄντος τοῦ πάσας ἀποβαίνειν τὰς τῶν καλουμένων μάντεων προρρήσεις ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπό τινος τούτου συγχωρηθέντος, τοῦ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, καὶ οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἂν ψευδοῦς ῥηθέντος καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ πάντα ἀποβαίνειν τὰ προαγορευθέντα, 4.3.2 μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν, ἡ ἐνάργεια δείκνυσιν. οὕτω τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἡμῖν Χρύσιππος κεκόμικεν, δι' ἀλλήλων κατασκευάζων ἑκάτερα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐκ τοῦ μαντικὴν εἶναι δεικνύναι βούλεται, τὸ δὲ εἶναι μαντικὴν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποδεῖξαι δύναιτο, εἰ μὴ προλάβοι τὸ πάντα 4.3.3 συμβαίνειν καθ' εἱμαρμένην. ποῖος δ' ἂν μοχθηρότερος τρόπος ἀποδείξεως τούτου γένοιτο; τὸ γὰρ ἀποβαίνειν τινὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ὧν προλέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις, οὐ τοῦ μαντικὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι σημεῖον ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχικῶς συμπίπτειν ταῖς προαγορεύσεσι συμφώνους τὰς ἐκβάσεις· ὅπερ οὐδεμίαν 4.3.4 ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην ὑποδείκνυσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοξότην ἂν εἴποιμεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἅπαξ ποτὲ τυχόντα τοῦ σκοποῦ, πολλάκις δὲ ἀποτυγχάνοντα, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸν τὸν ἀναιροῦντα τοὺς πλείους τῶν θεραπευομένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕνα δέ ποτε διασῶσαι δυνηθέντα· οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐπιστήμην λέγομεν τὴν μὴ πάντα ἢ τά γε πλεῖ4.3.5 στα τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων κατορθοῦσαν. ὅτι δὲ ἀποτυγχάνεται τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς καλουμένοις μάντεσιν, ὁ πᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος μάρτυς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὗτοί γε αὐτοὶ οἱ τὴν μαντικὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι τέχνην, οὐχὶ διὰ ταύτης ἑαυτοῖς βοηθοῦντες ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείαις, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ τε ἰδίᾳ ποτὲ χρώμενοι καὶ συμβουλῇ καὶ συνεργίᾳ τῶν ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν πραγμάτων ἐμπειρίαν κεκτῆ4.3.6 σθαι νενομισμένων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ συνεστάναι τοῦτο, ὃ προειλήφαμεν καλεῖν μαντικήν, ἐν ἄλλοις ἀποδώσομεν πληρέστερον, παρατιθέμενοι τὰ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ περὶ τούτου δοκοῦντα. νυνὶ δὲ τοσοῦτο τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσθήσομεν, ὅτι μάλιστα μὲν τὸ ἀληθεύειν ποτὲ τοὺς καλουμένους μάντεις ἐν ταῖς προαγορεύσεσιν οὐκ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ τυχικῆς αἰτίας ἔργον ἂν εἴη οὐ γὰρ τὸ μηδεπώποτε τοῦ προκειμένου τυγχάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ πάντοτε μηδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μηδ' ὡς ἐξ ἐπιστήμης, ὅταν τις καί ποτε τυγχάνῃ, τύχης ἔργον καλεῖν προειλήφαμεν οἱ διειληφότες τὰς ὑφ' ἕκαστον ὄνομα τεταγμένας ἐναργεῖς ἐννοίας ἑαυτῶν· ἔπειτα εἰ καὶ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἦν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὴ τὴν μαντικὴν τῶν μελλόντων ἁπάντων εἶναι θεωρητικήν τε καὶ προαγορευτικήν, τὸ μὲν πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι συνήγετο ἂν οὕτως, τὸ μέντοι χρειῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ βιωφελὲς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐδείκνυτο, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δοκεῖ Χρύσιππος 4.3.7 ὑμνεῖν τὴν μαντικήν. τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἡμῖν ἦν προμανθάνειν τὰ πάντως ἐσόμενα δυσχερῆ, ἃ οὐδὲ προφυλάξασθαι δυνατὸν ἂν εἴη; τὰ γὰρ καθ' εἱμαρμένην γινόμενα πῶς ἄν τις φυλάξασθαι δύναιτο; ὥστ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἡμῖν τῆς μαντικῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τινος ἐγίνετο ἂν αὕτη, τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι μάτην παρέχουσα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ ταῖς προδηλουμέναις δυσχερείαις κατ' 4.3.8 ἀνάγκην ἐσομέναις. οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἴσην πάλιν εὐφροσύνην παρέχειν τις φήσει τὴν τῶν ἐσομένων ἀγαθῶν προαγόρευσιν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ οὕτως πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς προσδοκωμένοις ἀγαθοῖς