14. [XIII.]—He Shows That, Even After the Synod of Palestine, Pelagius Held the Same Opinions as Cœlestius on the Subject of Original Sin.

I see, however, that it may be most justly demanded of me, that I do not defer my promised demonstration, that he actually entertains the same views as Cœlestius. In the first book of his more recent work, written in defence of free will (which work he mentions in the letter he despatched to Rome), he says: “Everything good, and everything evil, on account of which we are either laudable or blameworthy, is not born with us but done by us: for we are born not fully developed, but with a capacity for either conduct; and we are procreated as without virtue, so also without vice; and previous to the action of our own proper will, that alone is in man which God has formed.” Now you perceive that in these words of Pelagius, the dogma of both these men is contained, that infants are born without the contagion of any sin from Adam. It is therefore not astonishing that Cœlestius refused to condemn such as say that Adam’s sin injured only himself, and not the human race; and that infants are at their birth in the same state in which Adam was before the transgression. But it is very much to be wondered at, that Pelagius had the effrontery to anathematize these opinions. For if, as he alleges, “evil is not born with us, and we are procreated without fault, and the only thing in man previous to the action of his own will is what God has formed,” then of course the sin of Adam did only injure himself, inasmuch as it did not pass on to his offspring. For there is not any sin which is not an evil; or a sin that is not a fault; or else sin was created by God. But he says: “Evil is not born with us, and we are procreated without fault; and the only thing in men at their birth is what God has formed.” Now, since by this language he supposes it to be most true, that, according to the well-known sentence of his: “Adam’s sin was injurious to himself alone, and not to the human race,” why did Pelagius condemn this, if it were not for the purpose of deceiving his catholic judges? By parity of reasoning, it may also be argued: “If evil is not born with us, and if we are procreated without fault, and if the only thing found in man at the time of his birth is what God has formed,” it follows beyond a doubt that “infants at their birth are in the same condition that Adam was before the transgression,” in whom no evil or fault was inherent, and in whom that alone existed which God had formed. And yet Pelagius pronounced anathema on all those persons “who hold now, or have at any time held, that newborn babes are placed by their birth in the same state that Adam was in before the transgression,”—in other words, are without any evil, without any fault, having that only which God had formed. Now, why again did Pelagius condemn this tenet also, if it were not for the purpose of deceiving the catholic Synod, and saving himself from the condemnation of an heretical innovator?

CAPUT XIII.

14. Sed video de me jam justissime postulari, ut quod promisi, utrum et ipse hoc sentiat quod Coelestius, demonstrare non differam. In primo libro recentioris operis sui, quod scripsit pro Libero Arbitrio, cujus operis in litteris quas Romam misit, commemorationem fecit: «Omne,» inquit, «bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur: atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit.» Nempe cernitis in his Pelagii verbis, quod dogma contineatur amborum, de parvulis sine ullius vitii ex Adam contagione nascentibus. Non itaque mirum est, quod eos qui 0392 dicunt, «Adae peccatum ipsi soli obfuisse, et non generi humano; et infantes qui nascuntur, in eo statu esse, in quo fuit Adam ante praevaricationem,» Coelestius damnare noluit: sed multum mirum est, qua fronte Pelagius ista damnaverit. Si enim, sicut dicit, «malum non nobiscum oritur, et sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit;» profecto peccatum Adae ipsi soli obfuit, quia nullum in prolem transitum fecit. Non enim peccatum non est malum, aut peccatum non est vitium, aut peccatum Deus condidit. Dicit autem iste, «Malum non nobiscum oritur, et sine vitio procreamur, et hoc solum est in nascentibus, quod Deus condidit.» Ac per hoc cum «peccatum Adae ipsi soli obfuisse, non generi humano,» secundum istam suam sententiam, verissimum putet, cur hoc damnavit Pelagius, nisi ut judices catholici fallerentur? Similiter etiam illud dici potest: «Si malum non nobiscum oritur, et sine vitio procreamur, idque solum est in homine nascente, quod Deus condidit;» procul dubio, «qui nascuntur infantes, in eo statu sunt, in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem,» cui nullum malum vitiumque inerat, atque id solum in illo erat, quod Deus condiderat. Et tamen anathematizavit Pelagius, «qui tenent aut aliquando tenuerunt, in eo statu esse recentes ab ortu parvulos, in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem,» id est, sine ullo malo, sine ullo vitio, id solum habentes, quod Deus condidit. Utquid ergo et hoc damnavit Pelagius, nisi ut catholica synodus falleretur, ne novus haereticus damnaretur?