Chapter 65

A premise is either a sentence denying something of something—which is a negation, as, for example, ‘Socrates does not laugh; or it is a sentence affirming something of something—which is affirmation, as ‘Socrates does laugh. A term is that into which the premise is resolved. A syllogism is a discourse in which, when two things have been laid down, or acknowledged as true, a third necessarily follows from the things laid down, and follows because of them. Thus, because of the premises laid down, the conclusion is made without any need of external support. A question is an examination directed to acceptance or rejection, that is to say, denial or approval, with respect to knowledge and speculation. An interrogation is an inquiry requiring a detailed, or full answer. Now, the inquiry differs from the interrogation in that the answer to it is short, that is to say, is given in a few words, whereas the answer to the interrogation is long and requires many words. That which is in the form of question and answer is said to be in dialogue form. An objection is that which from the very beginning upsets the assertion, while antiparastasis accepts the assertion as true but shows how it has no bearing on the matter at hand. A lemma is that which has been taken for granted for the purpose of proving something. A heresy is a persuasion, or opinion, held by several persons in agreement with each other but at variance with others. A common opinion is one acknowledged by everyone, as, for example, that the sun exists. A thesis is an unusual assumption made by some person who is distinguished for his wisdom, or, in other words, it is an extraordinary theory like that of Parmenides, who held that being is one, or that of Heraclitus, who held that all things are in motion.

That is common which is observed in several or is predicated of several. There are four ways in which a thing is said to be common: (1) either as that which is divisible into parts, as land is parcelled out; (2) or as that which is indivisible but is used in common, as one slave or one horse belonging to two masters and now carrying out the orders of one and now those of the other; (3) or as that which becomes private by reservation but reverts again to the common use, as a seat at the theatre or a place at the baths; (4) or, finally, as to that which is indivisible, yet proposed to the same common consideration, as the voice of the herald. It is in this last sense that the expression ‘having a common name is to be understood with respect to equivocal and univocal terms. That is of itself which does not belong accidentally to something, but primarily and essentially, as does the rational to man. And that is universal which signifies several individual things, as do the terms man, animal, and substance. That is accidental which may or may not exist in something, as sickness or health in a man. The term to make is used in connection with the creative arts, where the thing done endures—as in the case of carpentry and the like. Thus, after the process of making the couch remains. On the other hand, the term to do is used in cases where the work does not endure, that is to say, where the result of the work does not endure, as in the case of fluteplaying and dancing. Speculation is that which we call thinking, the practice of astronomy and geometry, and so on.

Correct speech exhibits two kinds of excogitation (emvoioc). Thus there is that which is, as it were, a certain extra thinking out and consideration by which the general concept and unanalyzed knowledge of things are unfolded and made fully clear. Such is the case when that which to the senses appears simple is by careful investigation discovered to be manifold and varied. Man, for example, appears to be simple, but by excogitation he is discovered to be twofold—made up of a body and a soul. The other kind is that which, through a combination of the sensitive and imaginative faculties, from things which exist makes up and imagines things which do not and produces a figment of thought. Such is the concoction of fabulous centaurs, sirens, and tragelaphs. For this kind has taken parts of wholes and, quite freely and arbitrarily composing something else from these parts, has in thought and speech given form to things never seen in reality and substance. Then, by taking on material form, also, it has produced idols. And this is called simple excogitation.

(When one predicates the things contained in something of. the thing contained, we have redundance. For example, both the animal and the biped are included in man, and in Socrates both the cultivated and the white. If, then, one should predicate these of man or Socrates and say that man is a two-footed animal or that Socrates is something white and cultivated, he would be talking redundantly by saying the same thing several times over. This is redundance, because these things are contained in man and in Socrates, so that by mentioning the latter one also reveals the former.

Nearness is a relation, and so is fondness, that is to say, friendship, and so is possession, and participation, and connection. Furthermore, we call relation that connection, habitude, and disposition to which and such a thing which is expressed by ‘whither, ‘whence, and ‘where. It must still further be known that among four men there are six relations: that of the first to the other three, which makes three relations; that of the second to the last two, which makes five; and that of the third to the last one. Thus, it turns out that the four have six relations. And among five men there are ten relations,)

A union is brought about in various ways. Thus, it may be by mixture, as in the case of several kinds of flour being put together and mixed. Or it may be by welding, as with copper and lead; or by joining, as with stones and wood; or by fusion, as with molten materials like wax, pitch, and the like, and as with molten metals like gold and silver and such; or by mingling, as with liquids such as wine and water, or wine and honey. It may be by coalescence, as in the case of things which have been separated and then put back together again—for example, a brand taken from a fire and then put back.

Union by composition is the mutual association together of the parts without detriment to any of them, as in the case of the soul and the body. This is what some have called a blending together, that is to say, a knitting together. One must know, however, that while some of the Fathers did not accept the term blending in connection with the Mystery of Christ, union by composition was acceptable to them all. This union which is by composition is the hypostatic union. That thing which subsists of two natures is one hypostaticaUy. And again, that is one hypostatically which is perceived to be of two things but in one person. Still again, the union is hypostatic when the nature joins with another hypostasis.

Blending is an opposition of bodies and a mutual combination of qualities. And again, blending is an intimate union of bodies with an intermingling of their qualities. Blending is the concurrence of substances of different sorts accompanied by the interpenetration of the qualities associated with them.

That which is by apposition is also a union, and it is like that which is by joining.

Again, a union is apparent when one assumes the appearance of another and in his stead proffers the statements of this other about himself. A union may also be relative, as is that of a friend to a friend. And Nestorius thought up still other kinds of union—such, I mean, as those according to dignity, and equality in honor, and identity of will, and good pleasure, and the bearing of the same name.

It must further be known that in the hypostatic union the spiritual things are united to those things which can receive them, as are those which are corruptible. Once united, they remain unconfused, incorruptible, and unchangeable like things in juxtaposition. For such is the nature of spiritual things.

[51b] Πρότασίς ἐστι λόγος ἀποφαντικός τινος ἀπό τινος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις, οἷον ‘Σωκράτης οὐ γελᾷ’, ἤ τινος κατά τινος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατάφασις, ὡς ‘Σωκράτης γελᾷ’. Ὅρος ἐστίν, εἰς ὃν ἀναλύεται ἡ πρότασις. Συλλογισμός ἐστι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἤγουν ὁμολογηθέντων ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνει διὰ τὰ κείμενα: διὰ γὰρ τὰς κειμένας προτάσεις γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ δεόμενον ἔξωθεν ἑτέρας τινὸς συστάσεως. Πρόβλημά ἐστι θεώρημα συντεῖνον εἰς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἤγουν εἰς ἄρνησιν καὶ συγκατάθεσιν πρὸς γνῶσιν καὶ θεωρίαν. Πύσμα ἐστὶν ἐρώτημα διεξοδικὴν ἤγουν πλατεῖαν ἀπαιτοῦν ἀπόκρισιν: διαφέρει γὰρ ὁ ἐρωτηματικὸς λόγος τοῦ πυσματικοῦ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἐρωτηματικῷ ταχεῖα ἕπεται ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἤγουν δι' ὀλίγων, τῷ δὲ πυσματικῷ χρονία καὶ διὰ πολλῶν. Διαλογικὸς χαρακτὴρ λέγεται ὁ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν. Ἔνστασίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ προοιμίων ἀνατρέπουσα τὸν λόγον. Ἀντιπαράστασις δὲ ἡ δεχομένη μὲν τὸν λόγον ὡς ἀληθῆ, δεικνύουσα δέ, ὡς οὐδὲν βλάπτει πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. Λημμάτιόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ εἴληπται ὡς ὁμολογούμενον πρὸς κατασκευήν τινος. Αἵρεσίς ἐστι δόξα πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους μὲν συμφωνούντων, πρὸς ἄλλους δὲ διαφωνούντων. Κοινὴ δὲ ἔννοιά ἐστιν ἡ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογουμένη, οἷον ὅτι ἔστιν ἥλιος. Θέσις δέ ἐστι παράδοξος ὑπόληψίς τινος τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γνωρίμων ἤγουν ξένη ἔννοια ὡς ὁ Παρμενίδου λόγος, ὅτι ἓν ἔλεγε τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὡς ὁ Ἡρακλείτου, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται. Κοινόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρούμενον ἢ πολλῶν κατηγορούμενον. Κοινὸν δὲ τετραχῶς λέγεται: ἢ τὸ εἰς τὰ μέρη διαιρετὸν ὡς ἡ κληρουχουμένη γῆ: ἢ τὸ ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν χρήσει κοινῇ λαμβανόμενον, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ὡς εἷς δοῦλος ἢ εἷς ἵππος δύο δεσποτῶν ποτὲ μὲν τοῦδε, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦδε τὴν κέλευσιν πληρῶν: ἢ τὸ ἐν προκαταλήψει ἰδιοποιούμενον, εἰς δὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀναπεμπόμενον ὡς ὁ ἐν θεάτρῳ τόπος ἢ ἐν βαλανείῳ: ἢ τὸ ἀδιαιρέτως εἰς κοινὴν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν προβαλλόμενον ὡς ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ κήρυκος. Κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χρὴ ληφθῆναι ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων τὸ ‘ὧν ὄνομα κοινόν’. Καθ' αὑτό ἐστι τὸ πρώτως καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν προσόν τινι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς τὸ λογικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Καθόλου ἐστὶ τὸ πολλὰ σημαῖνον ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, οὐσία. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, ὃ δύναται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν. Ποιεῖν λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν τεχνῶν, ἐφ' ὧν διαμένει τὸ γινόμενον ὡς ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων: διαμένει γὰρ μετὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἡ κλίνη. Πράττειν λέγεται, ἐφ' ὧν οὐ διαμένει τὸ τέλος ἤγουν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς καὶ ὀρχηστικῆς. Θεωρεῖν δὲ λέγεται τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν, τὸ γεωμετρεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος διττὴν ἀποφαίνεται. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέννοιά τις καὶ ἐπενθύμησίς ἐστι τὴν ὁλοσχερῆ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἐξαπλοῦσα καὶ διασαφοῦσα θεωρίαν καὶ γνῶσιν, ὡς τὸ αἰσθήσει δόξαν εἶναι ἁπλοῦν τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ τοῦ νοῦ πολυμερές τε καὶ ποικίλον ἀναφαίνεσθαι, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁπλοῦς φαινόμενος τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διπλοῦς κατανοεῖται, ἐκ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συγκείμενος, ἡ δὲ ἀνάπλασμα διανοίας τυγχάνει κατὰ συμπλοκὴν αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα συντιθεῖσα καὶ δοξάζουσα. Τοιαύτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἱπποκενταύρων καὶ σειρήνων καὶ τραγελάφων μυθοπλαστία. Τῶν γὰρ ὅλων τὰ μέρη λαμβάνουσα καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο τι συντιθεῖσα κατὰ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν τε καὶ εὐκολίαν τὰ μηδαμῶς ἐν ὑποστάσει τε καὶ οὐσίᾳ θεωρούμενα ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀνέπλασεν, εἶτα καὶ ταῖς ὕλαις διατυπουμένη ἀνειδωλοποίησεν: αὕτη δὲ λέγεται ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια. Ἕνωσις γίνεται κατὰ διαφόρους τρόπους: ἢ γὰρ κατὰ φυρμὸν γίνεται ὡς ἐπὶ διαφόρων ἀλεύρων ἀναφυρομένων καὶ μιγνυμένων, _ἢ κατὰ κόλλησιν ὡς ἐπὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ μολύβδου, _ἢ κατὰ ἁρμονίαν ὡς ἐπὶ λίθων καὶ ξύλων, _ἢ κατὰ σύγχυσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τηκτῶν καὶ τῶν μεταλλικῶν, τηκτῶν μὲν κηροῦ καὶ πίσσης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, μεταλλικῶν δὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, _ἢ κατὰ ἀνάκρασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν, οἴνου τυχὸν καὶ ὕδατος, οἴνου καὶ μέλιτος. _Ἡ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἕνωσίς ἐστιν ἡ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν χωρὶς ἀφανισμοῦ περιχώρησις ὡς ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔχει καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἥντινα ἕνωσίν τινες σύγκρασιν ἐκάλεσαν ἢ συμφυΐαν. Ἰστέον δέ, ὥς τινες τῶν πατέρων τὸ τῆς κράσεως ὄνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου οὐ κατεδέξαντο, τὴν δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἕνωσιν ἅπαντες. Αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις ἡ κατὰ σύνθεσιν. Καθ' ὑπόστασιν μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐκ διαφόρων φύσεων ὑφεστὸς πρᾶγμα. Καὶ πάλιν καθ' ὑπόστασίν ἐστι τὸ ἐκ δύο μὲν πραγμάτων, ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ προσώπῳ. Καὶ ἔτι καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσίς ἐστιν ἡ ἑτέρᾳ ὑποστάσει προστρέχουσα φύσις. Κρᾶσις δέ ἐστι σωμάτων παράθεσις, ποιοτήτων ἀντέμβασις. Καὶ πάλιν κρᾶσίς ἐστιν οὐσιῶν ἀλλήλαις ἑτεροίων συνδρομὴ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὰς ποιοτήτων ἀντεμβολή. Κρᾶσίς ἐστι σύζευξις σωμάτων ἀντικιρνώντων ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ποιότητας. Ἔστιν ἕνωσις καὶ ἡ κατὰ παράθεσιν: ἔοικε δὲ τῇ κατὰ ἁρμονίαν. Πάλιν ἕνωσις λέγεται προσωπική, ὅταν τις τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑποδυόμενος πρόσωπον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ποιῆται λόγους, καὶ ἕνωσις σχετικὴ ὡς φίλου πρὸς φίλον. Ὁ δὲ Νεστόριος καὶ ἄλλας ἐπινοεῖ ἑνώσεις, κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν φημὶ καὶ ὁμοτιμίαν καὶ ταυτοβουλίαν καὶ εὐδοκίαν καὶ ὁμωνυμίαν. Δεῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἑνώσεως τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἑνοῦνται τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ δέξασθαι ὡς τὰ συνεφθαρμένα καὶ ἑνούμενα μένει ἀσύγχυτα καὶ ἀδιάφθορα καὶ ἀναλλοίωτα ὡς τὰ παρακείμενα: τοιαύτην γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν τὰ νοητά.